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Abstract
How might one describe early Christian exegesis? This question has given rise to a 
significant reassessment of patristic exegetical practice in recent decades, and the present thesis 
contributes to this reappraisal of patristic exegesis in two significant ways. First, this thesis 
attempts to move beyond the idea of exegesis to investigate the textual practices that serve as its
modus operandi. In order to accomplish this task, I develop the notion of "creative exegesis." I 
argue that creative exegesis permits one to pay attention in detail to two modes of archival 
thinking at the heart of the ancient exegetical enterprise: the grammatical archive, a repository 
of the textual practices learned from the grammarian, and the memorial archive, the 
constellations of textual memories from which textual meaning is constructed. Second, this 
thesis examines the textual practices of Clement of Alexandria, a figure whose exegesis has on 
the whole been neglected in modern scholarship. I argue that an assessment of Clement's 
creative exegesis reveals his deep commitment to scriptural interpretation as the foundation of 
theological inquiry, even in his works that cannot be explicitly labeled "exegetical." Clement 
employs various textual practices from the grammatical archive to read Scripture figurally, 
though he restricts the figural referents of Scripture to two mysteries, bound up in the 
incarnation of Christ and the knowledge of God. These mysteries are discovered in an act of 
rhetorical invention by reading Scripture for the constellations that frame its narrative. For 
Clement, the plot of Scripture—and the progression from Old Testament to New—is expressed 
under the dual constellations of "fear," by which God leads his people to faith, and "wisdom," 
through which God leads his people to the ultimate vision of the divine essence.
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1Introduction
But, just as most people even now believe, as it seems, that Mary ceased to be a virgin through 
the birth of her child, though this was not really the case—for some say that she was found by 
the midwife to be a virgin after her delivery;—so we find it to be with the Lord's Scriptures, 
which bring forth the truth and yet remain virgins, hiding within them the mysteries of the 
truth.1
Hans von Campenhausen once claimed that "no Father of the Church has been judged 
in so many different ways as Clement.”2 In his analysis, Campenhausen came to the conclusion 
that the late second century C.E. teacher Clement of Alexandria was "above all an exegete," who
"regarded the interpretation of the Bible as his real task and vocation."3 In the passage I quote 
above from book seven of his Stromateis, Clement provides the clearest glimpse of his own 
approach to Christian Scripture.4 Appealing to the cave narrative in the Protevangelium of James, 
Clement compares the Scriptures to Mary, the mother of Jesus. Although Mary had just given 
1Str. 7.93.7–94.1 (GCS 17:66)
2Hans von Campenhausen, The Fathers of the Greek Church, trans. Stanley Godman (New York: Pantheon, 
1959), 29.
3Campenhausen, Fathers of the Greek Church, 30.
4For a biographical account of Clement's life, as much as this is possible from the scant evidence, see 
André Méhat, Étude sur les ‘Stromates’ de Clément d’Alexandrie, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), 42–70; Eric Osborn, Clement 
of Alexandria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–27; Piotr Ashwin-Siejkowski, Clement of Alexandria: A 
Project of Christian Perfection, (London: T & T Clark, 2008), 19–38. From the vast literature on the "catechetical school" 
of Alexandria, see Gustave Bardy, “Aux Origines de l’École d’Alexandrie,” RSR 27 (1937): 65-90; Méhat, Étude sur les 
‘Stromates,’ 62–70; Robert L. Wilken, “Alexandria: A School for Training in Virtue,” in Schools of Thought in the Christian 
Tradition, ed. Patrick Henry (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 15-30; Ulrich Neymeyr, Die christlichen Lehrer im zweiten 
Jahrhundert: ihre Lehrtätigkeit, ihr Selbstverständnis und ihre Geschichte, (Leiden: Brill, 1989); Roelof van den Broek, “The 
Christian ‘School’ of Alexandria in the Second and Third Centuries,” in Centres of Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-
modern Europe and the Near East, eds. Jan Willem Drijvers and A. A. MacDonald (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 39-47; Annewies 
van den Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” HTR 90 (1997): 
59-87; and Alain Le Boulluec, “Aux origines, encore, de l’’école’ d’Alexandrie,” in Alexandrie antique et chrétienne: 
Clément et Origène, (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2012), 27-57.
1
birth, she was nevertheless discovered to be a virgin post partum, and Clement sees in this 
account a powerful analogy to the Scriptures. Although the Scriptures grant truth to the one 
who reads them, they "yet remain virgins, hiding within them the mysteries of truth." What 
does such a perspective say about Clement's understanding of Scripture and biblical exegesis? Is
he above all an exegete of Scripture? How do the Scriptures present truth and yet still hide away
its mysteries? And what are the mysteries of truth? The purpose of this study is to seek an 
answer to just such questions, in order to understand Clement's practice of scriptural exegesis. 
The only way to offer a compelling account of Clement's practice of exegesis and the 
theology that was shaped by this reading of Scripture is by attempting to understand the ways 
in which he adapts the technical terminology, tools, and concepts of ancient modes of reading. 
In order to accomplish this task, this study seeks to bring two conversations from the field of 
early Christian studies together. On the one hand, it aims to contribute to the burgeoning 
reassessment of patristic exegesis of the past few decades. I will argue in agreement with this 
scholarly reappraisal that Clement's exegesis, and that of all early Christian interpreters, is best 
viewed within the background of ancient Greco-Roman education. Although the terminology 
and techniques employed by exegetes varied, all ancient readers participated in a discourse first
learned in the grammatical and rhetorical schools. On the other hand, this study seeks to 
provide an account centered on Clement of Alexandria's distinct reading practices, and as a 
result, will interact with recent scholarly assessments of the Alexandrian teacher. Monographs 
that have focused on Clement's exegetical enterprise broadly are sparse, but the most 
compelling readings of Clement offer fruitful perspectives on the idea of his exegesis. 
Nevertheless, I will question some of the scholarly assumptions about Clement that tend to 
color our readings of his texts—most pointedly his understanding of Christian figural reading. 
Allow me to speak briefly by way of introduction to these two scholarly conversations.
As I mentioned earlier, in recent years many scholars have continued to assess the 
significant role that the ancient classroom, and especially grammatical and rhetorical training, 
played in the development of early Christian exegesis.5 The practices and techniques that 
5The most significant works in this reappraisal are Christoph Schäublin, Untersuchungen zu Methode und Herkunft
der antiochenischen Exegese, (Köln: P. Hanstein, 1974); Bernhard Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, (Basel: F. Reinhardt, 
1987); Frances M. Young, “The Rhetorical Schools and Their Influence on Patristic Exegesis,” in The Making of 
2
characterized the ancient classroom can be seen in the strategies of interpretation used by 
Christian readers. Nevertheless, there is a particular point often missed in this scholarship. 
While most scholars have rightly noted some of the techniques that these grammatical and 
rhetorical traditions have bequeathed to Christian readers, they have been content to describe 
the use of these tools in the literal exegesis of Scripture. Scholars have far less frequently pointed 
to the fact that these same tools of literary analysis are utilized in the construction of figural 
readings of Scripture.6 I contend, however, that we must account for the fact that, when early 
Christian readers turned to read the Bible figurally, they employed the very same tools of 
literary analysis that were used for reading a text in its literal sense. In my view, this feature of 
early Christian exegesis is often missed because scholars have been overly rigid in their 
portrayal of the distinct features of the grammatical and rhetorical tradition prior to its 
adoption in Christian exegesis, primarily stemming from the significance these works assign to 
the Art of Grammar by Dionysius Thrax.7 
In this study, I will argue that we must move beyond an examination of the idea of early 
Christian exegesis to an analysis of the practices of early Christian exegesis. The shades of 
difference between these two concepts may be slight, but a miscalculation of a single shade can
completely alter the colors of an entire image. I can best illustrate what I mean here by looking 
at a clear and brilliant comment on early Christian exegesis by David Dawson.
The overwhelming presumption of classical Christian figural reading, at least as it has 
Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed. Rowan Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
182-99; David Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992); Robert L. Wilken, “In Defense of Allegory,” Modern Theology 14 (1998): 197-212; Elizabeth A Clark, 
Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); David 
Dawson, Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); and 
Frances M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture, (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Press, 2002). More 
recent forays into this arena can be seen in the insightful works of Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul, the Corinthians, and the 
Birth of Christian Hermeneutics, Paul, Corinthians, and Hermeneutics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); 
and Peter W. Martens, Origen and Scripture: The Contours of the Exegetical Life, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). The 
arguments of Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), have been influential on my own thinking about the relationship between biblical exegesis and 
theological debate and development.
6One notable exception is Martens, Origen and Scripture, 63–66.
7This will be the claim for which I argue more extensively in chapter two.
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been characterized in the writings examined in this book, is that the Christian Bible is 
read Christianly when it is seen to depict the ongoing historical outworking of a divine intention to 
transform humanity over the course of time.  Moreover, Christian figural readers insist that the 
history of Israel, Jesus of Nazareth, his immediate followers, and the Church are all 
somehow ingredients in this overarching divine intention.  That intention and its outworking 
in history are regarded as alternately clear and obscure, reliable and unpredictable.  Figural readers turn to
the text of the Bible for clues and models useful for unraveling as much as they can of 
what they think they discern as the mysterious working of God in the lives of people 
over time.  What is always ultimately at stake is the reality and the proper 
characterization of a divine performance in the material world of space and time, a 
performance that defines the personal, social, ethical, and political obligations of 
Christians in the present, as well as their stance toward past and future.8
To be sure, I completely agree with Dawson's claims in the substance of this paragraph. 
Nevertheless, there are two significant points to consider from Dawson's comments, which I 
have italicized for easy reference. First, Dawson claims that the Christian Bible is read 
"Christianly" when the divine intention of human transformation over time is seen to be the 
framework for its narrative. This intention consists, as Dawson rightly says, of "the history of 
Israel, Jesus of Nazareth, his immediate followers, and the Church." What is just as significant, 
however, is what is left unsaid. How do these distinct aspects relate to one another within the 
outworking of this divine intention? Or, to put it in literary terms, how do the various texts, 
persons, and events of the Christian Bible relate to its whole? How is Israel to be understood in 
relation to Jesus of Nazareth and vice versa? The ways that early Christians put together the 
whole—itself a reading strategy learned from the grammarian—reflect some significant 
distinctions in early Christian exegesis as much as it displays similarities.9 
Such distinctions are magnified—but given to observation—in Dawson's astute 
sentence that claims the events that characterize the divine intention and its historical 
outworking are "alternately clear and obscure, reliable and unpredictable." Indeed, in this study,
I want to suggest that this is the very place that we can observe the function of grammatical 
reading practices in early Christian exegesis. I will argue that a recognition of the influence of 
8Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 216.
9Perhaps compare this with Dawson's earlier book that distinguishes the reading practices of four 
Alexandrian readers?
4
the grammatical and rhetorical traditions upon Christian exegesis may be satisfactory to explain
the idea of Christian exegesis, but we will only note its influence on the actual practice of 
exegesis when we see how readers employ their grammatical repertoires to clarify obscurities 
that permeate the texts they read.  it is the fact that these stages in the divine outworking in 
history, as they are depicted in the Scriptures, are not always clear and often obscure that 
provides the impetus for early Christian reading strategies. How does one clarify those events, 
figures, or texts that are obscure? 
Clement of Alexandria makes for an interesting specimen for investigation for two 
significant reasons. First, scholarly treatments focused broadly on Clement's exegetical 
endeavors are rare.10 To be sure, the works of Mondésert, Schneider, and Paget are helpful, and 
each contribute to our framework for understanding Clement's biblical exegesis. Mondésert for 
the first time provides a thorough account of the centrality of the Bible for Clement's 
theological reflection, suggesting that Clement's exegesis can be analyzed from five different 
senses: the historical sense, the doctrinal sense, the prophetic sense, the philosophical sense, 
and the mystical sense.11 Paget builds upon Mondésert's typology, emphasizing that for Clement
"the symbolic or hidden meaning of the OT" matters most.12 Indeed, though he notices a 
"surprisingly frequent" concern by Clement for a literal reading of Scripture, Paget nevertheless
claims that Clement "is not interested in the literal sense of the OT as a technical problem."13 
10The exceptions I shall note here are Claude Mondésert, Clément d’Alexandrie: Introduction à l’étude de sa pensée 
religieuse à partir de l’écriture, (Paris: Aubier, Éditions Montaigne, 1944); J. N. B. Carleton Paget, “The Christian Exegesis 
of the Old Testament in the Alexandrian Tradition,” in Hebrew Bible, Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation, Vol. 1: From 
the beginnings to the Middle Ages (until 1300), ed. Magne Sæbø (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 478-542; 
and Ulrich Schneider, Theologie als christliche Philosophie: Zur Bedeutung der biblischen Botschaft im Denken des Clemens von Alexandria, 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999).
11See Mondésert, Clément d’Alexandrie, esp. 153–63.
12Paget, “Christian Exegesis,” 494.
13Paget, “Christian Exegesis,” 494. I will argue below that the false dichotomies like this one by Paget are 
the very reasons that ancient readers like Origen are never considered in a holistic fashion in modern scholarship, 
but either as an figural reader or a literal scholar. For instance, on the one hand, the two most comprehensive 
monographs on Origen's biblical exegesis have predominantly focused on Origen's figural reading; see R. P. C. 
Hanson, Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen’s Interpretation of Scripture, (London: SCM Press, 1959);
and Henri de Lubac, Histoire et esprit: L’Intelligence de l’Écriture d’après Origène, (Paris: Aubier, 1950). For an English 
translation, see Henri de Lubac, History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture according to Origen, trans. A. E. Nash and J. 
Merriell (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007). On the other hand, Origen's literary scholarship was the primary 
5
Even still, a glance at all three works betrays the second justification for a focus on Clement's 
exegesis. All three of these studies are primarily concerned with what I have termed here as the 
idea of Clement's exegesis. That is, any extended discussion of textual practices—how Clement 
does things with Scripture—is lacking. But is this not the very substance of exegesis? What is 
exegesis if it is not a series of textual practices performed on (or with) an authoritative text as a
means of commenting on it?  And the most recent collection of essays on Clement's biblical 
exegesis is cut from the same cloth.14 
A number of the essays in Clement's Biblical Exegesis make insightful contributions to our 
understanding of Scripture in Clement's thought and milieu. Nevertheless, no single essay in 
the volume deals with the practices that Clement performs on or with the Scriptures. It is telling 
that, in the conclusion to her fine preface to the volume, Judith Kovacs summarizes the status 
quaestiones of Clement's exegesis—and presumably the raison d'être of the collection—by citing 
Mondésert's title approvingly. It is entirely appropriate and fitting "to describe Clement's 
thought 'à partir de l'Écriture'—on the basis of Scripture."15 But describing Clement's 
thought—the idea of his exegesis—is somewhat different than actually examining the textual 
practices that he employs within his theological reflection. And it is in this place that the 
present study seeks to make a contribution to research on Clement—an examination of the 
textual practices that form the substance of his exegesis.
Therefore, corresponding to the two broad conversations I reference earlier, there are 
two ways that one may approach this study. On the one hand, those readers who are most 
interested in my development of "creative exegesis," and why this is an appropriate term by 
which to describe the early Christian interpretation of the Bible in particular, may begin with 
focus of Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe. Yet, Neuschäfer is aware of the state of affairs in Origenian scholarship 
(which is, in my view, no better in scholarship on patristic exegesis more broadly), when he concludes his book 
by asking whether the pictures of "Origen the allegorist" and "Origen the scholar" could ever be reconciled 
(292).
14Veronika Cernušková, Judith L. Kovacs, and Jana Plátová, eds. Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second 
Colloquium on Clement Of Alexandria (Olomouc, May 29-31, 2014) (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
15Judith L. Kovacs, “Clement as Scriptural Exegete: Overview and History of Research,” in Clement’s Biblical 
Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement Of Alexandria (Olomouc, May 29-31, 2014), eds. Veronika Cernušková, 
Judith L. Kovacs, and Jana Plátová (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 37.
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Chapters 2 and 3, then proceed directly to Chapters 7 and 8. These four chapters form the two 
halves of understanding this concept in my thought. In the first two chapters, I emphasize the 
noun "exegesis." In Chapter 2, I begin with an argument that the traditional account of ancient 
grammatical interpretation has been portrayed too rigidly in disparate parts. This account often 
follows the presentation of grammar as it is found in the scholia to Dionysius Thrax's Art of 
Grammar, but the result is a less than holistic account of grammatical interpretation and its aims. 
I argue that we may remedy this shortcoming by understanding that every reading practice 
learned from the grammarian—whether applied to figural or literal ends—forms a 
grammatical archive that is intended to clarify the obscure elements of texts. Thus, all 
grammatical exegesis is in a significant sense a practice of commentary. Then, in Chapter 3, I 
offer extended examples of how a variety of tools and techniques from this grammatical 
archive were employed towards the aim of clarifying obscurity in antiquity. To emphasize that 
these practices were employed similarly for literal and figural ends, I provide examples from 
ancient literary scholars, like the Hellenistic Alexandrian Aristarchus of Samothrace, and also 
figural readers, like the Stoic interpreter Cornutus and the Derveni commentator. Regardless of 
whether the resolution of the textual obscurity is found in a literal or figural interpretation, the
ubiquitous use of these reading practices allow all these readers to discover what I term a 
textimmanent meaning.
In chapters 7 and 8, I turn attention to the adjective "creative." Chapter 7 investigates 
the metaphors for memory found in texts discussing literary composition. I argue that the 
metaphors of a treasury, bees, and digestion, seen in such authors as Plato and Seneca, are 
found throughout Clement's corpus, which provide us with evidence of a Christian 
incorporation of memory in the process of writing. The Christian use of memory, however, is 
not primarily psychological as it is in Aristotle's De memoria. Christians like Clement are more 
concerned with the role of memory in the process of meditation and composition. Thus, in 
Chapter 8, I compare Aristotle's conception of recollection—how memories are recalled—with 
Clement's own understanding. Though Clement retains the imagery of hunting and searching 
that are found in Aristotle's De memoria, this imagery is used in a way reminiscent of the 
locational recollection found in the Cicero and the Ad Herennium. For Clement, one's memories 
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are placed into a "memorial archive," a repository for recollecting texts or events gathered from
the entire Scriptures. Moreover, the Pauline building trope from 1 Corinthians 3 provides a 
scriptural precedent for understanding recollection as a creative discovery of textual meaning.
For those readers who are most interested in Clement of Alexandria's own practice of 
exegesis, this is the subject matter of Chapters 4–6 and Chapter 9. In Chapter 4, I argue that 
Clement's description of scriptural exegesis in book five of the Stromateis cannot be understood 
merely as an apology for figural interpretation. While I solidly agree that Clement does 
articulate a process for the figural reading of Scripture within these pages, I argue here that he 
actually circumscribes the potential of Scripture for figural meaning. Specifically, grounded in 
his grammatical archive, Clement restricts the figural referents of Scripture to two "mysteries." 
On the one hand, there are the prophetic realities fulfilled in the incarnation and ministry of 
Christ, and on the other hand, there are the mysteries contained in the higher knowledge of 
God's essence, which Paul refers to as "the depths of God" (1 Cor. 2:10). The bulk of Chapter 4 
refrains from identifying the particular practices and skills of the grammatical archive that 
Clement employs, in order to focus more broadly on his larger argument for figural 
interpretation. Chapters 5–6, then, zoom in from this forest to examine the trees. Chapter 5 
analyzes the tools from the grammatical archive that define the properties of Scripture qua text, 
and Chapter 6 examines those practices from the grammatical archive that Clement applies to 
the biblical text.
In Chapter 9, I turn to consider the question, what about those scriptural texts that are 
brought together for no obvious or apparent reason? How can we consider texts that appear to 
be commented on in an instance of imaginative use of Scripture? I argue that the Christian use 
of memory offers a solution to this dilemma. In particular, Clement forges a "memorial 
archive" where texts become gathering places for other texts and permit one to read Scripture 
under thematic constellations. By gathering disparate scriptural data under such constellations, 
Clement is able to articulate a path through Christian Scripture—his own creative rendition of 
the divine intention for which Dawson argued above—that accords with the figural potential 
he outlines in book five of the Stromateis. In fact, for Clement, the constellations of "fear" and 
"wisdom" not only provide him with a means for approaching the Scriptures, but they also 
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give him a process of organizing its knowledge. The constellation of fear organizes the working
of the Word as recorded in the Old Testament. When the Old Testament is read as a text 
containing commands and examples, Scripture reveals clearly that the Word uses fear to lead his
people to faith. Clement uses the constellation of wisdom, however, to argue that believers 
move beyond the fear by which they are initially educated to a wisdom that accompanies 
divine teaching. Thus, when the Old Testament is read as a prophetic text, it points to New 
Testament realities fulfilled in the incarnation and ministry of Christ and the knowledge of 
God. The Bible is therefore never a document intended to be read in one way or approached 
solely from one direction. On the contrary, it is always intended—at least for Clement—to 
reveal its truth and simultaneously remain virginal, hiding further mysteries for the astute and 
mature reader.16
16Cf. my comments in the epilogue on how we might use the concept of creative exegesis and its archival
thinking to understand other various ways that early Christian readers ordered the knowledge contained in the 
Scriptures. It is only in this larger project of examining the practices of multiple readers that we will reach a point 
to describe "patristic exegesis" as a phenomenon itself.
9
2Reading as "Creative Exegesis":
The Grammarian's Task
Let us begin at once the investigation against the grammarians, first of all since we are handed 
over to grammar almost since infancy or as soon as we are in nappies, and grammar is, as it 
were, a point of departure for learning the other studies; secondly, because it is the boldest of 
the sciences, practically promising the Sirens' promise. For those females knew that man is 
naturally fond of learning and that the desire for truth within his breast is great. So they 
promise not only to charm the men sailing past with divine songs, but also to teach them the 
truth. . . . So grammar, boasting of its practical work dealing with dialects, expert exposition, 
and critical recitation, in addition to its ability to elucidate by reason the details of myths and 
histories, creates a great longing for itself in those who hear its claims.1
The recent reappraisal of early Christian exegesis has rightly emphasized the role played
by the ancient grammatical and rhetorical traditions for reading the Bible. Yet, the majority of 
the insightful studies within this reassessment have argued that the textual practices learned 
first at the hands of the grammarians were employed by Christian readers to interpret the 
Scriptures in their literal sense. The result of this argument is that scholars have been unable or 
unwilling to analyze the figural interpretation of these early Christian exegetes according to the
textual practices that drive their readings. Exegesis, however, regardless of whether it is 
performed toward literal or figural ends, is always driven by textual practices—what one does 
with texts at hand. We cannot sever the techniques learned in the ancient classroom from the 
goal for which they are employed.
In this chapter, then, I will argue that the grammatical traditions to which this scholarly
reassessment of patristic exegesis points us is best viewed not as an atomistic project with 
sequential steps that must be followed. Rather, exegesis is itself a holistic project of 
commentary and interpretation focused on the clarification of a text's obscurity. Thus, I will 
1S. E., M 1.41–43 (LCL 382:24–27)
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argue throughout this chapter that the aim of literary analysis as learned in the schools of 
antiquity, and especially at the hands of the grammarian, was a holistic process of "creative 
exegesis."2 As we progress through the stages of this chapter, I will expand a working definition
of "creative exegesis" as I conceive of it, which will serve as the foundation for describing the 
practice of early Christian biblical interpretation throughout this project.
An Atomistic Understanding of Γραμματική
As I mentioned briefly in the introduction, many of the works in the recent reappraisal 
of patristic exegesis frequently display a common thread. These studies build their analyses on 
the grammatical framework provided by the Art of Grammar (τέχνη γραμματική) of Dionysius 
Thrax (c. 170–90 B.C.E.). In this text, Dionysius introduces the enterprise of γραμματική as 
follows:
Γραμματική is the experiential knowledge of the general usage of language by the 
2My use of the expression "creative exegesis" throughout this project is unique. As will become clear 
throughout the course of this study, I intentionally develop both words in this phrase. "Exegesis" specifically refers 
to the textual practices of interpretation learned in the ancient classroom, employed toward the clarification of 
obscurity, as I argue in this chapter. "Creative," on the other hand, refers to the role of memory and imagination in
the process of interpretation, which will be the specific subject matter of chapters 7–8. I will defer further 
discussion of this adjective to that point.
To be sure, one can occasionally come across previous scholarly uses of the term "creative exegesis," but 
none of them have developed the term as I do here. On the one hand, Jaap Mansfeld, Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled 
Before the Study of an Author, or a Text, (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 26, 155–61, uses "creative exegesis" to describe Galen's 
interpretation of the medical canon of Hippocrates. It is here that I first came across the expression, and I am 
grateful to Mansfeld for it. Nevertheless, while I will note some similarities between Clement and Galen in this 
study, it is important to call attention to the fact that Mansfeld's use of "creative exegesis" is solely focused on the 
clarification of what is unclear—an idea that I incorporate entirely into the word "exegesis." Mansfeld does not 
develop the term "creative" in any substantive way. On the other hand, one can find the expression "creative 
exegesis" in the recent essay of Piotr Ashwin-Siejkowski, “Clement of Alexandria’s Reception of the Gospel of John:
Context, Creative Exegesis, and Purpose,” in Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement Of 
Alexandria (Olomouc, May 29-31, 2014), eds. Veronika Cernušková, Judith L. Kovacs, and Jana Plátová (Leiden: Brill, 
2016), 259-76. For Ashwin-Siejkowski, "creative exegesis" seems to mean the collecting and reshaping act within 
Clement's interpretation, specifically as it pertains to (a) the philosophical tradition of Middle Platonism, (b) the 
theology and exegesis of Philo, and (c) the Christian Scriptures. Ashwin-Siejkowski never attempts to explain the 
concept of "creative exegesis," and he comes closest to defining this term when he suggests that the prologue to 
the Gospel of John and the gospel in its entirety "were subjects of his ongoing intellectual and spiritual reflection, 
not alienated from other materials such as Philo's commentaries on the Logos or the Middle Platonic notion of the
Logos, but as, in Clement's view, coherent notions." Of course, he notes, this "coherence, however, did not mean 
for Clement that all three sources were of the same value" (272). Thus, "creative exegesis" is the concept that 
Ashwin-Siejkowski suggests for the reshaping of these traditions in Clement's thought.
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poets and prose-writers. It has six parts: first, a skilled reading with due regard for 
proper pronunciation; second, an exposition of the inherent literary devices; third, a 
definition of common terms and narratives; fourth, the discovery of etymology; fifth, 
the consideration of analogies; and sixth, the judgment of the text, which is the finest 
part of this expertise.3
It is more than clear that, for Dionysius, the grammarian's chief task is the understanding and 
interpretation of literary texts. More particularly, the grammarian trained his students in the 
specific skills necessary for proper historical and literary analysis. Here, Dionysius claims that 
this analysis involves a skilled reading (ἀνάγνωσις ἐντριβὴς), attuned to such factors as 
pronunciation, literary devices, common terms and narratives that a poet uses, etymological 
constructions, and the presence of analogies, each of which leading to the highest of all 
activities, the critical judgment of the poem.4 In the scholia on Dionysius's handbook, this 
process of literary analysis is further refined to include four stages: correction (διόρθωσις), 
reading (ἀνάγνωσις), exposition (ἐξήγησις), and judgment (κρίσις).5 And it is this four stage 
presentation in particular that studies of early Christian exegesis have used as the foundation for
explorations in the Christian adaptation of grammar and rhetoric.
3Dionysius Thrax, Gram. §1 (GG I.1, 5.1–6.3). For a modern edition with French translation, see Jean 
Lallot, La Grammaire de Denys le Thrace, (Paris: CNRS, 1989). An English translation has been provided by Alan Kemp, 
“The Tekhne Grammatike of Dionysius Thrax: English Translation with Introduction and Notes,” in The History of 
Linguistics in the Classical Period, ed. Daniel J. Taylor (Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1987), 169-89. The distinction between 
γραμματική as "experiential knowledge" (ἐμπειρία) and "expertise" (τέχνη), which was frequently discussed in 
antiquity, is not crucial for my argument. On this question in relation to grammarians and Dionysius Thrax, see 
Robert H. Robins, “The Initial Sections of the Techne Grammatike,” in Ancient Grammar: Content and Context, eds. Pierre 
Swiggers and Alfons Wouters (Leuven: Peeters, 1996), 6–8; and David L. Blank, Sextus Empiricus: Against the Grammarians 
(Adversus Mathematicos I), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), xvii–xxxiv. Cf. S. E., M 1.57–90 (LCL 382:34–53).
4The discrepancies between Dionysius's introduction and the body of the treatise have drawn suspicion 
on the authenticity of the work as a whole, at least as it has been preserved. It is quite likely that what follows after
the introduction was composed at a later date, perhaps even as late as the third or fourth century C.E. But 
Dionysius' definition of γραμματική was copied by his younger contemporary Varro, and Sextus Empiricus quotes
both Dionysius's definition and the six-part division nearly three centuries later, even if it is to argue against 
grammatical expertise. Cf. S. E., M 1.57 (LCL 382:34–35). It seems most likely, then, that this initial section to 
Dionyisius's Τέχνη is indeed authentic to him. For an overview of the Τέχνη Γραμματική, including the issue of 
its integrity and authenticity, see Dirk M. Schenkeveld, “Scholarship and Grammar,” in La philologie grecque à l’époque 
hellénistique et romaine, ed. Franco Montanari (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1994), 263–69.
5Schol. D. T. (GG I.3, 10.7–9). Cf. H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. George Lamb (New 
York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 165–70.
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For instance, in her influential monograph Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian 
Culture, Frances Young offered her own attempt to clarify the influence that pagan grammatical 
and rhetorical education had on Christian exegesis.6 She focused most of her attention on the 
œuvre of Origen in the third century C.E., and the influence of the Dionysian scholia can be 
seen clearly. Young maintained an argument built on the four stages of interpretation presented 
in the scholia, even though she frequently speaks of these stages under Quintilian's famous 
twofold description of grammar as "methodical" and "historical."7 Thus, even her reading of 
Quintilian's description of γραμματική is given through this Dionysian lens. Correction and 
reading were "methodical" tasks; exposition and judgment were the domain of "historical" 
investigation. Regardless of the categorization, however, these tasks still, it is suggested, 
operated in stages, and one must progress one through the next, moving from the grammarian 
to the rhetor.  From Young's point of view, Quintilian's categories can obviously account for the
fourfold description of grammar that the Dionysian scholia present.8 And to be sure, if this is 
how one ought to view the grammatical and rhetorical traditions in antiquity, then Young is 
certainly right to claim that "the advent of Christian scholarship belongs to the early third 
century," with the work of Origen.9 
In reaching this conclusion, Young follows Bernard Neuschäfer's magisterial analysis of 
Origen's literal scholarship, Origenes als Philologe. Here, Neuschäfer also leans upon the fourfold 
depiction of Dionysius' understanding of the grammarian's task for his account of Origen's 
exegesis. Neuschäfer provides lengthy discussions of Origen's text-critical enterprise 
(διόρθωσις) and his techniques of literal exposition (ἐξήγησις) in accordance with the scheme
modeled in the scholia.10 In an effort to classify each facet of Origen's literary-critical 
6Young, Biblical Exegesis, 76–96.
7See Quintilian, Inst. 1.9.1 (LCL 124:208–09). 
8I certainly agree with Young that Quintilian's perspective is crucial, though I think its utility for the 
present discussion is best viewed in distinction to Dionysius' treatise. I will discuss this below. 
9Young, Biblical Exegesis, 82.
10Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, 35–36, admits that this philological model was not followed blindly. 
Rather, the scholia present the "old system of philology" (altes Lehrgebäude der Philologie), which served as an 
ideal model of subject areas that could be analyzed when interpreting a text. In a more recent reading of Origen as
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scholarship, these four stages of literary analysis become paramount for the structure of 
Neuschäfer's study. Unfortunately, in his reliance on the Dionysian scholia, Neuschäfer does not
seem to discern or explain a key facet of Origen's exegesis—his figural reading. Neuschäfer 
misses the forest in light of the trees, content to portray Origen's exegesis in an atomistic 
manner, such that the parts do not seem to cohere in any consistent whole. In fact, Neuschäfer 
recognizes this shortcoming. At the end of Origenes als Philologe, he admits that the impetus for his 
own study of Origen's exegesis was the preoccupation of earlier scholarship with Origen's 
figural reading to the detriment of his work as a philologist, and he ends with a crucial 
question that foregrounds this issue for our purposes. Neuschäfer asks whether the image of 
Origen the allegorist (painted by earlier scholarship) and that of Origen the philologist (which
he had painted) can ever be integrated into a single harmonious portrait. Or is it rather the case
that these two profiles of Origen's exegetical enterprise are mutually exclusive?11
For her part, Young characterizes nonliteral readings, like those she finds in Origen, and
the (supposed) more literal stance of the Antiochenes, as two distinct approaches to texts, 
deriving from the philosophical schools and the grammatical and rhetorical schools, 
respectively.12 And while she cautions that the line between rhetorical and philosophical 
exegete, Martens, Origen and Scripture, 41–66, follows Neuschäfer's framework of analyzing Origen's exegetical 
technique through the lens of the scholia on Dionysius' Τέχνη.
11Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, 292: "Jetzt, wo neben den allegorischen mit scharfen Konturen der 
philologische Bibelexeget Origenes tritt, stellt sich eine grundsätzliche Frage um so dringlicher: Stehen zwei Bilder
in einander ausschliessendem Gegesatz gegenüber, oder lassen sie sich als zwei Hälften verstehen, die harmonisch 
in ein einheitliches Gesamtbild zusammengefügt werden können?" My criticism of Neuschäfer is not that he is 
oblivious to this shortcoming; his conclusion suggests that this is not the case. Moreover, Neuschäfer does hint at 
the capability of the philological textual practices to speak to figural readings. See, for example, his reflections on 
Origen's prosopological exegesis with two dimensions of meaning (273–76) and Origen's desire to seek clarity 
from what is unclear (282–85). Nevertheless, Neuschäfer does not ask how such activities might be applicable 
both to literal and figural readings. 
Martens, Origen and Scripture, 63–66, also calls attention to this unfortunate shortcoming in Neuschäfer's 
study, and he seeks to establish the argument (rightly, in my view) that Origen's figural readings of Scripture flow 
as much from his philological practices as his literal readings do: "Ideal philologists pursued a broad education 
and cultivated a series of exegetical techniques with the intent of deciphering both the literal and the allegorical 
referents of a passage" (63, emphasis original). A full discussion of this correlation, however, was beyond the 
scope of Martens' study, and therefore, it occupies only three pages of Origen and Scripture. There still remains work to 
be done on the various ways that these two ideas are integrated into a coherent picture, not simply for Origen but 
also for a vast array of early Christian exegetes, including Clement of Alexandria.
12Young, Biblical Exegesis, 161–85, where she describes the difference in approach as "ikonic" mimesis over 
against the philosophical "symbolic" mimesis (191); cf. Young, “The Rhetorical Schools and Their Influence on 
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exegesis was thin, she nevertheless treats such topics as "allegory," "typology," and "theoria" in 
entirely separate chapters from her analysis of grammatical and rhetorical interpretation.13 
Young's portrayal of these grammatical activities are, however, much too clear-cut and neatly 
packaged. In my view, these areas—figural exegesis and the grammatical and rhetorical 
tradition—must be analyzed as a coherent whole. 
Both Young's and Neuschäfer's portrayals of the literary-critical analysis of early 
Christians depend upon a particular analysis of Dionysius' Art of Grammar that, in following the 
claims of the Dionysian scholia, describes the grammarian's task of literary analysis in four 
successive stages. But is this in fact the best way to describe the task of interpretation or the 
aims of grammatical and rhetorical education in antiquity? On the contrary, the grammatical 
tradition is much broader than can be seen by the atomistic portrayal of γραμματική that these
studies presuppose.
It is a significant point that, although Dionysius' definition of γραμματική was repeated
by his contemporary Varro, it does not seem to appear again until Sextus Empiricus quotes the 
Τέχνη in his refutation Against the Grammarians three centuries later.14 And though he cites 
Dionysius, Sextus prefers to describe γραμματική in quite different terms. First, Sextus grants 
that grammar is composed of three different tasks, a historical task (τὸ ἱστορικὸν), an expert 
task (τὸ τεχνικὸν), and a special task (τὸ ἰδιαίτερον). He then claims that each of these 
activities are composed of specific techniques:
Of these, the expert activity is that in which they make arrangements concerning the 
elements, the parts of a sentence, orthography, and Hellenism, and what follows from 
these. The historical task is where they teach about persons, for example, divine, 
human, and heroic, or explain about places such as mountains or rivers, or transmit 
traditions about fictions and myths or anything else of this kind. The special task is one 
through which they examine what concerns poets and writers, where the grammarians 
Patristic Exegesis.”. 
13See Young, Biblical Exegesis, 140–213. Ultimately, in her discussion of "method," Young articulates five 
kinds of literal reading (189), eight types of allegory (192), and even four categories of typology (201). Such 
broadening of the categories, I would argue, does not resolve the difficulties inherent in the allegory/typology 
contrast as much as complicate the problems.
14S. E., M 1.57 (LCL 382:34–35)
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explain what is unclearly said, judge the sound and the unsound, and sort the genuine 
from the spurious.15
Sextus clearly divides the grammarian's expertise into three distinct activities, but he 
specifically maintains that none of these "tasks" can be fully grasped without reference to the 
whole of the grammarian's activity. He says, "the expert and historical tasks of γραμματική and
the part concerning poetry and writings are each very much intertwined and mixed with the 
rest. In fact, the examination of the poets cannot occur without the expert and historical tasks, 
and each of these does not stand without being entangled with the others."16 This is not an 
entirely new presentation of γραμματική. A century earlier, Seneca had offered a similar 
depiction. He says, "The grammaticus occupies himself with attention to language, and if he 
wants to extend his study more broadly, he turns to history, or, if he would extend his range to 
the farthest limits, to poetry."17 Though Seneca does not emphasize the interdependence of the 
grammarian's tasks as Sextus will, one can easily see that he views the grammarian's activity as 
a whole when he criticizes the profession in toto for failing to inculcate virtue.18 Sextus and 
Seneca both furnish their descriptions of the grammarian's expertise in order to mount a 
refutation against it. 
Should we therefore anticipate that this holistic conception of γραμματική is only 
shared by those who would argue against it? On this point, it is striking to see the altogether 
similar description of γραμματική that Quintilian provides as one who is more sympathetic 
toward the grammarian than either Sextus or Seneca. In the Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian defines 
the practice of grammar concisely (cum brevissime) as "correct speaking and reading and the 
interpretation of the poets" (recte loquendi scientiam et poetarum enarrationem).19 These two activities are
15S. E., M 1.91–93 (LCL 382:52–55)
16S. E., M 1.94–95 (LCL 382:54–57). Of course, Sextus presents the coherence of the grammarian's task 
not as a tribute to γραμματική, but instead to ensure that, if he is successful at refuting one part, "the rest will also
be destroyed" (M 1.96).
17Seneca, Ep. 88.3 (LCL 76:350): Grammaticus circa curam sermonis versatur et, si latius evagari vult, 
circa historias, iam ut longissime fines suos proferat, circa carmina.
18Seneca, Ep. 88.2–4 (LCL 76:348–51)
19Quintilian, Inst. 1.4.2 (LCL 124:102–03). Here, I follow Rita Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation 
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elsewhere described by Quintilian as the methodical and historical tasks of the grammarian. 
But just as in Sextus and Seneca, Quintilian reflects on the interconnections between the 
techniques of γραμματική and its goal: interpretation and understanding. "The principles of 
writing are closely connected with those of speaking, correct reading is a prerequisite of 
interpretation, and judgment is involved in all of these."20 As Robert Kaster has noted, 
Quintilian here presents γραμματική as the "fundamentum of eloquence," the elements of which 
are far from insignificant for the purpose of the whole.21 It is clear then that Quintilian sees 
each task interdependently contributing to the interpretive goal of γραμματική.22 
So, how best may we conceive of this grammatical tradition? As portrayed by 
Quintilian, Seneca, and Sextus, γραμματική is best viewed as a single holistic discipline that 
emphasizes the interpretation of texts, heuristically composed of either two or three tasks. 
Moreover, its techniques of literary analysis, which are never employed independently from the
aim of textual understanding, are woven together finely in the hands of a capable 
grammarian.23 We must not miss this point. Whatever tools the grammarian applied to a text, 
his aim was never simply to identify literary devices, list the most common words in a given 
author, or discover the presence of etymologies. This atomistic portrayal of the grammarian's 
enterprise is where Dionysius' description falls short and is quite likely one of the reasons that 
it does not appear elsewhere. On the contrary, the grammarian's understanding of such 
technical details as the proper construction of sentences and his comprehension of the general 
in the Middle Ages: Academic Traditions and Vernacular Texts, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 12–13, and 
imply by my translation that Quintilian means both right speech and right reading in the single phrase recte loquendi.
Cf. Inst. 1.4.3 (LCL 124:102–05).
20Quintilian, Inst. 1.4.3 (LCL 124:102–05)
21Robert A. Kaster, Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 54–55. Cf. Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 12–13. See Quintilian, Inst. 1.4.5–6 
(LCL 124:104–07).
22Cf. F. H. Colson, “The Grammatical Chapters in Quintilian I. 4-8,” CQ 8 (1914): 33-47.
23Blank, Against the Grammarians, 148, is surely right that Sextus' purpose in emphasizing the 
interdependence of the three grammatical tasks is "to show why, as soon as one part has been destroyed, the rest 
are destroyed." Regardless of this purpose, Sextus' presentation of γραμματική does help one see the coherence of
each task in the grammarian's whole expertise.
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plot of the poet's narrative—tools of analysis that would ostensibly fall under Sextus' τὸ 
τεχνικὸν and τὸ ἱστορικὸν, respectively—are integrated into a common enterprise: the proper 
interpretation of a given text. One sells γραμματική short if he describes it as an enterprise that
is comprised of stages that are clearly adjudicated. Instead, the grammarian's expertise is better 
understood as a holistic enterprise of textual interpretation tout court, built upon a constellation 
of techniques and tools of literary and historical analysis. Thus, Ineke Sluiter provides a clear 
and simple definition of the grammarian: he is "an interpreter of someone else's work."24
To begin filling out our definition of γραμματική in antiquity, then, we may begin with
the clear implication of this section. The grammarian's task could not be described adequately 
by focusing on any one feature of his expertise. Though he was ostensibly concerned inter alia 
with issues of style, verbal usage, semantics, and syntax, this was not the grammarian's goal, 
the aim to which he taught his students to strive. That place was reserved for a holistic literary 
analysis. To emphasize the entire process of grammatical interpretation, then, I will use the 
term "creative exegesis." Permit me here, then, to offer a provisional definition of creative 
exegesis understood, as I have argued in this section, as the entire process of literary analysis:
Creative exegesis is the task of the grammarians to discover the intention of an author.
Before proceeding further, I do want to emphasize that I am certainly sympathetic to 
the growing body of scholarship, of which Young and Neuschäfer are only representative 
examples, emphasizing the influence of the grammatical and rhetorical traditions on early 
Christian exegesis. Nevertheless, its inability currently to analyze the influence of these school 
traditions apart from the atomistic divisions I outlined earlier severely limits its effectiveness. As
we have seen, this scholarship does often note the stark differences between literal and figural 
modes of reading, but it has no category in which to discuss the similarities between them. More
24Ineke Sluiter, “The Dialectics of Genre: Some Aspects of Secondary Literature and Genre in Antiquity,” in
Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons, and Society, eds. Mary Depew and Dirk Obbink (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), 202. Sluiter rightly suggests that the grammarian should be seen "in the tradition of commentators, 
with a specific competence in grammar and exegesis" (187). For a similar definition, see the insightful work of 
Gerald L. Bruns, Inventions: Writing, Textuality, and Understanding in Literary History, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1982), 56, who defines the grammarian as "the writer who dwells among tets and who is always discovering in 
them more things to say."
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specifically, we must attempt to relate the nonliteral interpretations prevalent in early Christian 
exegesis to the grammatical tools of literary analysis on which they also depend. In what way 
can the reading practices learned in the grammatical and rhetorical schools of antiquity 
account for the entirety of early Christian exegesis, both literal and figural? Thus, in the 
remainder of this chapter, I will argue that a broader conception of early Christian biblical 
interpretation—namely, "creative exegesis"—will account for the grammatical skills and 
techniques employed by both literal and figural readers of antiquity. 
Grammatical Exegesis and The Spectrum of Obscurity
As we saw earlier, Sextus claimed in his refutation Against the Grammarians that the 
grammarian's task was to utilize his expert and historical skills in order "to explain what was 
spoken unclearly" (τὰ ἀσαφῶς λεγόμενα ἐξηγοῦνται).25 Whether seeking to distinguish 
between written word and writer's intention or to choose between multiple significations of a 
polysemous word,26 both grammar and rhetoric sought to resolve the difficulties, 
contradictions, problems, and ambiguities that arose from written texts.27 The ultimate aim was
a suitable interpretation that led to a resolution of any obscurity, and the literary-critical tools 
learned in the schools were employed to achieve this end from the outset. It was perhaps the 
physician Galen of Pergamum that described this exegetical purposes most concretely: "The 
power (ἡ δύναμις) of exegesis (ἐξηγήσεως) is to make clear (σαφῆ) everything that is obscure 
25S. E., M 1.93 (LCL 382:54–55):
26This distinction between written word (scriptum) and intention (either voluntas or sententia) is particularly 
true of forensic rhetoric (interpretatio scripti). See Cicero, Inv. 2.40.116–51.154 (LCL 386:284–323); and Quintilian, 
Inst. 7.6–10 (LCL 126:264–97). For an early account of textual exegesis concerned with the polysemous nature of 
words, see Plato, Prt. 341A–B (LCL 165:190–91). We will return to each of these examples below.
27In order to preempt an obvious critique, one should discern from this statement that I am defining 
obscurity in a very general sense, covering terms that could easily be distinguished. It is perhaps helpful to 
consider that this understanding of "obscurity" aligns more clearly with the traditions of ancient literary criticism,
rather than ancient philosophical discussions on ambiguity. For the role of ambiguity in ancient philosophy, see 
Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Atherton discusses the 
understandings of ambiguity among various ancient disciplines (15–27), and she provides an extremely helpful 
appendix noting the varieties of lexical fallacies—the primary use of ambiguity in the grammatical and rhetorical 
tradition—as identified by Aristotle's De sophisticis elenchis  (505–06).
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(ἀσαφῆ) in these books."28 Thus, any attempt to articulate the role of the grammatical and 
rhetorical tradition in early Christian exegesis must consider this exegetical aim—namely, the 
clarification of what is obscure—for which these techniques and strategies were employed. In 
what follows, I want to suggest that a more fruitful account of the influence of the grammatical
and rhetorical traditions on early Christian exegesis lies in the idea of negotiating the spectrum 
between clarity and obscurity. An examination of the function of this spectrum in the grammatical 
traditions of antiquity will permit us to extend our working definition of creative exegesis.
 Clarifying Textual Obscurity
The aim of the reading practices taught by the γραμματικός was to address any 
difficulties arising from textual obscurity. As the grammarian approaches the text of another, 
any number of uncertainties could arise. The inherent nature of words can provide ambiguity. 
After all, words can signify more than one thing, and words may signify in more than one way. 
For this reason, obscurity, and even apparent contradictions, can be seen both narrowly, at the 
level of lexeme and sentence, and broadly, at the level of text as a whole. The work of the 
grammarian, then, is a hermeneutical endeavor from the outset, seeking to determine the most 
appropriate interpretation for any given text.29 For interpreters trained in the schools of 
antiquity, obscurity and unclarity must be contextualized, both historically and textually. Only 
then can one begin to offer an exegetical disambiguation, a creative exegesis that—to use 
Sextus' words—explains what is unclear. 
From his earliest days at the hand of the grammarian,30 a student would learn reading 
28Galen, Hipp. Frac. 18.2.318 (Kühn).
29Here, the link between grammar and hermeneutics is emphasized by the brilliant work of Copeland, 
Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, esp. 9–62. Copeland understands this hermeneutical task to be the area in which 
much of the blurring between grammar and rhetoric occurs, especially in late antiquity. Her conclusions are 
singularly apt for understanding early Christian exegesis: "As if to fill the space left open when rhetoric distanced 
itself from active application to discourse, grammar assumed an unprecedented importance for the systematic 
analysis of the text as a discursive system. The grammatical function of enarratio becomes itself a metadiscourse. It 
provides access to all fields of learning, and in many respects constitutes an application of that learning, as inquiry 
can advance itself through commentary. . . . The once debased activity of the grammarians can now supply the 
paradigm for the exalted activity of biblical exegesis" (60).
30In order to preempt an obvious question stemming from this phrase, I do not intend here to enter into 
20
practices designed to address the textual obscurity that he confronted in challenging and 
complex texts, and above all, in those of the poets. Though grammar certainly concerned issues 
of style and writing, perhaps the first areas of inquiry to which our modern minds turn upon 
hearing the word, these activities were not ends in themselves. As early as the fifth century 
B.C.E., we see that the very purpose behind the grammatical endeavors of literary exegetes is 
the ability to understand the intention of the author.31 In fact, in Plato's Protagoras 339a–348c 
proper literary exegesis is prized by Socrates as the very epitome of the virtues of a liberal 
education.32 And Plato's description of Socrates' literary exegesis against Protagoras is an 
extremely helpful and early portrait of the task of grammatical exegesis. In this episode, we see 
that the tools of the grammarian—distinguishing the meaning of a polysemous word, 
comparing passages from elsewhere in the poem, and seeking the general purpose of the 
poem33—are never employed in isolation. Rather, the grammarian's activity in the Simonides 
episode, which Hans Baltussen has described as the "practice of clarifying a text," is from first to 
last an attempt to understand the intention of the poet, his διάνοια, through the recognition and 
the debate about the structure of primary and secondary schools in antiquity. I want only to emphasize here that the 
blurring of the lines between "primary" and "secondary" schools, or between the activities of the γραμματιστής/
magister ludi and the γραμματικός/grammaticus, is analogous to the thin line between the strategies of textual exegesis
as practiced by grammarian and forensic orator. On schooling in late antiquity, I am persuaded by the insightful 
arguments of Robert A. Kaster, “Notes on “Primary” and “Secondary” Schools in Late Antiquity,” TAPA 113 (1983):
323-46, and I agree with his conclusion that "there were throughout the Empire schools of all shapes and kinds, 
depending on local needs, expectations, and resources. And in a world without centralized direction of education 
of any sort, that is only what we should expect" (346). See also Alan D. Booth, “The Schooling of Slaves in First-
Century Rome,” TAPA 109 (1979): 11-19; and Alan D. Booth, “Elementary and Secondary Education in the Roman 
Empire,” Florilegium 1 (1979): 1-14. 
31For a succinct discussion on the origins and nature of exegesis, see Han Baltussen, “From Polemic to 
Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary,” Poetics Today 28 (2007), 250–61. It is important to note that my 
understanding of "exegesis" is along the lines of "commentary activity," of a secondary discourse about someone 
else's text. In my view, such a broad conception of both "exegesis" and "commentary" is required when speaking 
about early Christian biblical interpretation (and, perhaps, the writings of the biblical authors themselves). Cf. 
Sluiter, “Dialectics of Genre,” 202–03, who makes a similar point by claiming that the "commentator" always has 
two professional affiliations. On the one hand, he is doctor, philosopher, astronomer, or—we might say—
theologian, and on the other hand, he is also always a "grammarian," since he is always focused on interpreting 
another text.
32Plato, Prt. 338A–348A (LCL 165:180–213)
33See Plato, Prt. 341A–B; 341E–342A; 344B (LCL 165:190–91; 192–93; 200–01), respectively. 
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resolution of any textual obscurity.34
This exegetical goal, especially as it relates to the rhetorical tradition, has been 
examined in two recent books.35 Kathy Eden's short but lucid study Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical 
Tradition is a particularly helpful narrative of the influence of the school traditions on Christian 
intellectual history until Renaissance humanism. Eden points to the significance of the 
rhetorical discussions of interpretatio scripti, and she explicitly identifies two exegetical tools that 
were integral to this task.
Not yet so called, context as a concept developed within interpretatio scripti actually 
represents two interpretive instruments: what we might call historical context, on one 
hand, and textual context, on the other. Historical context includes all those 
particularities that routinely define the rhetorical occasion, such as time, place, persons,
and so on—the circumstantiae of the later rhetorical and grammatical traditions. . . . 
Textual context, on the other hand, includes not only those passages that precede and 
follow the questionable text, but also the entire work from which it comes.36
In her book Paul, the Corinthians, and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics, Margaret Mitchell builds
on Eden's foundation to develop the concept of an "agonistic paradigm of interpretation," 
which recognizes the reality that texts can be read in different ways. Both Eden and Mitchell 
point to Quintilian and Cicero as readers who exemplified most clearly the characteristics of 
this forensic interpretation. Mitchell argues that early Christian readers must "push" texts at 
hand "to support a claim of clarity for the present purpose."37 I am broadly sympathetic with 
34Baltussen, “From Polemic to Exegesis,” 256–57. Cf. Han Baltussen, “Plato Protagoras 340–48: 
Commentary in the Making?,” in Philosophy, Science, and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic, and Latin Commentaries, eds. Peter Adamson, 
Han Baltussen, and M. W. F. Stone (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2004), 21–22, who recognizes that one 
cannot call this "commentary" in any formal sense and thus treats the practice of commentary rather than the theory 
of commentary. This distinction is crucial, in my view, for one can speak of early Christian exegesis as the practice 
of commentary, even if a formal commentary (that is, commentary as "theory") is not present. On the pursuit of 
the poet's intention, see Plato, Prt. 347A (LCL 165:208–09): ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἦν δ᾿ 
ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ᾆσμα. Notice also that Protagoras expresses the need for 
exegesis by identifying contradictions (ἐναντία; 339B) in Simonides' poem, which Protagoras believes to imply 
that Simonides speaks wrongly (οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει; 339D).
35Kathy Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and Its Humanist Reception, (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Mitchell, Paul, the Corinthians, and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics.
36Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 17–18. For discussions of interpretatio scripti in the rhetorical 
tradition, see Cicero, Inv. 2.40.116–51.154 (LCL 386:284–323); and Quintilian, Inst. 7.6–10 (LCL 126:264–97).
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this understanding of the foundation that the grammatical and rhetorical traditions set for early
Christian exegesis, but I think more must be said to emphasize the particularly literary nature of 
these claims. In Mitchell's case, Cicero is placed on the stand as the key witness to the task of 
interpretatio scripti, while Aristotle falls by the wayside. The result for Mitchell's argument is that 
rhetorical claims are foregrounded, while the grammatical foundations are rarely referenced. 
Similarly, it is slightly misleading for Eden to argue that the grammatical endeavor to ascertain 
an author's intention (διάνοια) is "in keeping with the rhetorical art,"38 since this strategy 
would have first been introduced to students in the grammarian's classroom.39 Indeed, as we 
saw in Quintilian, the textual basis of the rhetorical interpretatio scripti itself emphasizes a blurring 
between these boundaries. For any educated person, the techniques of literary analysis used 
towards any professional end—and especially those called to witness by a forensic orator in his 
interpretations—were first learned not from the orators but as a student of the γραμματικός.40 
At this point, we may extend our definition of grammatical literary analysis a bit 
further. If we include the emphasis of grammarian's to resolve obscurity, the definition may 
37Mitchell, Paul, the Corinthians, and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics, 21–24; Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical 
Tradition, 7–19. I am less persuaded by Mitchell's claim that "all texts are potentially ambiguous." This would seem 
to disregard the point of Cicero, whom Mitchell is so fond of citing. In Inv. 2.40.117, Cicero claims that, although 
words considered individually might seem ambiguous, "it is not right to regard as ambiguous (ambigua) what 
becomes plain (perspicua) on consideration of the whole context." Thus, it is not clear to me that "all texts" are 
potentially ambiguous, as much as "all words" could be. 
38Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 22n.5. One should, however, note the caution of her earlier 
article. See Kathy Eden, “Hermeneutics and the Ancient Rhetorical Tradition,” Rhetorica 5 (1987), 60: "This evidence
not only demands and deserves equal attention in the continuing history of hermeneutics, but it also records the 
longstanding interaction between the grammatical and rhetorical traditions—an interaction that well predates the 
evidence itself. As Dio Chrysostom reminds us (53.1), Aristotle inaugurates a long line not only of rhetorical 
theorists, but also of grammarians (grammatikoi), then called critics (kritikoi), who worked at interpreting poetic 
intention (ten dianoian exegoumenoi). We should not be surprised, then, to find substantial overlapping between 
Chapter 25 of the Poetics,where Aristotle addresses the problems of literary interpretation, and portions of his 
Rhetoric. In ascribing these principles of interpretation to rhetoric, therefore, I do not mean to overlook their early 
grammatical affiliations."
39This is the very point that Sextus Empiricus claims to occupy grammarians endlessly. See S. E., M 1.320 
(LCL 382:184–87).
40This point was emphasized by Denis Berchem, “Poètes et grammairiens: Recherche sur la tradition 
scolaire d’explication des auteurs,” MH 9 (1952), 86: "Puisque tout homme cultivé allait y recevoir sa première 
formation [i.e., dans les quatre murs de l'ecole du grammaticus], il est impossible que la production littéraire ne se 
soit pas ressentie de l'esprit et des méthodes qui y étaient en honneur."
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now read as follows:
Creative exegesis is the task of the grammarians of clarifying textual obscurity to 
discover the intention of an author.
We must now consider the methods by which grammarians accomplished this task. How did 
they teach their students to penetrate such obscurity? What were the textual practices at hand?
Literary-Critical Tools
Though the vast majority of her work, as indicated by the title, focuses on the rhetorical
tradition, Kathy Eden admits that grammarians were especially attuned to "address the 
difficulties arising from textual obscurity."41 Moreover, Eden highlights the tools to which the 
grammarian turns for clarifying this obscurity:
The grammatical art, in the interest of resolving these obscurities, taught many of the 
same hermeneutical strategies [as the rhetoricians] for resolving ambiguities and 
contradictions and for weighing the competing claims of what the poet said, his verba or
scriptum, and what he meant, his voluntas. In fact, the two most powerful interpretive tools
of the orator (especially the forensic orator)—namely, historical context and textual 
context—receive their fullest treatment as part of the grammatical tradition.42
Historical Context 
In the grammarian's classroom,43 students were taught that the interpretation of the 
poets (ἐξήγησις ποιητῶν/enarratio poetarum), and textual exegesis in general, amounts to the 
ability of the reader to accommodate the circumstances of the text. To return to the passage 
41Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 21.
42Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 21.
43The best treatment of the grammarian's classroom, on which I am dependent for many details, is 
Raffaella Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), 185–219. For more classic treatments of grammatical education in antiquity, see Marrou, A History of 
Education in Antiquity, 160–85; Stanley F. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), 212–49; and Teresa Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 152–89. For the role of the grammarian in late antique society, 
see Kaster, Guardians of Language.
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from Eden that I quoted above, the ability to situate a text in its historical context can be pictured 
as asking specific questions of the text. When the grammarian taught students to ask such 
questions as who, to whom, when, where, and why, he was instilling the sensibilities that 
would be expanded by the orator.44
Grammarians would teach students to identify specific individuals in the text, not only 
whether these characters were historical or mythological, but they would also scrutinize their 
personalities and character traits. This scrutiny would allow readers to question whether a 
figure acted in accordance with his revealed personality. Geographical inquiries would 
frequently give rise to intriguing questions about a given text, and the locations of events were 
fastidiously recorded. Students were taught to maintain word-lists, noting the most common 
words employed by an author, and they often performed glossographical analysis of strange 
and unfamiliar terms. Along similar lines, etymology could serve the ends of historical analysis.
Especially in the case of Homeric interpretation, readers would appeal to etymology as a means
of understanding an author's claims about the gods and their corresponding actions.45
Above all, students were taught that texts should adhere to the principle of "propriety," 
called τὸ πρέπον as early as Aristotle and decorum in the corresponding Latin tradition.46 Eden 
points to Plutarch's example on how texts must be accommodated to a suitable reading.47 In his
44Cf. Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 26.
45Cf. Cornutus, ND 31 (Lang, 64.3–17). Although etymological reading multiplies at the hands of the 
Stoics, its existence implicitly in the poets and explicitly in such texts as Plato's Cratylus provides enough evidence 
to demonstrate its presence in the grammatical archive of antiquity, even before the Hellenistic period. See Ineke 
Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context: Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought, (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 
1990), 12–13. On the Stoics' use of etymology, see G. R. Boys-Stones, “The Stoics’ Two Types of Allegory,” in 
Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition, ed. G. R. Boys-Stones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), esp. 196–99.
46See Aristotle, Rh. 1408a–b (LCL 193:376–81); Cicero, Orat. 123 (LCL 342:396–99); Quintilian, Inst. 
1.4.2; 1.8–9 (LCL 124:102–03; 198–213). Cicero, Orat. 70–72 (LCL 342:356–59), explicitly draws the 
comparison between the Greek and Latin traditions of propriety and extends the concept of decorum to the realm of
the grammaticus. Cf. Max Pohlenz, “τὸ πρέπον. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des greichischen Geistes,” in Kleine Schriften,
ed. Heinrich Dörrie (Hildesheim: George Olms, 1965), 100-39;  Wesley Trimpi, “Horace’s ‘Ut Pictura Poesis’: The 
Argument for Stylistic Decorum,” Traditio 34 (1978): 29-73; Helen DeWitt, “Quo Virtus? The Concept of Propriety in 
Ancient Literary Criticism,” (D.Phil. diss., University of Oxford, 1987); and Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and 
Translation, 63–86. See also, in relation to rhetoric, Heinrich Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik, (München: Max
Hueber Verlag, 1973), §1055–62. 
47See Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 31–40.
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work How the Young Should Read Poetry, Plutarch claims that young readers must learn "to adapt the 
usage of the words to fit the matter in hand, as the grammarians teach us to do, taking a word 
for one signification at one time, and at another time for another."48 Much like Socrates in the 
Protagoras, Plutarch argues that, since words and texts have the inherent capacity for multiple 
significations, the student's resolution of obscurity and contradiction is paramount to the 
discovery of a writer's intention (διάνοια). 
Grammarians used other techniques to emphasize the requisite propriety of texts.49 On 
the one hand, there are better and worse ways to tell narratives. For example, characters should 
act according to the expectations of the narrative, and though deviation was allowed in this 
regard, it was always signaled by the author in some way. On the other hand, it is deemed 
"inappropriate" (ἀπρεπής) for an author to give too many details, too early in the narrative. 
Moreover, texts do not adhere to the principle of propriety in the fullest sense if they provide 
narratives that are untrue, a point that will become paramount in Christian figurative exegesis.
Textual Context 
Alongside his investigation into a work's historical context, then, is the grammarian's 
inquiry into its textual context, drawing upon his mastery of the "expert" tools of his art. Even the
immediate context of a passage contained ambiguities that must be resolved. Grammarians 
would expect students to master the correct understanding of accentuation, breathing and 
pauses, pronunciation, and proper word separation. The importance of these techniques to 
γραμματική and literary exegesis can be understood when one simply considers that 
manuscripts in antiquity were written in scriptio continua. There was no spacing between words, 
which were instead given in continuous blocks with essentially no punctuation. Thus, 
manuscripts provided to students were inherently "an ensemble of letters in need of 
48Plutarch, De aud. poet. 22f (LCL 197:118–19): καὶ τὸ τὴν χρείαν τῶν ὀνομάτων συνοικειοῦν τοῖς 
ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν, ὡς οἱ γραμματικοὶ διδάσκουσιν, ἄλλοτε πρὸς ἄλλην δύναμιν λαμβάνοντες
49For these and other issues subsumed under discussions of "propriety," see DeWitt, “Quo Virtus? The 
Concept of Propriety in Ancient Literary Criticism,” 32–45.
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interpretation."50 Thus, a student had to apply the breadth of his syntactical knowledge—his 
understanding of syllables, punctuation, and tone—in order to divide words coherently, parse 
out phrases and sentences, and distinguish between interrogatives, declaratives, and 
imperatives. A task that seems fairly basic for us today was replete with ambiguity and 
intriguing possibilities, and the grammarian sought to train his students with the skills to 
rectify these difficulties. 
The insightful work of Raffaella Cribiore has pointed to the papyri evidence that reveals 
many of the teaching strategies that the γραμματικός used to instill these skills into his 
students.51 For example, on one papyrus that preserves the myth of Hero and Leander, the most 
noticeable characteristic is the clear spacing between words, surely given as an aid to reading.52 
On another, not only are words separated by the inclusion of dots, but lectional signs point out 
such characteristics as accents and breathings, all intended to aid the student's reading of the 
text.53 And while these skills focused on the immediate textual context and the resolution of 
lexical ambiguity, challenges could still arise. Aristotle, for instance, gives the following 
example in his Sophistical Refutations. How should one translate ἐγώ σ᾿ ἔθηκα δοῦλον ὄντ᾿ 
ἐλεύθερον?54 This statement could clearly be rendered as "I made you, a free man, a slave." 
50Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind, 190. On the issue of scriptio continua, William A. Johnson, Readers and Reading 
Culture in the High Roman Empire: A Study of Elite Communities, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18–20, argues 
that its use was deliberate. He claims that "Greeks and Romans knew perfectly well, for instance, the utility of 
word division—the Greek school texts on papyri bear eloquent testimony to the need for emerging readers to 
practice syllable and word division." For Johnson, the use of scriptio continua was a testament to the elite culture of 
readers in Greek and Roman society. I think Johnson's picture is compelling, but this does not detract from the 
arguments I am making in this chapter. If anything, readers trained in elite communities should be expected to 
adhere to the techniques and tools of the grammarian even more.
51For the discussion of papyri evidence, which is a strength of her study, see Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind,
esp. 137–43.
52P.Ryl. III.486 (SH 951; first century C.E.)
53P.Lond.Lit. 5 (Pack 634)
54Aristotle, S.E. 166b36–38. Atherton, Stoics on Ambiguity, 505, provides a helpful modern example in the 
sentence "Police found drunk in shop window." The meaning turns on how one understands "drunk" to function 
in the sentence. Is it an adjectival description of the police themselves, meaning "the drunk police were found in 
the shop window"? Or is it a substantival adjective, meaning "the police found a drunk in the shop window"? For 
both Aristotle and modern English, something more must be ascertained from the story in order to interpret the 
immediate context of this sentence fittingly.
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However, it could equally mean "I made you, a slave, a free man." Though a student's 
syntactical skills could properly dissect a sentence into its parts, further potential ambiguities 
could still remain. Thus, grammarians also taught students to clarify broader textual obscurity 
with the reading strategies that attend to the work as a whole.55
A crucial tool by which one could ascertain the proper textual context of a specific 
passage was οἰκονομία. This term has no Latin equivalent in the tradition, and, for this reason, 
it is often left untranslated by Latin authors.56 In its correspondence to the concept of propriety 
in historical context, literary "economy" seeks to comprehend any individual passage in light of
the whole poem. Eden offers a beautiful summary of οἰκονομία:
A formal property, literary economy works, like its counterpart, decorum, to 
accommodate the particular occasion. Subordinating the individual parts of the 
discourse to the overall plan of the whole, oeconomia, a principle of composition and 
interpretation, presupposes the whole in the disposition of the parts.57
Grounded in this principle of economy, each individual episode, even if it appears irrelevant to 
the structure of the whole work, is in fact an "architectonic element" that reveals the unified 
organization of the complex whole.58 By using οἰκονομία as an interpretive tool, readers would
claim to discern the poet's intention for for particular passages.
This principle of economy, then, worked in tandem with a second tool of textual 
context. Authors who maintained such a unified organization in their work do so, according to 
the grammarians, in order to preserve the cohesiveness of its subject matter, the ὑπόθεσις.59 An 
55I am not persuaded by Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind, 215, who suggests that the encyclopedic 
knowledge and close attention to detail taught by the grammarian inculcated a "myopic ability" in his students to 
dismember a text but failed to instill a similar appreciation for the whole of the work.
56Cf. Quintilian, Inst. 3.3.9 (LCL 125:26–27); Cicero, Att. 115.(VI.1).1 (LCL 8:104–05).
57Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 30. See also her insightful article, Kathy Eden, “Economy in the
Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity,” SLitI 28 (1995): 13-26.
58For the significance of οἰκονομία in readings of Homer, see N. J. Richardson, “Literary Criticism in the 
Exegetical Scholia to the Iliad: A Sketch,” CQ 30 (1980), 266–72. This concept, along with others to which it was 
related (e.g. variety, foreshadowing, delayed suspense, etc.), was fundamental for the literary scholarship of the 
Homeric scholia, and we will see the subsequent influence of such concepts in Hellenistic Alexandrian scholarship
below.
59For detailed discussions of ὑπόθεσις, see Roos Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek Scholia, 
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understanding of the text's ὑπόθεσις, therefore, allowed students to note the coherence 
between individual passages with the work as a whole. Authors were believed to be consciously
consistent when telling their stories, so any ambiguous or unclear statements were frequently 
compared with similar claims elsewhere in the text. As Roos Meijering has noted, this 
understanding of authorial composition combined with an emphasis on the text's ὑπόθεσις 
meant that readers would anticipate a coherent story without any possible incongruities.60 To 
return to Aristotle's example, then, if a student perceives the author's ὑπόθεσις to concern the 
liberation of a slave community, then the ambiguity inherent to the sentence is resolved. It 
must mean, "I made you, a slave, a free man." A focus on the overall narrative and theme of the
text was useful to resolve any apparent contradictions in more narrow passages.61  
I began this section by asking how grammarians sought to clarify textual obscurity, and 
we have examined a few of the tools of the trade. Indeed, in what Rafaella Cribiore has termed 
the grammarian's "mental gymnastics," students were taught "to take apart works of literature 
by distilling their characteristics with relentless attention to detail," providing techniques by 
which to examine a work's historical and textual contexts. These analytical exercises performed 
on the text were geared entirely toward "an elucidation of all its features."62 After examining a 
sample of the tools that characterized his task, we may extend our working definition.
Creative exegesis is the task of clarifying textual obscurity by employing the literary-
critical tools of the grammarians to discover the intention of an author.
(Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1987), 99–133; and René Nünlist, The Ancient Critic at Work: Terms and Concepts of Literary 
Criticism in Greek Scholia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 23–68. Other discussions may be found in
Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 219–20; Richardson, “Literary Criticism in the Exegetical Scholia,” 268–69; Rudolf 
Kassel, “Hypothesis,” in ΣΧΟΛΙΑ: Studia ad criticam interpretationemque textuum Graecorum et ad historiam iuris Graeco-Romani 
pertinentia viro doctissimo D. Holwerda oblata, eds. W. J. Aerts et al. (Groningen: E. Forsten, 1985), 53-59. For a similar 
statement on the interdependence of "economy" and "hypothesis" in early Christian exegesis, with a particular 
emphasis on Irenaeus of Lyons, see Anthony Briggman, “Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1,” VC 69
(2015), esp. 519–23.
60Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 133.
61Cf. Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 108, who notes, "the ὑπόθεσις of a text evidently is what the 
author aims at, his personal and freely chosen τέλος."
62The previous two quotes may be found in Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind, 205.
29
In the course of the last two sections, I have attempted to show that the grammarian's 
task is focused on applying specific techniques of literary analysis to clarify any textual 
obscurity in the process of a holistic creative exegesis. I have also suggested that viewing 
exegesis in this way as a practice of commentary places us in a better position from which to 
describe early Christian exegesis. But this surely begs the question. How does this focus on the 
interpretive aim of the grammatical tradition—the clarification of textual obscurity—place us 
in any better position than the studies we briefly rehearsed earlier? To put the matter another 
way, can this account of the exegetical aims of the literary analysis of grammarians and forensic
orators account for the literal and figural exegesis of early Christians? In other words, where is 
such creative exegesis to be found? This will be the subject matter of our next chapter.
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3The "Grammatical Archive":
Creative Exegesis in Antiquity
Grammatica as a discursive practice was defined not simply by the objects it was associated with 
but by a repertoire of rules and models of statement-making—what can be called the 
grammatical archive—that allowed an endless number of new statements to be formulated 
from within the discipline.1
As we saw in the previous chapter, Sextus Empiricus described the greatest attributes of 
the grammarians as the skills to explain things spoken unclearly (ἀσαφῶς), to discern sound 
narratives (τά ὑγιῆ), and to distinguish authentic sayings from spurious ones (τά γνήσια ἀπὸ 
τῶν νόθων).2 And as the realm of grammatical education focused on the poets above all, one 
can trace this line of scholarship to the tradition of Homeric commentary prominent in 
Hellenistic Alexandria. Of course, Homeric scholarship broadly speaking can be shown to have 
existed even earlier, in the fragments from Aristotle's Aporemata Homerica and the related twenty-
fifth chapter of his Poetics. Though Aristotle offered the initial rebuttal to Plato's rejection of 
Homer's writings qua philosophy, Homeric scholarship in the Hellenistic age was centered in 
Alexandria. Sadly no commentaries from this period are extant, but we do have a number of 
examples of literary scholarship in the form of the Homeric scholia. And as René Nünlist has 
suggested, though the Greek scholia remain an understudied topic of ancient literary criticism, 
especially in relation to the great treatises of antiquity, they do hold a distinct advantage over 
the treatises.3 The scholia preserve scholarly interactions—a record of the application of the 
1Martin Irvine, The Making of Textual Culture: ‘Grammatica’ and Literary Theory, 350-1100, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 16.
2S. E., M 1.93 (LCL 382:54–55)
3Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 1–2
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grammarian's expertise—on the texts of Homer. For this reason, they provide a more accurate 
(even if more complex) picture of the literary devices in use, and in many ways, the scholia 
reveal the critical literary strategies that attempt to come to terms with texts in their entirety. It 
was this stream of ancient literary scholarship that served as the foundation for the work of 
modern scholars who first emphasized the role of grammatical techniques in early Christian 
exegesis.4 But, as we have seen, the problem with these studies was their inability to account 
for early Christian figural exegesis. How is one to move beyond this impasse? 
A fundamental flaw in the scholarly analysis of early Christian exegesis is that scholars 
who examine specifically Christian readers have been plagued by idiosyncratic appeals to 
terminology that simply has no value in wider scholarly discussions. Whereas our field has 
described the figurative readings of Christian exegetes under terms like "literal sense," 
"allegory," and "typology," scholars in other fields make no use of these particular categories. I 
suggest that the work of these classicists and historians, who attempt to describe the process of 
reading in antiquity more broadly, will aid us in a more accurate understanding and 
description of how Christians read their texts. 
As a case in point, the recent work of Peter Struck reorients the discussion of ancient 
figurative interpretation by emphasizing the fact that σύμβολον and αἴνιγμα were the more 
significant conceptual terms of nonliteral modes of reading.5 At the heart of Struck's 
reorientation is the emphasis of this alternative narrative to focus on the potential of poetic 
texts to transcend mere imitation. He claims that, for these figurative readers, "symbolic 
language has been granted the power to invoke and create the world, right before our eyes."6 At
home in philosophers and oracles, this mode of reading changes the expectations that one has 
of poetic texts altogether. The witness of Plutarch suggests that this mode of reading was still in
effect in the first century C.E. In his On the Oracles at Delphi, Plutarch claims that oracles were 
4Schäublin, Untersuchungen zu Methode; Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe
5Peter T. Struck, The Birth of the Symbol: Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004). For a good discussion of the technical terminology, see Félix Buffière, Les Mythes d’Homère et la pensée 
grecque, (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1956), 45–65.  
6Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 277.
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clothed in poetic language (τὴν περικειμένην τοῖς χρησμοῖς ποίησιν) characterized by 
undermeanings (ὑπόνοιαν), enigmas (αἰνίγματα), and ambiguities (ἀμφιβολίας).7 According 
to Plutarch, the "poetic" character of oracular literature is based on its very propensity towards 
obscurity. Throughout this tradition of nonliteral interpretation, these texts are believed to 
contain deep theological and cosmological truths, and poetic language, full of undermeanings, 
symbols, and enigmas—is understood as the proper medium for the greatest messages.8
Of course, it is entirely possible to narrate this tradition of nonliteral reading accurately, 
as I think Struck has done, and miss a crucial feature that relates this mode of reading to the 
literal reading strategies of the Homeric scholars in Alexandria. Struck contrasts the symbolic 
reading he describes in his book as a fundamentally different stance towards texts than that 
espoused by Aristotelian literary critics.9 Whereas Aristotle presented a "poetics of clarity" 
(cf. Aristotle, Po. 1458a18–26), Struck claims that symbolic reading operates within what he 
terms the "poetics of the riddle." Yet, this position is much too general to accommodate fully 
all the evidence.
In what follows, I will draw attention to a number of textual practices and techniques 
that are employed by ancient exegetes of both stripes, literal and figural readers. It is not my 
intention to provide an exhaustive catalog. Instead, I want only to suggest that each of these 
ancient exegetes sought to resolve the textual obscurities presented to them by recourse to a 
7Plutarch, De Pyth. or. 407a–b (LCL 306:328–31); cf. Plutarch, De aud. poet. 19e–f (LCL 197:100–101). Cf. 
Maximus of Tyre, Dial. 4.5 (Hobein, 45.10), who, at the end of the second century C.E., claims that the work of 
poets and philosophers are "full of enigmas" (μεστὰ αἰνιγμάτων).
8See Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 142–61. A few French scholars have consistently emphasized the transition 
from Stoic allegory and its propensity to view hidden cosmological and metaphysical truths in ancient texts, to the
Neoplatonic allegorists of the third century C.E., who see in the Homeric texts a narrative about the gods and the 
ability to move through the intelligible realm to the gods. For this narrative on the development of allegorical 
reading, see Buffière, Les Mythes d’Homère et la pensée grecque; Jean Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie: Les origines grecques et les contestations 
judéo-chrétiennes, (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1976); and, most recently, Luc Brisson, How Philosophers Saved Myths: 
Allegorical Interpretation and Classical Mythology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). For a more detailed account
of the former period that sees two different accounts of allegorical reading in the Stoics, see Boys-Stones, “The 
Stoics’ Two Types of Allegory.”. The significance of this narrative for early Christian encounters with Valentinian 
exegesis has been preliminarily examined by Lewis Ayres, “Irenaeus vs. the Valentinians: Toward a Rethinking of 
Patristic Exegetical Origins,” JECS 23 (2015): 153-87.
9Cf. Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 63–75.
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"grammatical archive"—a repository of textual practices, techniques, and tools first learned in 
the ancient classroom. Although some sought to find the resolution to such obscurity on the 
surface of the text, while others provided clarification through figural readings, they are all in 
similar fashion dependent on this "grammatical archive" for the techniques by which they 
interpret their texts.10
Stylistic Ambiguity
As we saw earlier, the grammarians taught their students that authors employed 
customary terms and made their points clearly. Moreover, since the authors were deemed to be 
consistent, the stories likewise should be free from any incongruities.11 For this reason, an 
author's style can often hold the key to explaining any difficulties found within a text, and we 
see this principle of stylistic ambiguity at play in the interpretation of literal and figurative 
readers alike. As an example of a scholar who sought such stylistic resolution in a literal 
reading, we need only look to Aristarchus of Samothrace (c. 216–145 B.C.E.), the most 
renowned scholar in Alexandria.12 Though none of Aristarchus' compositions are extant, 
10See the comment of Francesca Schironi, “Greek Commentaries,” DSD 19 (2012), 435, who notes that 
"an allegorical approach to a text does not exclude more philological concerns in a commentary or in a 
commentator." Philological techniques are employed in both modes. Cf. Francesca Schironi, “L’Olimpo non è il 
cielo: Esegesi antica nel papiro di Derveni, Aristarco e Leagora di Siracusa,” ZPE 136 (2001): 11-21.
11Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 133.
12Aristarchus was the librarian in Alexandria in the mid-second century B.C.E. He continued the 
Alexandrian project of editing Homeric texts, which originated with Zenodotus of Ephesus (c. 325–270 B.C.E.). 
The project was carried forward by Zenodotus' pupil Aristophanes of Byzantium (c. 257–180 B.C.E.), who is 
credited for establishing the Greek accent marks still in use today and refining the system of text-critical signs 
employed in the editions to Homer; see William Lameere, Aperçus de paléographie homérique: À propos des papyrus de l’Iliade et 
de l’Odyssée des collections de Gand, de Bruxelles et de Louvain, (Paris: Éditions Érasme, 1960), 90–92, for the textual evidence 
of this attribution to Aristophanes. Aristarchus advanced the system of critical signs that Aristophanes had refined, 
linking the signs in his editions with sections of his commentaries, wherein he would provide a detailed 
discussion of the textual issues at hand. On Zenodotus, Aristophanes, and especially Aristarchus, see Rudolf 
Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 
105–22, and 171–233; Dietrich Lührs, Untersuchungen zu den Athetesen Aristarchs in der Ilias und zu ihrer Behandlung im Corpus 
der exegetischen Scholien, (Hildesheim: Olms, 1992); James I. Porter, “Hermeneutic Lines and Circles: Aristarchus and 
Crates on the Exegesis of Homer,” in Homer’s Ancient Readers: The Hermeneutics of Greek Epic’s Earliest Exegetes, eds. Robert 
Lamberton and John J. Keaney (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 67-114; Martin L. West, Studies in 
the Text and Transmission of the Iliad, (München: Saur, 2001); Francesca Schironi, I frammenti di Aristarco di Samotracia negli 
etimologici bizantini: Introduzione, edizione critica e commento, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004); Eleanor Dickey, 
Ancient Greek Scholarship: A Guide to Finding, Reading, and Understanding Scholia, Commentaries, Lexica, and Grammatical Treatises, from Their
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including his Homeric editions and at least two running commentaries (ὑπομνήματα) on a 
variety of poetic texts, the details of his work can be constructed from the remains of the 
Homeric scholia.13 As a γραμματικός, he prized clear (σαφής) language and believed that 
Homer always constructed his sentences in the most lucid ways to promote clarity 
(σαφήνεια).14 The concept of clarity could come to Homer's defense in a couple of ways. 
Artistarchus frequently claimed that Homer used terms according to their normal (κύριον/
κυρίως) usage. Yet, when the need arises, Homer is granted the poetic license both to use a 
word in a way that is "proper" to Homer (ἰδίως) or in a metaphorical sense.15 Perhaps nowhere
else does Aristarchus emphasize the clarity with which Homer writes than in his understanding
of contradictions or superfluous statements (περισσός).16
Aristarchus frequently used this criterion of redundancy as an argument for athetesis.17 
For instance, in Iliad 21, after a quarrel with Poseidon, Apollo yields in shame. Homer then 
introduces Artemis to the scene in order to confront Apollo and rebuke him for retreating 
without a fight: 
His sister rebuked him harshly, the Queen of the beasts;
Wild Artemis, indeed, spoke a reproachful word.
Beginnings to the Byzantine Period, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5–6; Maren R. Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and 
Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 9–12. Tatian, Or. 31 (Whittaker, 56),
lists Zenodotus, Aristophanes, and Aristarchus as γραμματικοί.
13Aristarchus emphasized the characteristic expressions of individual authors, and based on this standard,
argued that the Iliad and the Odyssey were creations of a single poet. Moreover, the principle of consistency 
became paramount for Aristarchus, who used it to argue that Homer would not contradict himself. Thus, the 
comparison of similar or supposedly contradictory lines became a central tenet of his philology.
14Cf. schol. A Il. 15.8a
15See, for instance, schol. A Il. 2.670; 4.141a; 5.266b; 7.146b. For further examples, see Francesca 
Schironi, “Theory into Practice: Aristotelian Principles in Aristarchean Philology,” CP 104 (2009), 300–03. On 
poetic license in the scholia, see Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 174–84. Cf. Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 62–
67.
16On περισσός in the scholia, see Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 173–75.
17See Lührs, Untersuchungen zu den Athetesen Aristarchs, 18–148. Note, however, the sympathetic yet cautious use 
of Lührs by Maren R. Niehoff, “Homeric Scholarship and Bible Exegesis in Ancient Alexandria: Evidence from 
Philo’s ‘Quarrelsome’ Colleagues,” CQ 57 (2007), 180. Cf. Schironi, “Theory into Practice,” 309, who summarizes 
the Aristarchean conviction: "Everything that is περισσόν is rejected in Homer."
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τὸν δὲ κασιγνήτη μάλα νείκεσε πότνια θηρῶν
Ἄρτεμις ἀγροτέρη, καὶ ὀνείδειον φάτο μῦθον (Il. 21.470–71)
In the midst of this transition, Aristarchus notices a redundant phrase. The ever-
consistent Homer has essentially written the same sentence twice, which, for Aristarchus, is 
clearly superfluous and perhaps subtly demeaning to his readers. The scholia again preserves 
Aristarchus' response:
ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι περισσὸς <μετὰ τὸν> „τὸν δὲ κασιγνήτη μάλα νείκεσε πότνια θηρῶν“ 
(Il. 21.470). τίς δὲ κυνηγετικὴ θεὸς εἰ μὴ ἡ Ἄρτεμις;
[This verse] is athetized, because it is superfluous after "His sister rebuked him harshly, 
the Queen of beasts" (Il. 21.470). And who is the god of the hunt besides Artemis?
Aristarchus' grammatical sensibilities suggest to him that Homer would expect his readers to 
identify both the sister of Apollo and the goddess of wild animals as Artemis. Thus, the 
superfluous quality (περισσός) of Il. 21.471 betrays its inauthenticity, and Aristarchus athetizes 
it as spurious.18 Such concerns with stylistic ambiguity seem at home in the literal scholarship 
of Aristarchus, intent as he was to verify Homer's original text. But this concern for stylistic 
clarity was shared by figurative readers as well.
The Derveni Papyrus is a figurative commentary on an Orphic "enigmatic" poem from 
the fourth century B.C.E..19 The commentary situates itself firmly in the figurative mode of 
18Of course, a superfluous statement (περισσός) is not inherently negative and did not always demand 
athetesis. Often, it could even speak positively about the poet. Apollonius Dyscolus, for example, attributes 
superfluousness to poetic license (ποιητικὴ ἄδεια). See A. D., Conj. 249.25–30 (Dalimier, 178–81). Cf. schol. bT Il. 
6.377 ex., which attributes Andromache's epithet "of white arms" to the poet and not the character (τοῦ ποιητοῦ 
τὸ ἐπίθετον, οὐ τοῦ προσώπου.)
19On the dating of the Derveni Papyrus, see Maria Serena Funghi, “The Derveni Papyrus,” in Studies on the 
Derveni Papyrus, eds. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 25–26; Struck, Birth of 
the Symbol, 29–30; and Walter Burkert, “La genèse des choses et des mots. Le papyrus de Derveni entre Anaxagore et 
Cratyl,” EP 25 (1970), 443: "II semble qu'on puisse faire remonter la composition du texte à une date qui ne doit 
pas être très postérieure à 400." Cf. Theokritos Kouremenos, George M. Parássoglou, and Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou, 
The Derveni Papyrus. Edited with Introduction and Commentary, (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 2006), 8–9, who claims that "a dating 
between 340 and 320 B.C.E. on the basis of script is perhaps closer to reality" (9). All citations of the Derveni 
Papyrus here will follow the numeration from Richard Janko, “The Derveni Papyrus: An Interim Text,” ZPE 141 
(2002): 1-62. I will give the column in Roman numerals, followed by the appropriate line(s) (e.g. I.1–2).
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reading we saw earlier, a point that is particularly clear in the following lines:
And it is impossible to articulate the true interpretation of the words, even though they 
are spoken. The poem is oracular and riddling for people. Orpheus did not wish to utter
contestable riddles, but rather to speak great things in riddles. Indeed, he is speaking 
figurally from his very first word right through to his last.20
      [κ]αὶ εἰπεῖν οὐχ οἷόν τ[ε τὴν τῶν ὀ]νομάτων 
[λύ]σιν καίτ[οι] ῥηθέντα. ἔστι δὲ μ[αντικὴ ἡ] πόησις 
[κ]αὶ ἀνθρώ[ποις] αἰνι[γμ]ατώδης. [ὁ δ]ὲ [Ὀρφεὺ]ς αὐτ[ῆι]
[ἐ]ρίστ’ αἰν[ίγμα]τα οὐκ ᾔθελε λέγειν, [ἐν αἰν]ίγμασ[ι]ν δὲ 
[μεγ]άλα. ἱερ[ολογ]εῖται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀ[πὸ το]ῦ πρώτου 
[ἀεὶ] μέχρι οὗ [τελε]υταίου ῥήματος.21
Though the Derveni Papyrus marks the first instance of figural commentary on record, 
and as Struck has shown, the commentator concentrates on the fact that Orpheus has composed
the poem as a riddle (αἴνιγμα). Significantly, the Derveni commentator shows no surprise in 
the obscurity of the Orphic poem. Inasmuch as he equates the poem with an oracle, he expects 
the words to be obscure and not straightforward.22 All "great things" (μεγάλα) about the gods 
and the cosmos are best transferred through enigmas,23 but far from forcing one to believe that
20This is my own translation, based upon that of Richard Janko, “Reconstructing (again) the Opening of 
the Derveni Papyrus,” ZPE 166 (2008): 37-51, and Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 31–33. Both scholars also read 
μ[αντικὴ ἡ] for the gap in line 4, rather than the reading of ξ[ένη τις ἡ] offered by Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou, “The 
First Columns of the Derveni Papyrus and their Religious Significance,” in Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, eds. André 
Laks and Glenn W. Most (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 95. In this reading, Janko and Struck both 
follow the initial proposal of Martin L. West, who had informally suggested the replacement in a letter to 
Tsantsanoglou in June 1984. For an explanation of the possibility for this reconstruction, see Janko, 
“Reconstructing,” 39–40. 
21P. Derv., VII.3–8 (Janko, 14). In my translation of ἱερολογεῖται, I am intentionally parting from the 
translation of Janko, “An Interim Text,” 15, who renders this as "he is speaking allegorically." I want to 
emphasize—like Janko—the figural nature of Orpheus's composition, but I think it better to abstain from using 
the term "allegorical" without the presence of ἀλληγορία (or its cognates).
22That the poem is situated in an oracular context can be seen in P. Derv., V.6–7 (Janko 10), where the 
commentator suggests that he is serving in the role of a priestly mediator between the gods and the laypeople who
"do not understand dreams or any of the other real things" (οὐ γινώσ[κοντες ἐ]νύπνια οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων 
πραγμάτων ἕκαστ[ον]).
23Note the comment of Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 145, that the commentator sees "αἰνίγματα as deeply 
resonant poetic images that carry hidden messages about the gods, the cosmos, or the place of humans in the 
world." Struck compares the perspective of the Derveni commentator with the reading strategies of the Stoic 
philosopher Cornutus, whom we will discuss below.
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there is an inherent and unavoidable lack of clarity, the poem's riddles in actuality urge the 
reader to exert even more energy in the search for meaning. Notice how the Derveni 
commentator emphasizes the importance of textual exegesis in column thirteen: "Since 
[Orpheus] riddles (αἰνίζεται) concerning his subject matter throughout the whole poem, one 
must discuss it word by word."24 If one is to penetrate to the truth of the subject matter, he 
must reinvigorate his focus on the text one word at a time. The enigmas may very well veil the 
truth, but this particular veil is meant to be lifted in the hands of a capable interpreter. The 
Derveni commentator then models a number of strategies that would characterize his capable 
interpreter.
Similarly to Aristarchus' scholarly efforts on the Iliad, one of the exegetical tools for the 
Derveni commentator is a reflection on the stylistic features of Orpheus. In Column VIII, the 
commentator notices an ambiguity in Orpheus' poem. Orpheus had composed, "when Zeus 
took from his father the predicted rule and strength in his arms..."25 Should one therefore 
understand Zeus to usurp the rule from Kronos ("he takes the rule from his father"), or 
whether he receives strength from Kronos ("he takes his father's strength")? The commentator 
points to the transposition of the phrase (ὑπερβᾰτόν) and suggests that only an accurate 
understanding of the syntactical sequence will resolve Orpheus' ambiguous statement.26 
One of the most influential figurative readers in antiquity was the Hellenistic Jew, Philo 
of Alexandria (c. 20 B.C.E.–45 C.E.). Maren Niehoff has provided an insightful study on Philo's 
exegetical practice in her recent book Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria. Niehoff 
elegantly presents Philo as a complex interpreter who not only utilizes the Aristotelian literary-
critical tools at hand, but quite unlike the Alexandrian scholars before him, applies them within
a Platonic framework. For Niehoff, much of Philo's ingenuity is the distinct application of 
24P. Derv., XIII.5–6 (Janko, 26): ὅτι μὲν πᾶσαν τὴν πόησιν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰνίζεται κ[α]θ᾽ ἔπος 
ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη λέγειν. Cf. Gábor Betegh, “Exegesis in the Derveni Papyrus,” in Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, 
Arabic and Latin Commentaries, eds. Peter Adamson, Han Baltussen, and M. W. F. Stone (London: Institute of Classical 
Studies, 2004), 41–42. On consideration of the Derveni Papyrus from the perspective of ancient literary criticism, 
see Madeleine Henry, “The Derveni Commentator as Literary Critic,” TAPA 116 (1986): 149-64.
25P. Derv., VIII.4–5 (Janko, 16)
26P. Derv., VIII.6–11 (Janko, 16)
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literary scholarship in his figurative readings of the Jewish Scriptures. As Niehoff argues, Philo 
actually stressed the inherent ambiguities and difficulties on the surface of the text, in order to 
create a place for his allegorical readings.27 Within this paradigm, however, Philo assumes a 
strict authorial intention built upon the grammatical teachings of antiquity, and it is this 
complex fusion of literal reading with figurative reading that Niehoff believes made Philo very 
attractive to his later readers.28
Philo's strong presumption of authorial intention, itself a grammatical sensibility, leads 
him to pay close attention to the distinct traits of Moses' style.29 Just as Aristarchus claimed that 
Homer spoke clearly, Philo argues that Moses has customary usages of words and terms. Philo 
claims that Moses customarily calls (εἴωθε καλεῖν) someone "young" (νέον), not as a reference 
to the youthfulness of his body but rather as a statement on the state of rebellion that 
accompanies his soul. Similarly, "elder" (πρεσβύτερον) does not refer customarily to old age, 
but Moses intends it to refer to an individual who is worthy of honor.30 Moreover, it is clear 
that Philo considers Moses' choice of terminology to reflect the clarity of the context. 
Reflecting on Abram's inquiry of God in Genesis 15:2 ("But Abram said, 'Master, what will you 
give me?'"),31 Philo offers a literary-critical explanation for Moses' use of "master."
But observe on the other hand that confidence is blended with caution. For while the 
words “what will you give me” reveals (ἐμφαίνει) confidence, the title “master,” reveals
caution. Moses customarily employs (εἰωθὼς δὲ χρῆσθαι) two titles in speaking of the 
Cause, namely God and Lord (τῇ θεὸς καὶ τῇ κύριος). In this case, however, he uses 
neither, but, with great caution and the desire to speak in proper terms, substitutes 
“master” (τὴν δεσπότου). To be sure, these words are said to be synonyms, namely 
27Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 133–51.
28Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 151.
29For further examples of Philo's attention to stylistic traits, see Det. 39–40 (LCL 227:228–29), where he 
reflects on Moses' customary descriptions of Aaron as "mouth," "spokesman," and "prophet"; Gig. 6–7 (LCL 
227:448–49), where Philo discusses Moses' customary attribution of the term "angel."
30Philo, Sobr. 16–17 (LCL 247:450–53), where Philo is reflecting on Moses' description of Joseph in Gen. 
37:2 (LXX): "Joseph was seventeen years and, although he was young, was shepherding the flock with his brothers" 
(Ιωσηφ δέκα ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν ἦν ποιμαίνων μετὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ πρόβατα ὢν νέος).
31Gen. 15:2 (LXX): λέγει δὲ Αβραμ Δέσποτα, τί μοι δώσεις;
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"Lord" and "master." But, although the referent of both is one and the same, the nouns 
express different ideas.32
Philo here reflects not only on the customary usage of "God" and "Lord" to name the Cause, 
but he examines Moses' intention in straying from these terms. Culling even more of his 
grammatical skills, Philo provides a further etymological link to secure his interpretation, 
namely between δεσπότης (master) and δέος (fear). For Philo, though Lord and master have 
God as a referent, the term "master" implies something further. Not only is a δεσπότης a Lord, 
but he is one who is also able to instill fear and terror in his subjects.33 For Philo, Abram's 
question in Genesis 15:2 should be understood to express confidence, even before the 
transcendent Cause of all things.34
The notion that Moses desired clarity and plain speech in the composition of the Torah 
was paramount for Philo. From this conviction, which is identical to Aristarchus' view of 
Homer and the Derveni commentator's conception of Orpheus, Philo echoes Aristarchus' 
earlier arguments and concludes that "Moses spoke nothing superfluously" (περιττὸν ὄνομα 
οὐδὲν τίθησιν).35 Nevertheless, Philo was steeped in the grammatical tradition of Alexandrian 
literary scholarship, and he recognized the obscurity present on occasion in the Torah. His 
description of his interpretive method in On the Confusion of Tongues explicitly claims to deal with 
such unclarity.
There are those who will refute on their own account those writing such things and 
falsifying [the Scriptures], who will have explanations at hand from the outward sense 
of Scripture for questions as they arise. [But we shall offer a figurative interpretation,]36 
32Philo, Her. 22 (LCL 261:294–95)
33Philo, Her. 23 (LCL 261:294–95): ἀλλὰ καὶ δέος καὶ φόβον ἱκανὸν ἐμποιῆσαι
34Cf. Philo, Her. 24–29 (LCL 261:296–99)
35Philo, Fug. 54 (LCL 275:38–39)
36Here, I follow the conjecture of Colson (LCL 261:18n.1) who suggests that an explicit reference to 
Philo's allegorical method has dropped from the text. For similar arguments in Philo, see Conf. 190 (LCL 261:112–
115); Somn. 1.102 (LCL 275:350–51); Sobr. 33 (LCL 247:460–61). The contrast drawn in Colson's reconstruction 
between Philo's method and that of the critical interpreters of the Babel story described in Conf. 1–13 is supported 
by (a) his conviction that others exist who can refute them from the "outward sense of Scripture" (Conf. 14) and 
(b) the use of φαμὲν τοίνυν in Conf. 15 to contrast his own method of refutation. Cf. Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and 
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neither in a contentious spirit nor in order to meet sophistry with sophistry, but rather, 
following the chain of logical sequence, which does not permit stumbling 
(προσπταίειν οὐκ ἐῶντι) but easily removes any stumbling-block that may arise, in 
order that the course of the narratives may be smooth (αἱ τῶν λόγων διέξοδοι 
γίνωνται ἄπταιστοι).37
Philo understood, as did Aristarchus, that texts present ambiguities on the surface. 
Aristarchus, as we have seen, chose to athetize such problems with the aim of discerning the 
Homeric original. In this sense, perhaps, Aristarchus can be likened to Philo's colleagues, whom
he trusts will refute his opponents with explanations "from the outward sense of Scripture" (ἐκ
τῆς φανερᾶς γραφῆς).38 For Philo, however, the presence of such redundancies in the Torah 
were not superfluous in actuality. Instead, Philo insists that an apparent ambiguity in the Jewish 
scriptures serves, as Maren Niehoff has argued, "as an instrument to move from the literal to 
the non-literal level."39 For Philo, the Jewish scriptures contain an underlying consistency from 
first to last.40 All of Moses' instructions are profitable, and athetesis is inappropriate technique. If
an ambiguous statement is observed on the surface of the text, then one is directed to consider 
the consistent figurative meaning that Moses intended. As an example, Niehoff points to the 
narrative of Genesis 4:16, where Cain is said to depart from God's face (ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ 
θεοῦ).41 Philo retorts, based on his understanding of God's transcendence, that such an act is 
impossible (ἀδυνατον). Thus, it is signaled that a more figurative (τροπικώτερον) 
interpretation must be provided through the route of allegory (τὴν δι᾿ ἀλληγορίας ὁδὸν).42 
Philo then adopts a reading of Genesis 4:16 built upon the Platonic motif of rising above the 
Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 77–94, who argues that his exegetical opponents were Jewish colleagues who offered
a comparative mythology for the Tower of Babel narrative.
37Philo, Conf. 14 (LCL 261:16–19)
38Philo, Conf. 14 (LCL 261:16–19). On the literary scholarship of Philo's colleagues, see Niehoff, Jewish 
Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 75–129.
39Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 140. Niehoff provides a helpful discussion of 
Philo's approach to resolving "contradictions" and "verisimilitudes" in Scripture. In this chapter, however, I intend 
the term "ambiguity" to include both of these types of textual obscurities.
40Cf. Philo, Det. 81 (LCL 227:256–57).
41See Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 146–47.
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material realm to reach contemplation of the One. 
Questions and Answers
We have seen that both literal and figurative readers in antiquity closely analyzed the 
stylistic features of texts, since their grammatical education had taught them that authors were 
consistent throughout their compositions. Thus, one could attend to an author's common usage
of terms, the presence of superfluous statements, and the transposition of words to uncover the
clear meaning behind the apparent obscurity that was intended by the author. Another frequent
trait of grammatical interpretation, found in both literal and figurative readers alike, was the 
presence of a question and answer format of textual analysis. 
The Homeric scholia frequently emphasize that the appearance of problems in the text 
gives rise to the need for answers and/or emendations.43 In order to offer such resolution, the 
scholia often take this "question and answer" format (ζητήματα καὶ λύσεις). They may pose a 
question directly (διὰ τί), or they might instead simply say "the answer is that..." (λύσις ὅτι). 
In both of these strategies, however, the fragments of Aristotle's Homeric Questions (Ἀπορήματα 
Ὁμηρικά) looms in the background, where he regularly introduces questions with the διὰ τί 
formula.44 For Aristotle, though an answer could be found by utilizing any number of literary-
critical tools, the questions arose first by the realization of textual ambiguity, frequently from 
apparent contradictions between verses. Any number of textual factors could be used in the 
42See Philo, Post. 1–7 (LCL 227:328–31)
43For a helpful overview of the scholia material, see Dickey, Ancient Greek Scholarship, 18–23; Nünlist, Ancient 
Critic at Work, 7–20
44Though we cannot now know the scope of Aristotle's work on Homer, Diogenes Laertius knew of six 
volumes (D. L. 5.26). And of the 36 extant fragments from the Homeric , 24 include a version of the διὰ τί formula; 
see Valentin Rose, ed., Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta (Leipzig: Teubner, 1886), 120–37. On the question-
and-answer format more broadly, see Christian Jacob, “Questions sur les questions: Archéologie d’une pratique 
intellectuelle et d’une forme discursive,” in Erotapokriseis: Early Christian Question-and-Answer Literature in Context, eds. 
Annelie Volgers and Claudio Zamagni (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 25-54; Yannis Papadoyannakis, “Instruction by 
Question and Answer: The Case of Late Antique and Byzantine Erotapokriseis,” in Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: 
Dynamism, Didacticism, Classicism, ed. Scott Fitzgerald Johnson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 91-105. Cf. Pfeiffer, History of
Classical Scholarship, 69–71; Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 11–12. One should also note the affinities with the twenty-
fifth chapter of Aristotle's Poetics, entitled περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων. See Aristotle, Po. 1460b6. This 
tradition is well-attested even into the third century C.E., where we find Porphyry's Ὁμηρικὰ ζητήματα.
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hands of these capable scholars to offer a resolution to the supposed difficulty.45
What gave rise to most of these questions? It was often the case that a comparison of 
passages led to an apparent contradiction. For example, Aristarchus noticed an apparent 
contradiction between Iliad 22.208 and 22.251. Do Hector and Achilles circle Troy three or four
times? To resolve the discrepancy, Aristarchus culls his grammatical expertise and resolves the 
tension with a geographical analysis in his comments on Iliad 22.251:
οὐ μάχεται δὲ τῷ „ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον“ (Il. 22.208)· τρεῖς μὲν γὰρ τελείους 
κύκλους περιέδραμον, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ἕως τῶν κρουνῶν ἐλθόντες οὐκέτι περιῆλθον 
τὴν πόλιν (schol. A Il. 22.251a)
It does not contradict "but when for the fourth time" (Il. 22.208). For they ran three 
complete cycles, and on the fourth, when they came to the springs, they went no 
further around the city.
In this instance, Aristarchus smooths the narrative with his geographical knowledge of Troy. 
Other ancient readers, while retaining the question and answer format refined by the 
grammatical tradition, provided starkly different resolutions.
In his Questions and Answers, Philo continues the line of reasoning in the "question and 
answer" format from the Homeric scholia.46 He frequently begins with a general inquiry, "Why
is it written that...?" (διὰ τί/τί ἐστιν). His response often comes in a verse-by-verse reflection 
on a portion of the Torah. Significantly, however, his solutions often appeal to the same 
categories as those evidenced in the earlier Homeric scholarship. For example, in his reading of
Genesis 2:19, Philo notices the oddity that God asked Adam to name the animals. Puzzled, 
Philo asks, "Why does [Moses] say, 'He led the animals to man to see what he would call them,'
since God does not doubt?"47 Niehoff has pointed out astutely that Philo's question precludes 
45Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 11–12, has a brief overview of these strategies as they are found in the 
scholia.
46James R. Royse, “The Works of Philo,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philo, ed. Adam Kamesar (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 34–35.
47Philo, QG 1.21 (LCL 380:13)
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one from offering a resolution that appeals to God's anthropomorphic features.48 But the more 
interesting point to be seen is the fact that the resolution Philo does provide is built on one of 
literary criticism's standard forms of resolving textual obscurity—λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου (i.e.,
"solution from the character").49 To be sure, the solution ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου often turns on an 
identification of the speaker or hearer of a particular phrase.50 But here, Philo offers a solution 
"from the character" in a second sense. He claims that "doubting is foreign to the truly Divine 
Power."51 Philo, certain that the narrative cannot imply that God doubted, suggests instead that 
it presents God as the suitable character who, having given mind (νοῦν) to man, allows him to 
name the animals in accordance with his natural reason. Thus, not only does Philo provide a 
solution according to which God must not act out of character, but appealing to the 
grammarian's principle of propriety, he suggests that this is the most appropriate 
understanding of the text.52
Plausibility
Aristarchus was frequently concerned with the ambiguities that arise in texts with 
respect to the plausibility of an action or event. His assumption was that Homer presented a 
text that was true to reality, and any presentation that seemed unrealistic were often rejected on
48Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 161–62.
49A. Gudeman, "λύσεις," RE 13, ed. G. Wissowa (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1927), 2511–29.
50For an introduction to the ancient practice of prosopological exegesis, see Neuschäfer, Origenes als 
Philologe, 1:263–76. For Aristarchus' use of this technique, see Adolf Römer, Die Homerexegese Aristarchs in ihren Grundzügen
dargestellt, ed. Emil Belzner (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1924), 253–56. For its application in early Christian exegesis 
of the Psalter, see Marie-Josèphe Rondeau, Les commentaires patristiques du Psautier: IIIe-Ve siècles. Vol. 2, Exégèse prosopologique et 
théologie, (Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1985).
51Philo, QG 1.21 (LCL 380:13): Ἀλλότριον γὰρ ὄντως θείας δυνάμεως τὸ ἐνδοιάζειν·
52Philo's argument therefore reveals the blurring of lines between issues of "character" and "fittingness" 
in these literary-critical strategies. One must not act "out of character" (παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπον), for this would not 
be suitable (ἀνάρμοστον/οὐκ οἰκεῖον/οὐ πρέπον). Cf. schol. A Il. 3.395; schol. A. Il. 8.164–6a; schol. A. Il. 
20.180–6a. The recommendation that a character should be suitable or appropriate to the narrative goes back to 
Aristotle (Po. 1454a16–36). Cf. Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 246–54. To be sure, Philo does not use these terms of 
"fittingness" to describe God's character in the Genesis narrative. He does, however, describe the activity of 
naming to be a "suitable example" (ἐπίδειξιν οἰκείαν) of the exercise of the reason God had bestowed upon man. 
For Philo, the issue of naming is a suitable action to follow from God's bestowal of νοῦς to man.
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this criterion of plausibility.53 Every event recounted in the epic should be believable. If it was 
not, then Aristarchus either offered a solution to the ambiguity or proposed to athetize the 
phrase. This principle of plausibility (πιθανός) was the foundation for Aristarchus' solution to 
the famous duals of Iliad 9. For Aristarchus, the narrative only makes sense if one understands 
two specific people to be present, Odysseus and Ajax. 
 τὼ δὲ βάτην <προτέρω, ἡγεῖτο δὲ δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς>: ὅτι ἐπὶ Ὀδυσσέως καὶ Αἴαντος 
τὸ δυϊκόν· παρόντος γὰρ τοῦ Φοίνικος ἀπίθανον λέγειν ἡγεῖτο δὲ δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς. 
(schol. A Il. 9.192a)
"The two of them came forward, and noble Odysseus led the way: [the diple is] 
because the dual is for Odysseus and Ajax. For if Phoenix had been present, it would 
have been implausible to say “noble Odysseus led the way.”
For Aristarchus, the ambiguity presented by the duals is resolved by clarifying that Homer 
meant Odysseus and Ajax. If Phoenix had been in the scene, then Homer's phrase would have 
been improbable (ἀπίθανον). Elsewhere, Aristarchus appeals to the principle of plausibility to 
adjudicate matters of chronology and to restrict even supernatural episodes to a level of 
believability, resulting in each case in an athetesis of one or more verses.54 Once again, however,
the use of this grammatical technique is not limited to a literal exegete like Aristarchus.
In his Compendium of Greek Theology, the first century C.E. Stoic philosopher Lucius Annaeus 
Cornutus aims to uncover the underlying truths expressed in the veneer of ancient poetry, 
particularly that of Hesiod. Although writing some five hundred years later, Cornutus employs 
language similar to that of the Derveni commentator. Cornutus uses αἴνιγμα (and its cognates) 
once again to suggest that the poet's composition hints at deeper theological realities.55 In 
53Schironi, “Theory into Practice,” 286–88.
54For the use of the couple πιθανός/ἀπίθανος in a chronological matter, see schol. A Il. 3.144a. For its 
use in a supernatural episode, see schol. A Il. 19.416–17a. In each of these cases, Aristarchus uses the principle of 
probability to suggest that the lines be athetized (ἀθετέω). For general considerations on Aristarchean athetesis, 
see Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 16, esp. 16n.17.
55The best study on Cornutus' allegorical interpretation is Glenn W. Most, “Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis:
A Preliminary Report,” ANRW 2.36.3 (1989): 2014-65. Cf. A. A. Long, “Stoic Readings of Homer,” in Homer’s Ancient
Readers: The Hermeneutics of Greek Epic’s Earliest Exegetes, eds. Robert Lamberton and John J. Keaney (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 53; Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 145. Cornutus uses αἴνιγμα cognates to describe 
the power of the poet's images and words to carry a deeper signification on ten occasions throughout his 
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chapter thirty-two of his Compendium, Cornutus writes of the gods Apollo and Artemis in this 
way: 
Next, my child, Apollo is the sun, and Artemis is the moon. And here is the reason that 
people represented them both as archers: they were hinting (αἰνιττόμενοι) at their 
release of far-ranging rays (πόρρω τῶν ἀκτίνων). The sun is called the "far-shooter" 
(ἕκατος), as is the moon (ἑκάτη), because they release and send forth their light to 
earth from afar (ἕκαθεν).56
For Cornutus, the poet's representation of Apollo as an archer is a subtle hint at his epithet 
Ἕκατος, an enigmatic description of his identity as Helios rather than his skill with the bow. 
Similarly, by Zeus' expulsion of Kronos as king, the poet suggests (αἰνίττονται) the victory of 
order over chaos in the cosmos.57 The enigma, however, is not Cornutus' preferred term for 
figurative reading. This honor is held by the term "symbol" (σύμβολον). As Struck notes, 
Cornutus especially turns to the idea of the symbol to indicate "the accoutrements of particular 
deities, which are interpretable codes of their qualities."58 The symbol, therefore, becomes the 
vehicle of theological truth, and Cornutus closes the Compendium with an exhortation for his 
student to read the poets carefully, since they were themselves the harbingers of philosophy.
And so, my child, it is my hope that you may be able in this same way to refer the other
things handed down to us in mythical form, seemingly about the gods, to the 
elementary models I have taught you, convinced that the men of antiquity were not 
common men, but rather they were well-suited both to understand the nature of the 
cosmos and to make philosophical statements about it through symbols and enigmas 
(πρὸς τὸ διὰ συμβόλων καὶ αἰνιγμάτων φιλοσοφῆσαι περὶ αὐτῆς εὐεπίφοροι).59
To uncover the theology in the myths, Cornutus interprets these symbols on 
etymological grounds. As a Stoic exegete, it may not be surprising for one to note the 
Compendium.
56Cornutus, ND 32 (Lang, 65.1–6)
57Cornutus, ND 7 (Lang, 7.21).
58Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 145–51. Any number of examples could be provided. Zeus' scepter serves as a 
σύμβολον of his reign, see ND 9 (Lang, 10.10). In ND 20 (Lang, 36.9), Athena's virginity is a σύμβολον of purity.
59Cornutus, ND 35 (Lang, 75.17–76.5)
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etymological methodology employed in Cornutus' Compendium. Nevertheless, one should not 
presume that etymology was the sole prerogative of philosophical allegoresis, lest he overlook 
the correlation between Cornutus' etymology and the literary exegesis of scholars like 
Aristarchus.60 Though etymology was certainly useful in Stoic philosophical speculation of the 
earliest poetic myths, we have already seen that it was also a skill learned from the grammarian 
to ascertain a text's historical context.61 
Etymology was built on the same principles of ambiguity and homonymy that allowed 
words to have more than one potential referent. In an example from chapter thirty-one of his 
Compendium, we find Cornutus reflecting on the literary potential of etymological construction. 
He suggests that the consort between Heracles and Hebe should be viewed as entirely suitable 
(οἰκείως), since this reading etymologically suggests that understanding is all the more 
complete when reason is paired with youth.62 Similarly, Cornutus concludes that Heracles' 
yearlong service to Omphale was surely "quite plausible" (πιθανωτέραν). According to 
Cornutus, the ancients suggest (ἐμφαινόντων) that even the strongest men have the need to 
submit to reason and, if necessary, the feminine voice (ὀμφῆς).63 The term ἔμφασις was used 
in both the rhetorical arts and literary criticism to describe passages where a meaning is 
60For the Stoic use of etymology and allegorical practices, see Buffière, Les Mythes d’Homère et la pensée grecque, 
60–65; Alain Le Boulluec, “L’Allegorie chez les Stoiciens,” Poétique 23 (1975): 301-21; Most, “Cornutus”; and 
Long, “Stoic Readings of Homer.”. I am persuaded by Long's argument that the Stoic practice of etymology was 
not intended as a means to discern the poet's intention, rather than a search for the "beliefs about the world held 
by those who first gave the gods their present names" (54). On Aristarchus' employment of etymology, see 
Francesca Schironi, “Aristarchus and his Use of Etymology,” in Etymologia: Studies in Ancient Etymology, ed. Christos 
Nifadopoulos (Münster: Nodus Publikationen, 2003), 71-78.
61See chapter two above, 25n.45. Cf. Plutarch, De aud. poet. 23a (LCL 197:118–21), who also suggests that 
meaning may be constructed etymologically from the divine names, and the interpreter must judge whether the 
name is used to reference the god or rather "certain faculties" that find their origin in the god. Robert Stephen 
Hays, “Lucius Annaeus Cornutus’ ‘Epidrome’ (Introduction to the Traditions of Greek Theology): Introduction, 
Translation, and Notes,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1983), 23, observes that, "as we come to the 
age in which Cornutus lived, it is necessary to be clear that detailed study of such matters as etymology and 
recondite mythological and ethnological details are not matters of interest only to philosophical teachers. They are,
rather, topics common to virtually all teachers of higher education, and a component of the education of virtually 
everyone educated under a grammaticus."
62Cornutus, ND 31 (Lang, 64.3–7). Here, Cornutus is reflecting on the maturity of Herakles as λόγος with
the youthfulness of Hebe (Ἥβῃ). Their cohabitation suggests a holistic maturation (cf. ἡβάω).
63Cornutus, ND 31 (Lang, 64.8–14)
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implied rather than stated explicitly, not an altogether surprising feature for a figurative text 
built upon the concepts of symbol and enigma.64 And it was the principle of plausibility, a clear
coherence between symbol and implied reality, that made each of these accounts entirely 
believable for Cornutus. Regardless of whether one finds such etymologies as convincing as 
Cornutus did, the significant point to note is that these readings were powered by the same 
conceptual tool as Aristarchus' resolution of Homer's duals. 
Propriety
As we noted earlier in the chapter, the crucial aim of the grammarian's task was to 
clarify any and all ambiguous statements, in order to provide the interpretation most suitable to
the author's intention (διάνοια). We have already seen Plutarch's argument for the necessity of a
proper interpretation, but this principle is cited frequently by ancient readers. Drawing upon 
Aristotle's link between propriety and character expectations, the scholia disclose Aristarchus' 
belief that the characters must remain consistent and credible to the narrative as a whole.65 
Aristarchus will not accept Achilles' cheap insults of Aeneas in Iliad 20, since they are 
"unsuitable to his character."66 For Aristarchus as for Aristotle, a character must act according to
common expectations, that is, as their social standing, age, gender, or present situation might 
dictate. There is, then, a clear distinction between what is appropriate for the gods and what is 
fitting for humans. For instance, in Iliad 1, in an encounter with Athena, Achilles claims that 
Agamemnon's arrogance will be his downfall. Yet, Aristarchus mounts an argument against the 
64One could therefore rightly link ἔμφασις with the concept of ὑπόνοια; see Ps. Plutarch, Hom. 26 
(KL 94–7). On ἔμφασις in ancient criticism, see Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 211. Cf. Neuschäfer, Origenes als 
Philologe, 225–27, who examines Origen's use of ἔμφασις. Neuschäfer notes, however, that the semantic range of 
the term is broad enough to allow for implied meanings, as Cornutus uses it, but that it can just as easily refer to 
words that are particularly expressive, much like its usage in modern language: "Was heutzutage unter Emphase 
und emphatisch verstanden wird, ist somit keine Erfindung der Neuzeit, sondern entspricht antikem 
Sprachgebrauch, der nicht einseitig an der rhetorischen Schuldefinition abgelesen werden darf." See Lausberg, 
Handbuch, §1246.
65On the principle of propriety in Aristarchus, see Schironi, “Theory into Practice,” 290–97. On this 
point, cf. Aristotle, Po. 1454a16–28; Rh. 1408a10–11.
66See schol. A Il. 20.180–86a: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι ἑπτά, ὅτι εὐτελεῖς εἰσι τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ τοῖς νοήμασι, 
καὶ οἱ λόγοι οὐ πρέποντες τῷ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως προσώπῳ
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reading from Zenodotus' edition. Since the ability to consider the future with such certainty is 
rather "more suitable to Athena [than Achilles]" (τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ἁρμόζει μᾶλλον), Aristarchus 
suggests an emendation from Achilles' definitive statement ("it will end this way") to the more 
speculative claim, "I suspect it shall end this way."67 In a similar way, there is a fitting portrayal 
according to social standing. Aristarchus athetizes seven lines from Iliad 6 that recount 
Andromache's counsel to Hector. These words of strategic advice are unsuitable (ἀνοίκειοι) 
from Andromache's mouth, since she is a woman.68 This Aristotelian principle of propriety, 
however, was equally at home in figurative readings of antiquity.
Nothing much is known of Heraclitus the Allegorist beyond his name. His treatise on 
Homeric Problems, however, supplies a crucial piece of evidence for the techniques of literary 
criticism in the imperial period.69 From the outset of his treatise, it is clear that Heraclitus 
intends to defend Homer from critics who charge him with a contempt of the gods (περὶ τῆς 
εἰς τὸ θεῖον ὀλιγωρίας). Strikingly, Heraclitus agrees with these Homeric antagonists, and in a 
statement that reveals the purposes of his work, Heraclitus claims, "If Homer spoke nothing 
allegorically, then he is entirely impious."70 Heraclitus recognizes the ambiguities and 
difficulties in the Homeric text, and like Aristarchus and the grammarians of Ptolemaic 
67See schol. A Il. 1.204b: τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελέσθαι ὀΐω: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει „τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον 
ἔσται“. τοῦτο δὲ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ἁρμόζει μᾶλλον διαβεβαιοῦν
68See schol. A Il. 6.433–39: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι ἑπτὰ ἕως τοῦ (439) ἤ νυ καὶ αὐτῶν θυμός, ὅτι ἀνοίκειοι 
οἱ λόγοι τῇ Ἀνδρομάχῃ· ἀντιστρατηγεῖ γὰρ τῷ Ἕκτορι
69In the Homeric Problems, Heraclitus refers both to Crates of Mallos (All. 27.2) and Apollodorus of Athens 
(All. 7.1), both contemporaries of Aristarchus in Alexandria. Both Crates and Apollodorus can be dated rather safely
to the second century B.C.E., and Heraclitus must have lived, therefore, in the first century B.C.E. or later. It is 
possible that Heraclitus' desire to employ ἀλληγορία (and its cognates) as a technical term serves as the immediate
background to Plutarch's comment that "allegories" (ἀλληγορίαις) had now replaced "undermeanings" 
(ὑπονοίαις) as a description of poetic texts. If this is the case, then the Homeric Problems may be dated to around 100 
C.E. Regardless, we are safe to assign the text broadly to the first or second century C.E., as most scholars do. On 
the dating of Heraclitus and the Homeric Problems, see Félix Buffière's introductory material to the critical edition, 
"Introduction" (Budé ix–x); Cynthia L. Thompson, “Stoic Allegory of Homer: A Critical Analysis of Heraclitus’ 
Homeric Allusions,” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1973), 4–5; Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie, 159; Long, “Stoic Readings of 
Homer,” 45; and Donald A. Russell and David Konstan, eds. Heraclitus: Homeric Problems (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2005), xi–xiii.
70Heraclitus, All. 1.1 (Budé, 1): πάντα γὰρ ἠσέβησεν, εἰ μηδὲν ἠλληγόρησεν
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Alexandria, he seeks to clarify Homer's intentions.71 For Heraclitus, it is clear (σαφὲς) that 
Homer included no polluted fictions (ἐναγῶν μύθων) in his poems.72 But Heraclitus' 
resolution is more Philonic than Aristarchean. From Heraclitus' perspective, Homer had 
employed allegory in his composition, and the one who reads him must seek to understand the
proper intention (τὸ νοούμενον) of the words that he spoke (τὸ λεγόμενόν).73 Failure to 
comprehend the poet's intention reveals a flaw, not in the author, but in the reader.
If some ignorant people (ἀμαθεῖς) fail to recognize Homeric allegory (την Ὁμηρικὴν 
ἀλληγορίαν) and have not descended into the secret caverns of his wisdom but instead 
have risked a hasty judgment of the truth without proper consideration, and if then 
they seize hastily on what they take to be his mythical invention, because they do not 
know what is said in a philosophical sense (τὸ φιλοσόφως ῥηθὲν), let them leave! But 
let us, who have been hallowed within the sacred enclosure, methodically track down 
in the deeper sense the grand truth of the poems.74
Much like Philo's claim that the Jewish Scriptures contained an underlying 
consistency,75 Heraclitus contends that Homer had intentionally crafted his texts to 
communicate truths obliquely. In fact, Homer should be expected to use nonliteral modes of 
communication, since even the greatest philosophers used symbols and unclear words to 
express their points. As Heraclitus claims, "It is not paradoxical to think that, when those who 
claim primarily to practice philosophy use allegorical expressions, the professional poet should 
71Heraclitus, All. 3.1 (Budé, 3), contends that, far from disrespecting the gods, Homer in fact honors 
them (νεωκορεῖ).
72Heraclitus, All. 2.1 (Budé, 2). There is an interesting juxtaposition here with the position of Cornutus, 
who clearly believed that the poets had included myths that had been fabricated and polluted in their poems. Cf. 
Cornutus, ND 17 (Lang, 27.19–28.2).
73On Homer's allegorical composition, see esp. Heraclitus, All. 6.1–2 (Budé, 6). For the distinction 
between spoken word and intention, see All. 5.16 (Budé, 6). Elsewhere, Homer's intention is referred to as the 
"clear meaning" (τὸ δηλούμενον; 5.16), the "truth of the poems" (τῶν ποιημάτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; 3.3), a 
"philosophical notion" (φιλοσοφοῦσαν ἔννοιαν; 16.5), and the "allegorical intention" (τοῖς νοουμένοις κατ᾽ 
ἀλληγορίαν; 17.3).
74Heraclitus, All. 3.2–3 (Budé, 3). In the final clause, I am reading ὑπονοίᾳ ("deeper sense") instead of 
ὑπὸ νόμῳ. See the conjecture by Russell and Konstan, Heraclitus: Homeric Problems, 6n.5.
75Philo, Det. 81 (LCL 227:256–57).
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practice allegory in a similar fashion to the philosophers."76 Heraclitus here stands as a further 
representative of the stream of figurative interpretation that is powered by enigmatic discourse 
and which traces back as far as the Derveni commentator. 77Yet, here once again, we find that 
the capable interpreter of these enigmatic truths is the exegete who can clarify Homer's 
ambiguous statements in order to discern his original intention, and in his creative exegesis, 
Heraclitus frequently appeals to the principle of propriety.
In Homer's account of Hephaestus (Ἥφαιστος), Hephaestus is presented as lame 
(χωλὸν) and near death. The effect of this presentation, as Heraclitus recounts, is a critique 
against Homer for damaging Hephaestus's divine nature (τὴν θείαν ἀκρωτηριάζων φύσιν). Yet, 
Heraclitus argues that the poet's intention was not to speak of the divine Hephaestus in this 
passage. Indeed, were Homer to speak of a lame Hephaestus, it would be an "improper account
of the gods" (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀπρεπὲς ὄντως ἱστορεῖν περὶ θεῶν). Readers must realize that, 
according to the principle of propriety, Homer could not speak of the gods in such a way. He 
must refer to something else with the term Ἥφαιστος. And, in a move reminiscent of 
Plutarch's arguments for the necessity of disambiguation for proper interpretation, Heraclitus 
contends that the ambiguity arises from the term's inherent polysemy. He recalls that the 
essence of fire is twofold (διπλῆ); that is, there is an ethereal fire (τὸ μὲν αἰθέριον), suspended 
in the heavens, and a terrestrial fire (πρόσγειος), which is destructible. It is this earthly fire that
is appropriately called "lame."78 Heraclitus confirms that this was Homer's intention by 
appealing to another passage in the Illiad, where he avers that Homer spoke clearly, with no 
need of exegesis. 
Indeed, Homer elsewhere calls fire Hephaestus in plain words, not figuratively at all: 
"They held the entrails, spitted, over 'Hephaestus'." In saying that the entrails are roasted
76Heraclitus, All. 24.8 (Budé, 30); cf. All. 24.1–5 (Budé, 29–30).
77Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 155, claims that "like the rhetorical critics, Heraclitus believes in Homer's total 
control over the text's meaning, a position sometimes absent, or at least nuanced, in allegorical readers." In my 
view, Struck here completely misses the grammatical foundations of any claim to authorial intention, which results
in a severe diminishing of the role that such questions play in the very allegorical reading that he wants to 
foreground.
78For this argument, see Heraclitus, All. 26.1–10 (Budé, 32–33).
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by "Hephaestus," Homer has transferred the term.
Τὸν γοῦν Ἥφαιστον οὐκ ἀλληγορικῶς ἐν ἑτέροις ἀλλὰ διαρρήδην φησὶν Ὅμηρος 
εἶναι· Σπλάγχνα δ’ ἄρ’ ἀμπείραντες ὑπείρεχον Ἡφαίστοιο· μεταληπτικῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ 
Ἡφαίστου τὰ σπλάγχνα φησὶν ὀπτᾶσθαι.79
Heraclitus recognizes that at times a writer may speak plainly (διαρρήδην), with no need of 
interpretation. Thus, a reader need only compare this clear speech with the ambiguous 
passage—the very strategy that Heraclitus models here—in order to clarify the latter.
Textimmanence and the Grammatical Archive
I hope by this point that the similarities between literal and figural reading among 
ancient exegetes has become clear. Inasmuch as they had been invested with the skills of the 
grammarians, all ancient readers sought to resolve textual ambiguities. This was indeed the aim 
of creative exegesis, namely, to clarify what was seemingly unclear. We have seen that literal and
figurative readers often employed the same techniques to achieve what is in their estimation a 
suitable and proper understanding of an author's meaning. I want suggest that this general 
idea—that literal and figurative reading were both characterized by the principles of creative 
exegesis—may best be understood by the concept of textimmanence.80
In the last subsection, I suggested that Heraclitus grounded his interpretation of the 
term "Hephaestus" by comparing an ambiguous phrase with a clear passage elsewhere in the 
Iliad. For Heraclitus, the propriety of his reading was confirmed by an appeal to a grammatical 
technique that is most often described under the maxim that Porphyry preserves for us: 
Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν.81 Of course, this principle as exemplified by Porphyry and 
79Heraclitus, All. 26.11 (Budé, 33)
80I have borrowed the helpful terminology of textimmanence from René Nünlist, “Aristarchus and 
Allegorical Interpretation,” in Ancient Scholarship and Grammar: Archetypes, Concepts, and Contexts, eds. Stephanos Matthaios, 
Franco Montanari, and Antonios Rengakos (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 8–9. Nünlist does not, however, employ 
this concept to the ends that I intend here. 
81See Porphyry, Quaest. Homer. 2.297.16–17 (Schrader). The most detailed discussion of this maxim to date 
is Christoph Schäublin, “Homerum ex Homero,” MH 34 (1977): 221-27. For other reflections on this principle, 
see Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship, 225–27; Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, 276–85; and Porter, “Hermeneutic 
Lines and Circles,” 67–85, who concludes that there is no overwhelming evidence to suggest that the maxim did 
52
Aristarchus, who is at times credited as its originator, concerns resolving obscurity on the 
surface of the text. But, if my argument is correct, and the entire process of the grammarian's 
literary analysis can be described as a creative exegesis that clarifies textual obscurity, then 
Heraclitus' aim to discern the intention (διάνοια) of the text in figural fashion is not, in fact, 
dissimilar from Aristarchus' resolution of obscurity on the surface of the text. In fact, this is the 
very point made by James Porter, who has claimed that the concept behind the Homerum ex 
Homero principle is centered on "the relationship of ipsissima verba to the recovery of meaning."82 
Thus, the objective of Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν can be understood as entirely similar to 
the claims of Cicero and Aristotle that we looked at earlier, but which I reiterate here:83
One gets much closer to a writer's intent (ad scriptoris voluntatem) if one interprets it from 
the writer's own words (ex ipsius litteris) than one who does not learn the writer's 
intention (sententiam scriptoris) from his own writing (ex ipsius scripto) (Cicero, Inv. 2.128) 
One must look (σκοπεῖν) not to the letter (λόγον) of the law, but to the intention 
(διάνοιαν) of the lawgiver (Aristotle, Rh. 1374b11)
The intention cannot be divorced from the letters. If we miss this subtle but significant 
point about ancient exegesis, we might come to conclusions that are not fit to the evidence at 
hand. Consider two examples. On the one hand, a scholar like Aristarchus, who clearly prefers 
to resolve obscurity on the surface of the text, is erroneously considered an opponent of figural
reading. On the other hand, rarely does one ever question whether figural readers like Cornutus
or Heraclitus have any limitations on their readings. In my view, however, both of these 
inclinations miss the mark. On the contrary, I suggest that the use of the Homerum ex homero 
principle in both modes of reading—literal and figural—can be understood as a search for a 
not originate with Aristarchus. Whether the maxim was original to Aristarchus or not, Schironi, “Greek 
Commentaries,” 436, is certainly right to say that "this easy motto is a very good description of Aristarchus’ 
methodology."
82Porter, “Hermeneutic Lines and Circles,” 73–74.
83On these parallels with the Homerum ex Homero principle, see Schäublin, “Homerum ex Homero,” 222–
26. Schäublin (222) also calls attention to Galen's statement in De com. sec. Hipp. 1.5 (CMG 5.9.2:182.23ff): ἐχρῆν 
γὰρ ἐξ Ἱπποκράτους αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐξήγησιν ποιεῖσθαι τῆς λέξεως, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ὅτι πιθανῶς εἴρηται λέγειν 
ἔχωμεν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γνώμην. It is helpful to note the criterion of plausibility (πιθανῶς) within
Galen's statement as well.
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resolution to the obscurity of a passage that is textimmanent. That is, figural and surface readers 
alike seek the intention that arises from the very words of the page—the ipsissima verba. Such a 
perspective will render a more balanced view of these two modes of reading, particularly 
highlighting the similar grammatical archive that they share. Permit me to illustrate my 
understanding of a textimmanent resolution by considering in turn the two mistaken 
inclinations I mentioned above.
Aristarchus and Figural Reading?
First, the general consensus of scholarship has been that Aristarchus was thoroughly 
opposed to figurative reading. Much of this claim is based on the testimony of a single 
scholium, which reads as follows:
Ἀρίσταρχος ἀξιοῖ “τὰ φραζόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ μυθικώτερον ἐκδέχεσθαι κατὰ τὴν
ποιητικὴν ἐξουσίαν, μηδὲν ἔξω τῶν φραζομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ περιεργαζομένους” 
(schol. D Il. 5.385)
Aristarchus demands "that <readers> accept the things said by the poet in a more 
mythical way in accordance with his poetic licence, without busying themselves about 
anything outside of the things said by the poet."
The scholium concerns the myth of Otus and Ephialtes in Iliad 5, and many have 
concluded from this apparent verbatim quote of Aristarchus that he never employed figurative 
readings in order to uncover a second, more fitting sense.84 The conclusion of most scholars has
been that "Aristarchus's advice has no sense at all unless it is directed against allegorizing 
interpretations of the passage."85 And as James Porter suggests, this view would seem to be 
supported by a commentary on this same passage from Eustathius of Thessalonica in the twelfth
century C.E.86
84Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie, 169–70; Porter, “Hermeneutic Lines and Circles,” 70–71; Dawson, Allegorical 
Readers, 66; Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 21–22.
85Porter, “Hermeneutic Lines and Circles,” 70. 
86Porter, “Hermeneutic Lines and Circles,” 71. The best edition of Eustathius' commentary on the Iliad is 
Marchinus van der Valk, ed., Eustathii Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem Pertinentes, 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1971–87).
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ἡ δὲ ἀλληγορία, εἰ καὶ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος ἠξίου, ὡς προεγράφη, μηδέν τι τῶν παρὰ τῇ 
ποιήσει μυθικῶν περιεργάζεσθαι ἀλληγορικῶς ἔξω τῶν φραζομένων
The allegorical interpretation [of this passage is], even if Aristarchus demanded, as has 
been written above, that one should not busy oneself with any of the poem’s mythical 
stories in an allegorical way outside of the things that are said . . . (Eustathius, 561.28)87
The key point to draw from Eustathius' comments on Iliad 5.385 is his use of the adverb
ἀλληγορικῶς.88 Yet, significantly, this term is not found in the Aristarchean passage in the D-
scholia. In Eustathius' account, Aristarchus is portrayed as claiming that the poem's mythical 
elements (τι τῶν παρὰ τῇ ποιήσει μυθικῶν) should not be treated ἀλληγορικῶς, which he 
equates to things "outside of the things said." This reading of Aristarchus results in a 
particularly restrictive view of the maxim Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν. If Aristarchus was 
anti-allegorical in the sense that Eustathius maintains, then the maxim Homerum ex Homero must 
mean that Homer is clarified solely on the surface of the text.89 But is this the intention of either 
Aristarchus' claim in the D-scholium or the interpretive maxim associated with his scholarship?
Eustathius explicitly draws attention to the contrast between μυθικῶς and 
ἀλληγορικῶς, which is altogether not surprising. For Eustathius, these terms are diametrically 
opposed. They mean "non-allegorically" and "allegorically," respectively.90 But this cannot be 
the case for Aristarchus. As Rene Nünlist has emphasized, the contrast between these two terms 
certainly postdates Aristarchus. For Aristarchus, μυθικῶς must mean something along the lines 
of "in a fictional way," and according to the Homeric scholia, the ability to treat events μυθικῶς
may be exercised according to the poet's license.91 Nünlist gives a more suitable interpretation 
87Eust. 561.28 (Valk 2:101.13ff)
88This is the starting point of the insightful essay of Nünlist, “Aristarchus and Allegorical Interpretation,” 
esp. 107. Nünlist is able to provide numerous pieces of evidence that I cannot here consider to offer a compelling 
argument, which I follow here.
89Cf. Philo, Conf. 14 (LCL 261:16–19), who suggests that he has colleagues who are capable of refuting 
opponents "from the manifest sense of Scripture" (ἐκ τῆς φανερᾶς γραφῆς).
90See Nünlist, “Aristarchus and Allegorical Interpretation,” 109–10. Cf. Eust. 157.24–30 (Valk 1:242.21–
27), where μυθικῶς means "non-allegorically"; schol. D Il. 15.18, where μυθικῶς seems to mean "allegorically."
91Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 174–84. It is also questionable whether ἀλληγορία (and its cognates) was 
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of Aristarchus' claim from the D-scholium: "readers should not be bothered by mythical stories
that might test their sense of credibility, but accept them as fiction and thus as belonging to the 
arsenal that is typical of poets (i.e. poetic license). Moreover, they should adhere to an 
interpretation that is textimmanent."92 In other words, when a poet speaks μυθικῶς, the scholar's 
task is to discern the "fictional" intention from the words themselves, for it is this intention 
that rises from the very words employed.
In terms of the maxim Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν, I am not suggesting that 
Aristarchus understood this to include allegorical interpretations of texts. I am merely claiming 
that, even if Aristarchus was not an active practitioner of figural reading, to characterize him as 
an outspoken opponent of nonliteral textual practices stretches the evidence too thinly. 
Moreover, if this is indeed the case, and the maxim Homerum ex Homero is best summarized as a 
principle that demands an interpretation to be textimmanent—drawn from the words 
themselves—, then it certainly does not rule out a priori the possibility that one could apply the 
maxim towards figural ends, as I have suggested Heraclitus does. Nevertheless, a second point 
should be made regarding textimmanence and the boundaries of nonliteral readings. Rather 
than look once again at Heraclitus, I want to use Cornutus, a figure who multiplies 
etymological examples, to make this second point.
Limitations to Cornutus' Allegory?
We have already seen that Cornutus offered etymological readings in his Compendium of 
Greek Theology based on the principle of plausibility. That is, he sought a clear coherence between 
the textual symbol and the reality to which it pointed. Thus, Heracles' service to Omphale was 
"quite plausible" (πιθανωτέραν), since the ancients implied by this account that even the 
strongest men have the need to submit to reason and, if necessary, the feminine voice 
in use or what it meant in Aristarchus' time. Cf. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship, 226–27, who notes Eustathius' 
"interpolation" of ἀλληγορικῶς. 
92Nünlist, “Aristarchus and Allegorical Interpretation,” 109, emphasis original.
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(ὀμφῆς).93 Earlier in the chapter, however, I omitted a striking claim that Cornutus makes in the
course of his reading of this account. He claims, "It is also possible to refer the twelve labors to 
[Heracles], as Cleanthes did. But it is not necessary for us always to give priority to that 
inventer of ingenious arguments."94 Cornutus' aim in reading is ostensibly the same as 
Cleanthes' goal, which is the discovery of philosophical truth subsumed in the text. But in his 
reading of the Heraclean myth, Cornutus differs quite noticeably from Cleanthes. As J. Tate has 
observed, Cornutus believes that "etymology should be more restricted in its application than 
Cleanthes imagined; the myths are so obscure and ambiguous that we ought to be content with
the most reasonable interpretation instead of multiplying ingenuities."95 We have already seen 
that ancient readers were seeking the most reasonable interpretation of an author's intention; 
here, however, Cornutus claims that there is no reason to move beyond the suitable resolution 
of the obscurity. In other words, the interpretation should be textimmanent; there is no need 
for "ingenious arguments."96
Indeed, the term ὑπόνοια, which was Plato's preferred term for what would come to be
called allegory, actually implied that the underlying meaning was stored up in the text itself.97 
N. J. Richardson has shown that the Homeric scholars among the sophists perhaps saw no sharp
distinction between philological analysis of a text and the search for interpretations that reveal 
the text's ὑπόνοιαι,98 and the Homeric scholia occasionally provide examples of readers who 
93Cornutus, ND 31 (Lang, 64.8–14)
94Cornutus, ND 31 (Lang, 64.15–17): τοὺς δὲ δώδεκα ἄθλους ἐνδέχεται μὲν ἀναγαγεῖν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως 
ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, ὡς καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐποίησεν· οὐ δεῖν δὲ δοκεῖ πανταχοῦ εὑρεσίλογον πρεσβεύειν
95J. Tate, “Cornutus and the Poets,” CQ 23 (1929), 43, emphasis mine.
96It is important to note here the argument of Boys-Stones, “The Stoics’ Two Types of Allegory,” esp., 205–
16, who emphasizes that, in addition to the traditional Stoic allegory that survives into this period, with Cornutus 
(among others) we see the rise of a second type of Stoic allegory. This allegory appears much closer to the later 
allegory to be found among Neoplatonists and Christians. Boys-Stones emphasizes that this second type of 
allegory is necessary when an author has chosen to conceal the deepest truths, which only those skilled to 
interpret may recover. Seen in this light, this second type of Stoic allegory is clearly reminiscent of the symbolic 
tradition of nonliteral reading that Struck, Birth of the Symbol, traces to the Derveni Papyrus.
97Cf. Nünlist, “Aristarchus and Allegorical Interpretation,” 109n.12.
98N. J. Richardson, “Homeric Professors in the Age of the Sophists,” PCPhS 21 (1975), 67.
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still sought to uncover the ὑπόνοια of a given passage.99 These "undermeanings" are associated 
with symbols and enigmas throughout the figural tradition that Peter Struck surveys, and I 
suggest that the concept of "undermeaning"—an intention buried within the words, but 
carried by the word nonetheless—is a reflection of the desire to provide a textimmanent 
interpretation. 
Thus, we have seen that the concept of a textimmanent intention emphasizes the 
grammatical archive shared by the literal and figural readers we have looked at in this chapter. It
thus provides us with the final phrase for our definition of creative exegesis, which now reads 
as follows:
Creative exegesis is the task of clarifying textual obscurity by employing the literary-
critical tools of the grammarians to discover the textimmanent intention of an author.
Creative Exegesis as Archival Thinking
In the last two chapters, I have attempted to develop a definition for the concept of 
"creative exegesis" as it is seen in the work of ancient exegetes. I have argued that creative 
exegesis is a holistic enterprise with a grammatical archive at its foundation—a repository of 
textual practices that readers were taught to utilize by the ancient grammarian.100 Permit me to 
draw out two final observations as it concerns the grammatical foundations of creative exegesis.
First, the implications of the definition we have outlined here for describing early Christian 
99Cf. schol. A Il. 17.153a; schol. bT Il. 1.275a
100Here, I borrow the term from the quote of Martin Irvine with which I began the chapter. See Irvine, 
Making of Textual Culture, 16. It is important to note that Irvine's employment of the term is for the express purposes 
of narrating the history of grammatica itself. I have augmented this concept to suggest that this archive is a beneficial
model for analyzing the ways that readers like Clement actually do things with texts—the way that they employ 
grammatica for hermeneutical ends. The classic use of "archive" as an epistemological category can be seen in the 
work of Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), esp. 126–31. I agree with 
the critiques of Foucault's concept given by Jason König and Tim Whitmarsh, Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 30, who question whether the "archive" is best seen as an a priori
cause with "only limited, localized ability." Surely, they rightly suggest, "societies are more fractured and 
embattled than Foucault allows." Nevertheless, as König and Whitmarsh claim, the archive still remains a helpful 
model for understanding the ordering of knowledge one creates from a given text, if it is seen as "a habit of 
thought, an intellectual genre, an inter- related set of culturally operative, but also embattled, propositions as to 
the necessary properties and social roles of language." 
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exegesis are significant. When Christians approach the text of Scripture, they will read it in 
keeping with the grammatical archive that Aristarchus, Philo, Cornutus, and Heraclitus used, 
prioritizing the techniques and sensibilities learned at the hands of the γραμματικός. Yet, the 
use of this archive was never intended to preclude figural exegesis. But the grammarian's 
commitment to poetic license and the belief that an author's intention can be understood from 
the text per se—that is, the principle of textimmanence—results in a restriction of the figural 
sense. One can read Scripture figurally; its meanings cannot, however, be compounded 
exponentially. Thus, Christian reflection on the theme, structure, and goal of Scripture—its 
ὑπόθεσις, οἰκονομία, and τέλος—will not only influence interpretations of the outward sense 
of Scripture. Sustained reflection on these topics will also restrict their speculation on the 
figurative meaning of Scripture. We will see this phenomenon at work in Clement's own figural
interpretation of the Christian Scriptures in the next two chapters.
Before moving on, however, there is a second important observation to make, which 
turns on the fact that patristic exegesis is far from monolithic. Any two exegetes will reflect on 
Scripture in substantially different ways. Given the fact that I have emphasized similarity in 
textual practices in this chapter, how might we account for interpretive differences? A full 
reflection on this process must await the second half of this study. As I suggested in the 
previous chapter, however, the adjective "creative" will allow us to modify our understanding 
of early Christian exegesis, in order to analyze the unique ways that different readers handle the
Scriptures. 
Much of our labor, then, in describing patristic exegesis must be concerned with 
identifying the reading practices and technical terminology—the components of the 
grammatical archive—employed by Christian interpreters individually. The creative exegesis of 
Scripture offered by Christian exegetes will differ in many ways, but as I have argued in the 
previous two chapters, there will be a foundation upon which they all depend. In order to 
describe a Christian figure's exegetical practice and the theology that results from his reading, 
one must painstakingly account for the use of this grammatical archive. What terms powered 
Christian figural reading? Where there ever statements in Scripture that Christians understood 
to speak clearly (σαφές or διαρρήδην?) and thus require no exegetical resolution? Did 
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Christians ever transpose terms from within their own literary lexicon—the language of the 
Bible—to the broader metalanguage of exegesis inherent to the grammatical archive, and as a 
result, furnish a new vocabulary, in distinction from pagan readers, that subsequently drive 
their figural readings of Scripture? The better one understands how this grammatical archive, 
with its key terms and essential reading practices, were adapted by Christian exegetes in 
antiquity, the better he will understand early Christian exegesis and theology as a whole.101 For 
the rest of this project, then, we will turn our attention to a single Christian reader—Clement 
of Alexandria. Before we can understand the theology Clement constructs through his reading 
of Scripture, we must first understand how he adapts this grammatical archive of literary 
exegesis in the construction of a distinct account of Scripture and its place in the Christian life. 
To this question, we may now turn.
101This point was made cogently by Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 39, regarding fourth century Trinitarian 
theology. Of course, one result of the current project will be to test how well this thesis may be used to 
characterize Christian exegesis two centuries prior to the subject matter of Ayres' book.
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4"Hidden Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge":
On the Reading of Scripture in Stromata 5
I remain amazed constantly by that divine statement: “Truly, truly, I say to you, he who does not
enter the sheepfold through the door, but climbs in another way, that man is a thief and a 
robber. But he who enters by the door is the shepherd of the sheep. To him the doorkeeper 
opens.” Then the Lord gives an explanation and says, “I am the door of the sheep.” One must 
therefore, to be saved, have learned the truth through Christ, even if one seeks wisdom in Greek
philosophy. For now it has been shown clearly “what in past generations was not made known 
to the sons of men, but is now revealed.”1
A little more than halfway through book five of the Stromateis, this passage marks a 
transition in Clement's composition, as he turns to reflect once again on a key theme in his 
project, the "theft" of Christian ideas by Greek writers.2 And while many note the transition 
that occurs at this juncture in Clement's thought, it is rarely noted that this passage serves as a 
subtle summary of Clement's argument in the first half of book five. In this short excerpt, 
Clement affirms that (a) salvation is dependent on learning truth, (b) truth is mediated 
through Christ, and (c) whatever Clement believes that has been hidden in generations past, it 
has now been revealed through the Christ. In these brief claims, Clement has rehearsed the very
reasons for his focus on the symbolic mode of literature in this book.
In a way reminiscent of Neuschäfer's description of Origenian scholarship, Clement's 
focus on the potential of symbolic literature for figural interpretation has been the 
overwhelming fascination of scholars over the years.3 Claude Mondésert, the scholar who first 
1Str. 5.86.4–87.1 (GCS 15:383)
2On this passage as a transition in Clement's thoughts for book five, see SC 279:273. On the theme of 
pagan larceny of wisdom in Clement (and others), see, especially, G. R. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study 
of its Development from the Stoics to Origen, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Cf. Daniel. Ridings, The Attic Moses: The 
Dependency Theme in Some Early Christian Writers, (Göteborg, Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995).
3Claude Mondésert, “Le symbolisme chez Clément d’Alexandrie,” RSR 26 (1936): 158-80; Willem den 
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emphasized the role of the Bible in Clement's thought, considered the division of Scripture into
five diverse senses best accounted for Clement's interpretation in book five.4 In his book The 
Letter and the Spirit, Robert Grant calls book five of the Stromateis Clement's "rational defense for the
allegorical method."5 More recently, Annewies van den Hoek has given extended reflection on 
Clement's figural reading of the tabernacle and vestments in Str. 5.32–40, in order to draw 
attention to the philonic material in Clement's reading.6 She concluded that Clement's exegesis 
of the tabernacle "centered on two complementary themes that form two sides of the same 
coin: the incarnation of Christ and the rise of the Gnostic to the higher regions."7 
The purpose of the next three chapters will be a close reading of Clement's creative 
exegesis in book five of the Stromateis, and I will draw attention specifically to the textual 
practices that he employs from the repository of his grammatical archive. In the present 
chapter, I will examine four significant passages from book five in which Clement interacts 
with specific biblical texts to outline his distinct account of Scripture's role in Christian 
theological reflection: Romans 1, Isaiah 45:3, and Colossians 1–2. I will argue that not only 
does Clement understand Christian exegesis and inquiry as a fundamentally literary project, but
the inclinations he develops from the use of the tools of the grammatical archive actually 
restricts the figural potential he sees in the Scriptures. In coming to this conclusion, I will 
suggest that Hoek's conclusions on the two themes of Clement's figural interpretation are 
exactly right. Clement restricts the figural reference of Christian Scripture to the promised 
Boer, De allegorese in het werk van Clemens Alexandrinus., (Leiden: Brill, 1940), 65–69; Mondésert, Clément d’Alexandrie, 131–
52; P. Th. Camelot, Foi et gnose: Introduction à l’étude de la connaissance mystique chez Clément d’Alexandrie, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1945); 
Eric Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 168–72; Jean 
Daniélou, “Typology et allégorie chez Clément d’Alexandrie,” SP 4 (1961): 50-57; Hans Jürgen Horn, “Zur 
Motivation der Allegorischen Schriftexegese bei Clemens Alexandrinus,” Hermes 97 (1969): 489-96; Dawson, 
Allegorical Readers, 183–234; Manlio Simonetti, Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church: An Historical Introduction to Patristic 
Exegesis, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 36. Cf. Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 203.
4Mondésert, Clément d’Alexandrie, 153–83.
5Robert M. Grant, The Letter and the Spirit, Letter and Spirit (London: S.P.C.K., 1957), 86.
6Annewies van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo in the Stromateis: An Early Christian Reshaping of a 
Jewish Model, (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 116–47.
7Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo, 146.
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incarnation of Christ and the higher mysteries of the divine essence that only the mature 
Christian can discover. Then, in the next two chapters, I will analyze in more detail the different
reading techniques on which Clement depends to provide this reading of Scripture in book 
five.  
Knowledge of the Father and the Son (Romans 1)
Clement opens book five with a significant passage on the purpose of Christian inquiry 
and theological reflection.
After this summary about the gnostikôs, let us resume our discussion and return to the 
careful study of faith. There are some who make the following distinction: whereas our 
faith concerns the Son, knowledge concerns the Father. But it has escaped their notice 
that while we must truly believe (πιστεῦσαι ἀληθῶς) the Son that he is the Son (ὅτι τε 
υἱὸς) (and that he came and how and why and about his passion), it is also necessary to
know (γνῶναι) who the Son of God is (τίς ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ). Now, knowledge is 
not without faith, nor is faith without knowledge, as indeed neither is the Father 
without the Son. For insofar as he is "Father," he is "Father of the Son," and the Son is 
the true teacher about the Father. Moreover, in order to believe in the Son, we must 
know the Father, with respect to whom is the Son (cf. Jn. 1:1).8 And conversely, in order
to know the Father, we must believe in the Son, because it is the Son of God who 
teaches. For one proceeds from faith to knowledge, and the Father is known through 
the Son. The knowledge of the Son and Father, which conforms to the truly gnostic 
rule, is the apprehension and discernment of the truth by the Truth. . . . For, in short, 
the agreement and harmony of the faith of both [the Lord who speaks and the hearer 
who comprehends what is spoken] contribute to one end—salvation. We have in the 
apostle an unerring witness: “For I desire to see you, that I may impart unto you some 
spiritual gift, in order that ye may be strengthened; that is, that I may be comforted in 
you, by the mutual faith of you and me" (Rom. 1:11–12). And below this he adds, 
“The righteousness of God is revealed from faith to faith” (Rom. 1:17). It is manifest, 
then, that the apostle proclaims a dual faith, or rather a single faith that admits of 
growth and perfection; for the common faith lies beneath as a "foundation" (cf. 1 Cor. 
3:10–15). Therefore, to those who desire to be healed, moved by faith, the Savior said, 
“Your faith has saved you” (cf. Matt. 9:22). But the exceptional faith (ἡ ἐξαίρετος) 
completes the believer, constructed upon the foundation (θεμέλιος), and together with 
8In my view, Clement's phrase πρὸς ὃν καὶ ὁ υἱός is a borrowing from the prologue to the Gospel of 
John.  I discuss this more below, but suffice it to say that this fits with the logic of the passage quoted here at 
length. Moreover, it coheres with the arguments that Clement will depend on elsewhere that highlight John's 
prologue to explain the relationship between the Son and the Father. See, for example, Prot. 1.7.3 (GCS 12:7).
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it, as a result of instruction, reaches its completion in the performance of the 
commandments of the Word.9
In the most recent examination of Clement's scriptural exegesis as a whole in book five,
Judith Kovacs suggests that Clement is thoroughly enmeshed in a critique of a Valentinian 
misreading of the scriptural terms πίστις and γνῶσις, which we encounter first in this passage 
from the outset of book five. According to Kovacs, Clement here argues against the Valentinian 
"two ways of salvation," wherein the "ecclesiastical Christians" (represented by Clement) are 
saved by faith (πίστις) and the "pneumatics" (the Valentinians) are saved by knowledge 
(γνῶσις).10 Kovacs understands this background, and the Valentinian use of the πίστις-γνῶσις 
relationship inherent to it, to be the unifying feature of Clement's treatise on symbolic 
literature in book five. She therefore suggests that Clement's exegesis in book five is concerned 
"with the same Valentinian ideas about Father and Son, πίστις and γνῶσις, that he quotes at the
beginning of book five."11
While Kovacs is surely right that Clement has Valentinians in mind at many junctures 
throughout his project,12 I am not persuaded that this is the predominant reason that he reflects
extensively on the πίστις-γνῶσις relationship.13 In this passage, Clement signals a return to the 
9Str. 5.1.1–2.6 (GCS 15:326–27)
10Judith L. Kovacs, “Concealment and Gnostic Exegesis: Clement of Alexandria’s Interpretation of the 
Tabernacle,” SP 31 (1997), esp. 414–18.
11Kovacs, “Concealment and Gnostic Exegesis,” 415.
12This is, in fact, the thesis of Lewis Ayres, As It Is Written: Ancient Literary Criticism, Hellenization, and the Rise of 
“Scripture” 100–250 CE, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). For Ayres, the distinct application of 
reading techniques from the grammatical archive in the generation of second century exegetes—Irenaeus, 
Clement, and Tertullian—particularly in response to the perceived faulty exegesis of Valentinians is a key juncture 
in the development of early Christian scriptural interpretation. I am convinced by Ayres' arguments, and I am 
grateful to him for discussions in person about this important forthcoming book. It is important to note, then, 
that my arguments about Clement's exegesis throughout this study presuppose the broader narrative as Ayres 
conceives of it.  
13Cf. Matyáš Havrda, “Some Observations on Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, Book Five,” VC 64 (2010), 
3; Le Boulluec, SC 279:10. I agree with both Havrda and Le Boulluec that the opponents Clement envisions in the 
initial lines of book five are not Valentinians. As will become clear below, this position is strengthened by the fact 
that Clement does identify Valentinian opponents for a specific yet different reason within the same chapter (Str. 
5.1). If this is the case, there is no clear reason that Clement would not identify his opponents as Valentinian.
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proposed order of discussion he outlined in the early stages of book four (Str. 4.1.2),14 where 
he suggested that, after the treatise on martyrdom (the subject matter of book four), he would 
discuss faith and inquiry (περί τε πίστεως καὶ περὶ τοῦ ζητεῖν) followed by a reflection on the
symbolic style (τὸ συμβολικὸν εἶδος). As he begins his discussion on faith and inquiry, 
Clement provides his readers with his own understanding of Scripture's portrayal of the 
complementary progression between faith and knowledge and its link to the similar 
relationship between the Father and the Son. More particularly, Clement describes his 
understanding of πίστις and γνῶσις through a reading of the Johannine prologue, as it 
presents the analogous relationship of the Father and the Son. 
Now, knowledge is not without faith, nor is faith without knowledge, as indeed neither
is the Father without the Son. For insofar as he is "Father," he is "Father of the Son," 
and the Son is the true teacher about the Father. Moreover, in order to believe in the 
Son, we must know the Father, with respect to whom is the Son (πρὸς ὃν καὶ ὁ υἱός). 
And conversely, in order to know the Father, we must believe in the Son, because it is 
the Son of God who teaches. For one proceeds from faith to knowledge, and the Father 
is known through the Son.
For Clement, faith and knowledge are inseparable in a way similar to the manner that 
one progresses from knowledge of the Son to a knowledge of the Father.15 Clement employs a 
reading technique that will gain steam in coming generations, and he emphasizes the 
14See Str. 4.1.2 (GCS 15:248). Le Boulluec (SC 279:9) suggests, rightly I think, that the summary about 
the gnostikôs interrupted the discussion at Str. 4.105.1, with the citation of Clement of Rome.
15For the various aspects of faith in Clement's theology, the most helpful work is Salvatore R. C. Lilla, 
Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 118–42.  Cf. 
Eric Osborn, “Arguments for Faith in Clement of Alexandria,” VC (1994): 1-24; Dragos A. Giulea, “Apprehending 
“Demonstrations” from the First Principle: Clement of Alexandria’s Phenomenology of Faith,” JR 89 (2009): 
187-213; and Matyáš Havrda, “Grace and Free Will According to Clement of Alexandria,” JECS 19 (2011): 21-48. 
Lilla rightly draws attention to the three aspects of faith in Clement's work: (1) "the attitude peculiar to the human
mind when it believes in the first principles of demonstration"; (2) "the firm conviction which the human mind 
possesses after reaching the knowledge of something by means of a scientific demonstration"; and (3) "the 
tendency of believers to accept the truths contained in the teachings of Scripture without attempting to reach a 
deeper comprehension of them" (119). The passage I am considering here most closely aligns with Lilla's third 
option, though I am less convinced that those who exercise faith in the truths of Scripture do not "attempt" to 
penetrate more deeply. In my view, Clement—regardless of whether such an attempt is successful—does expect 
every believer to make an attempt at deeper understanding. This is the purpose of his scriptural imagery at the 
outset of book five.
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correlative nature of the scriptural titles "Father" and "Son."16 Inasmuch as Scripture presents 
God as "Father," it does so as "the Father of the Son."17 Moreover, the Son is the only true 
teacher respecting the Father, for he is reciprocally the Son of the Father. In a subtle exegesis of 
John 1:1, Clement maintains that since the Son is with the Father (πρὸς ὃν καὶ ὁ υἱός), it 
follows that apart from the Son the Father cannot be known (cf. Jn. 1:18).18 Moreover, for 
Clement, this conception of progression to the knowledge of the Father through the Son is 
paralleled by his conception of the relationship between faith and knowledge. Thus, Clement's 
conception of the πίστις-γνῶσις relationship is not only governed by his reading of Scripture's
letter, but also by his understanding of Scripture's ultimate aim—the knowledge (γνῶσις) of 
God. This will serve as the background for all of his claims about the need for scriptural 
symbolism later in book five.
In order to illustrate his reading of Scripture's portrayal of πίστις and γνῶσις, Clement 
applies in the current passage an Aristotelian epistemological distinction between assuming that 
something is the case (ὅτι ἔστι) and understanding what something is (τί ἔστι).19 For Clement, 
one must not only "believe that the Son is" (πιστεῦσαι ὅτι τε υἱὸς), which includes the events 
of his Incarnation, life, and Passion, but one must also "know who the Son of God is" (γνῶναι 
τίς ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ).20 Just as there is a complementary progression between knowledge 
of the Son and of the Father, so also is there a similar progression that moves one from faith to 
16Origen will emphasize this logic in arguments for the eternal generation of the Son in the third century
C.E. On Origen's use of Father-Son terminology, see Rowan D. Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 2002), 131–48; and Michel René Barnes, The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian
Theology, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 111–24. For the role Origen's exegesis 
played in the Trinitarian theology of the fourth century C.E., see Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 20–30.
17A similar logic can be seen in Clement's reading of "the eternal life which was with the Father" in 1 
John 1:2; see Adumbr. 1 Jn. 1:2 (GCS 17:210): Patris appellatione significat, quoniam et filius semper erat sine initio.
18Cf. Str. 4.156.1 (GCS 15:317)
19See Aristotle, APo. 71a11–13: "It is necessary to know already of things in two ways: (a) of some, one 
must believe already that they are, and (b) of others, one must grasp what the thing said is" (διχῶς δ’ ἀναγκαῖον 
προγινώσκειν· τὰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι ἔστι, προϋπολαμβάνειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δέ, τί τὸ λεγόμενόν ἐστι). Cf. Havrda, 
“Some Observations,” 2–3.
20Str. 5.1.2 (GCS 15:326)
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knowledge, from not only believing that the Son is but understanding who the Son of the 
Father is. Clement concludes that "knowledge of the Son and the Father" (γνῶσις δὲ υἱοῦ καὶ 
πατρὸς) is in fact the attainment of the truth that is the goal of all Christian inquiry. 
Clement bolsters his claim to this reading of Scripture by emphasizing that this 
understanding of the progressive relationship of faith to knowledge is not merely a Johannine 
construct. Clement argues that the most explicit formulation of this teaching is distinctly 
Pauline. For Clement, this pedagogical process is the agreement and symphony between both 
sides of faith, most accurately portrayed by the Apostle Paul in Romans 1:17: "the 
righteousness of God is revealed ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν."21 Moreover, Clement understands this 
harmony asserted by Paul in Romans 1:17 as a clarification of the "spiritual gift" (χάρισμα 
πνευματικὸν) he described in 1:11. For Clement, the double occurrence of πίστις in Romans 
1:17 signals a movement, a progression to the deliverance of this spiritual gift. And though this
might appear on the surface to be a twofold faith (διττὴν πίστιν), especially in light of his use 
of Romans 1:17, Clement prefers to describe it as a "single faith that admits of growth and 
perfection."22 Clement therefore understands the Pauline teaching in Romans 1 to suggest that 
there is a common faith (κοινὴ πίστις) that serves as a foundation (θεμέλιος) upon which 
γνῶσις—here described as "the exceptional faith" (ἡ ἐξαίρετος)—is built (cf. 1 Cor. 3:10).23
Thus, Clement's arguments in the opening sections of book five not only reveal the 
literary nature of the Christian pursuit of knowledge on the foundation of faith. They also 
disclose that the predominant concerns of Clement's interpretive project are entirely theological—
how one may progress from the common faith to the knowledge of the divine nature.24 
21Str. 5.2.2–3 (GCS 15:326–27)
22Str. 5.2.4 (GCS 15:327)
23For a similar statement elsewhere, see Str. 2.126.3 (GCS 15:181).
24In making this statement, I do not deny that Clement touches on other subjects throughout the course 
of Str. 5. I am simply suggesting that these other discourses are subsidiary to his theological concerns. Cf. Alain Le 
Boulluec (SC 278:11), who claims that the various discussions in the latter half of book five all depend on 
"l'enseignement fondamental . . . que Dieu est créateur, juge et sauveur." Cf. Eric Osborn, “Clement and the Bible,” 
in Origeniana Sexta: Origène et la Bible = Origen and the Bible; actes du Colloquium Origenianum Sextum, Chantilly, 30 août – 3 septembre 
1993, eds. G. Dorival and A. Le Boulluec (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), 129.
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Moreover, Clement proposes this investigation explicitly as a search of the Scriptures.25 The 
discovery of truth, which is the knowledge of the Son and the Father, comes in the Scriptures 
under the auspices of Providence, and since the Lord himself commands such an inquiry—
"Seek (ζητεῖτε) and you will find" (Matt. 7:7)—Clement will spend the duration of the second
(5.20.3–57.1) and third (5.57.2–89.1) sections of book five concerned to articulate what 
proper theological inquiry of Scripture looks like.26
It is important to note, then, that this specific conception of Scripture's teaching 
becomes the background for Clement's reflection on the ambiguous and obscure qualities of 
symbolic literature. As Clement claims, the agreement and harmony (ἡ συνῳδία καὶ ἡ 
συμφωνία) displayed in Scripture's portrayal of faith has one goal (εἰς ἓν πέρας): salvation.27 
And for Clement, salvation is tantamount to the pedagogical ascent from faith to the knowledge
of God.28 Moreover, since the proper aim of this investigation is the knowledge of the Son and 
the Father, it comes as no surprise when Clement articulates the necessity of obscure and 
ambiguous language. As we saw in the previous chapter, symbolic language is actually to be 
expected in the transmission of these highest truths.
25Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 137, confirms this point: "The ζήτησις of which Clement speaks is therefore 
nothing but the attempt to disclose the hidden and higher meaning of Scripture." Cf. Q.D.S. 5.2–4 (GCS 17:163); 
Str. 7.95.9 (GCS 17:68), which we will discuss further below.
26Cf. Str. 5.6.2; 5.11.1 (GCS 15:329; 332–33). I follow here the structure advocated by Le Boulluec, 
SC 278:10–11. The citation of Matt. 7:7 is not surprising, as Le Boulluec, SC 279:69, rightly recognizes the "seek 
and find" leitmotif in Clement's oeuvre. Cf. Str. 1.51.4 (GCS 15:33). On the maxim itself, see Annewies van den 
Hoek, “‘You will find if you seek.’ Did Clement of Alexandria find this at Delphi (Str. IV 5, 1)?,” SP 31 (1997): 
546-53. Hoek shows that Clement's intention in citing the Delphic oracle in Str. 4.5.1 was to reinforce his reading 
of Scripture with a reference to the Greek world. It seems to me that this concern is less pertinent to Clement's 
argument in books one and five, and the Delphic background seems to have no direct influence on the citations of 
Matthew in these books.
27Str. 5.2.2 (GCS 15:327)
28Thus, Clement describes the contemplation of the Father as "pure truth" (ἁγνῆς ἀληθείας) and suggests
that those who have not received understanding from the Savior must remain outside the divine choir (ἔξω θείου 
χοροῦ) Str. 5.19.2 (GCS 15:338). This perspective is certainly not confined to the Stromateis. See Adumbr. 1 Jn. 2:23 
(GCS 17:213) Cf. Mondésert, “Le symbolisme,” 166, who notes the significance: "cette connaissance de Dieu que 
Clément poursuit avec tant d'ardeur et dont le désir, comme une flamme, anime toute son œuvre."
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"I Will Give You Hidden Treasures" (Isaiah 45:3)
At the height of his discourse on symbolic interpretation, Clement provides numerous 
illustrations of Greeks and barbarians who have utilized symbolism, even providing an 
extended illustration of symbolism based on Egyptian grammar.29 This section of book five 
(5.19–31), which precedes Clement's figurative reading of the Old Testament tabernacle, has 
often been seen as his general apology for allegory, which Clement, it is claimed, will then 
apply to the Christian Scriptures. For instance, Manlio Simonetti concludes that in this passage 
Clement "illustrates his point by reference to the ideographic scriptures of the Egyptians, as an 
example of symbolic expression in religious language. In this way, allegory becomes the 
hermeneutical principle by which the teaching of Scripture is divided into two levels." 
Simonetti suggests that the appeal to Egyptian grammar is thus Clement's "treatise on allegory 
and symbolism."30 Robert Grant describes this section of book five as Clement's "rational 
defense of the allegorical method," in which the religious language of Greeks and barbarians 
serve as a straightforward example of the symbolism found in Scripture.31 To be sure, the 
statement that Clement makes to begin this section does seem to draw similarities between 
Scripture and pagan literature, all of which has sought to transmit divine truth:
Everyone then, in a word, who has spoken of divine things, both barbarians and 
Greeks, has veiled the first principles of things, and handed down the truth in enigmas, 
symbols, and allegories, and also in metaphors and such tropes (αἰνίγμασι καὶ 
συμβόλοις ἀλληγορίαις τε αὖ καὶ μεταφοραῖς καὶ τοιούτοις τισὶ τρόποις).32
29For an analysis of Egyptian hieroglyphic in the Ptolemaic era, see Philippe Derchain, “Les hiéroglyphes à
l’époque ptolémaïque,” in Phoinikeia grammata: lire et écrire en Méditerranée, eds. Claude Baurain, Corinne Bonnet, and 
Véronique Krings (Namur: Société des études classiques, 1991), 243-56. 
30Simonetti, Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church, 36.
31Grant, Letter and the Spirit, 86.
32Str. 5.21.4 (GCS 15:340). Kovacs, “Concealment and Gnostic Exegesis,” 414, claims this passage as a 
summary of Clement's basic argument in book five, where "he offers a rationale for symbolic exegesis of the Bible 
through a survey of the practice of concealment in the Old and New Testaments, in the Greek poets and 
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But what is the function of Clement's reflection on symbolism, in general, and Egyptian
grammar, in particular, at this juncture in book five?33 Clement takes the time to outline in 
extensive detail the divisions of Egyptian symbolism, noting that it has three different modes: 
(a) that which expresses the "proper" meaning by the very appearance of the sign 
(κυριολογεῖται κατὰ μίμησιν), (b) that which is expressed by means of tropes (τροπικῶς), 
and (c) that which is openly figurative (ἄντικρυς ἀλληγορεῖται), characterized by the presence
of enigmas. Moreover, he provides examples of the ways in which Egyptians operated under 
each style.34 But is it actually the point of this extended illustration to suggest that the Christian 
Scriptures should be characterized as operating similarly? I suggest that such a conclusion 
neglects to consider the function of this extended example in light of Clement's aims 
articulated earlier in book five, which he significantly reiterates after providing this Egyptian 
aside in a crucial passage that is often overlooked. I give the passage here in full:
Now, the Spirit through Isaiah the prophet also says: "I will give you dark and hidden 
treasures" (Isa. 45:3). Now wisdom, which is hard to track, is the "treasures" of God 
and "unfailing riches." Indeed the poets who were taught theology (τὴν θεολογίαν) by 
these prophets often philosophize in a latent sense (δι’ ὑπονοίας). I mean Orpheus, 
Linus, Musaeus, Homer, Hesiod and sages of this sort. But they use the allure of their 
poetry as a covering against the multitude. As for dream symbols (ὄνειροί τε καὶ 
σύμβολα),35 the fact that all of them are obscure (ἀφανέστερα) to human beings is not 
due to jealousy (for it is not proper (οὐ θέμις) to think that God succumbs to passions).
Rather, [they are obscure] so that inquiry, by penetrating into the meaning of the 
enigmas, might ascend to the discovery of truth (ἐπὶ τὴν εὕρεσιν τῆς ἀληθείας). . . . 
Openly (ἄντικρυς), then, it is written in the Psalms respecting all our Scripture, that 
they are spoken in a parable (ἐν παραβολῇ), “Hear, O My people, my Law: incline your
ear to the words of my mouth. I will open My mouth in parables (ἐν παραβολαῖς), I 
philosophers, and among the Egyptians."
33Curiously, Kovacs, “Concealment and Gnostic Exegesis,” 420, provides no discussion on the role of this 
extended example in book five, except noting that Clement is here concerned with the "principle of concealment."
34Str. 5.20.3 (GCS 15:339). My translation here of the Egyptian modes of symbolism is based on the 
insightful work of Derchain, “Les hiéroglyphes.”.
35Here, I agree with Havrda, “Some Observations,” 13, that ὄνειροί τε καὶ σύμβολα should be read as a 
hendiadys. This reading therefore heightens the contrast Clement draws between the reasons for obscurity in the 
ancient poets and in the divine revelation of Scripture. Clement thus connects "symbol" with the motif of "dark 
and hidden treasures" in Str. 5.23.2.
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will utter my problems (προβλήματα) from the beginning” (Ps. 77:1–2 LXX). The 
noble apostle says something similar in this way (τὰ ὅμοια ὧδέ πως λέγει): “We speak 
wisdom among those that are perfect; yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the 
princes of this world who are being abolished. But we speak the wisdom of God 
hidden in a mystery (ἐν μυστηρίῳ); which none of the princes of this world knew. For 
had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (1 Cor. 2:6–8). 
"Philosophers" did not exert themselves in condemning the appearance of the Lord. It 
is clear then (ἀπόκειται τοίνυν) that it is the opinion of the wise among the Jews 
which the apostle inveighs against. Therefore he adds, “But we preach, as it is written, 
what eye has not seen, and ear has not heard, and has not entered into the heart of 
man, what God has prepared for those that love Him. For God has revealed it to us by 
the Spirit. For the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God” (1 Cor. 2:9–10).36
Clement's arguments in this passage stem from his reflection on Isaiah 45:3. There, 
Clement reads that God has promised, since it is the Spirit who speaks through Isaiah, to give 
hidden treasures (θησαυροὺς ἀποκρύφους) to his people. Clement is surely drawn to the 
Isaianic passage because the treasure is said to be "hidden," and he has already affirmed that 
those texts which speak of the divine (τὴν θεολογίαν) used the symbolic mode. But Clement's 
arguments in this passage raise two significant points for his account of Scripture in Christian 
theological reflection.
First, Clement returns to the issue of God's authorship of Scripture. As we saw earlier, 
Clement has already claimed that God speaks to his people through Scripture, and in this 
passage, Clement identifies a particular instance where "the Spirit indeed speaks through Isaiah 
the prophet" (λέγει δὲ καὶ διὰ Ἡσαΐου τοῦ προφήτου τὸ πνεῦμα). Yet, the reattribution of 
scriptural authorship to God has a particular function in this passage. Although Clement once 
again reflects on the necessity of an underlying sense to texts that speak about the divine, 
Clement actually contrasts the reason for a latent sense in pagan literature and the Christian 
Scriptures.37 If God is the author of Scripture, then it must have a fundamentally different 
36Str. 5.23.2–25.4 (GCS 15:340–41)
37Though he does not expand on this point, Jean Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, trans. J. A. 
Baker (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973), 253, seems to notice this contrast: "This is not to say that 
[Clement] sees no difference between scriptural typology and Hellenistic symbolism. Such a conclusion would do 
him an injustice; he did not rest content with so superficial a view of the matter. His point rather is that in each 
case symbolism of some kind is used, and that this is sufficient justification for the biblical kind."
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reason for the use of symbolism. Contrary to the obscurity of pagan literature, which speaks 
figuratively as a veil (παραπέτασμα) to the multitude in fear of jealousy (φθόνῳ), Clement 
argues that God speaks ambiguously in the Scriptures to encourage deeper investigation into 
the meaning of its enigmas.38 For Clement, the Scriptures require veiled language because they 
speak about the knowledge of God (τὴν θεολογίαν), but ambiguity does not mean an 
inattention to the letter. Rather, it drives a deeper and more relentless inquiry that results in the 
discovery of truth.39 Moreover, Clement's focus on detailed textual inquiry better accounts for 
Clement's extended illustration of Egyptian grammar. It is significant that Clement opens the 
Egyptian illustration by identifying those who are "educated" among them (οἱ παρ’ Αἰγυπτίοις
παιδευόμενοι). These are the ones who toil on the literary foundations of interpretation and 
who have the necessary skill to identify styles of writing or articulate the various ways that 
their symbols provide signification of realities.40 Clement does not hold up the Egyptians as the 
model allegorists. On the contrary, he points to them as the ideal grammatical readers, who 
model a deep and relentless inquiry into a text.
The second significant item to note in this passage stems from this realization. Clement 
38This account of pagan literature can perhaps be grounded in Plato. In Prot. 316a–e (LCL 165:114–19), 
in response to Socrates' introduction of Hippocrates, Protagoras discusses the sophistry of Homer, Hesiod, 
Simonides, and Orpheus, inter alia, and concludes that they all practiced their sophistic skills (τὴν σοφιστικὴν 
τέχνην) in fear of ill-will (φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον). Indeed, Protagoras concludes that it was due to this fear that 
they all "made use of these arts as outer coverings" (ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο). Here, 
Clement uses the same terminology to contrast the obscurity of the Scriptures, since it is not proper (οὐ γὰρ 
θέμις) to attribute jealousy to God. Scripture must be obscure for an altogether different reason, in light of its 
author. If this is true, then Plato's contrast in Theaet. 180cd (LCL 123:142–43), between ancients who veiled 
(ἐπικρυπτομένων) their meanings and later interpreters who demonstrate the meanings openly (ἀναφανδὸν 
ἀποδεικνυμένων) may be a helpful analogy to Clement's perspective on literary discovery of meaning. Cf. 
Clement's use of ἀναφανδόν at Str. 5.80.4; 5.88.3 (GCS 15:379; 384). For a discussion of the Platonic comparison 
to Galen's exegesis, see Mansfeld, Prolegomena, 155.
39Grant, Letter and the Spirit, 85–87, completely misses this contrast in his reading of book five. Cf. Str. 5.56.3
(GCS 15:364), however, where Clement suggests that this inquiry only results in true theology (τὴν ἀληθῆ 
θεολογίαν) for the one who "draws near to the Scriptures often" (τῶν γὰρ πολλάκις αὐταῖς πλησιαζόντων). 
Clement makes a chronological point (i.e., one must approach the Scriptures often) that subverts any esoteric point 
(i.e., truth must be kept from outsiders) that one might draw from the Egyptian example.
40That the literary critical nature of this Egyptian example is significant for Clement may be seen later in 
Str. 5.45.4–46.2 (GCS 15:356–57), where Clement clarifies symbolic interpretation by the comments of two 
grammarians, Dionysius Thrax and Didymus the Alexandrian. Moreover, in Str. 5.50.2–3 (GCS 15:360–61), 
Clement claims that "obscure" texts are indeed "proposed as an exercise in the exegesis of letters to children" 
(γυμνάσιον εἰς ἐξήγησιν γραμματικῶν ἔκκειται παισίν).
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presents the deep investigation of the Scriptures to hold the very reasons for its own ambiguity. 
Indeed, Clement claims that Scripture speaks openly (ἄντικρυς) on its own behalf about its 
figurative nature. Thus, in order to identify the treasures that God has hidden in Scripture, 
Clement first links Isaiah 45:3 with Wisd. 7:14 and 8:18, which identifies wisdom with both 
unfailing treasure (ἀνεκλιπὴς θησαυρός) and unfailing riches (πλοῦτος ἀνεκλιπὴς), 
respectively.41 The correlation of these texts allows Clement to identify wisdom as the hidden 
treasure, but he does not stop there. Clement offers a further gloss on the hidden treasure of 
Isaiah 45:3 by drawing upon scriptural synonyms of the technical term αἴνιγμα. 
Clement cites Psalm 77:1–2 (LXX): “Hear, O My people, my law: incline your ear to the
words of my mouth. I will open My mouth in parables (ἐν παραβολαῖς), I will utter my 
problems (προβλήματα) from the beginning.” This citation highlights the parallelism between 
παραβολή and προβλήματα, and it suggests that, for Clement, the parable is the virtual 
equivalent of the dark riddle in need of a resolution.42 More specifically, Clement here expresses
the view that παραβολή operates similarly to αἴνιγμα; each term implies that something more 
must be said to reach the full meaning of a passage. How one determines what more must be 
said is left unanswered by Clement, at least at this juncture in his argument. Nevertheless, this 
citation itself only clarifies half of Clement's use of Isaiah 45:3. If Scripture is full of enigmatic 
language, then one must hunt for its treasure; this much is clear in the correspondence Clement
41Le Boulluec (SC 279:108–09) suggests that Clement is here associating Isa. 45:3 with Luke 12:33. 
However, it seems more likely that Clement is influenced by the use of ἀνεκλιπὴς to modify both θησαυροὶ and 
πλοῦτος in Wisd. 7:14 and 8:18, respectively. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that Clement uses 
ἀνεκλιπὴς here, rather than Luke's ἀνέκλειπτος, a term that Clement happily employs elsewhere (cf. Paed. 3.87.3). 
Clement's description of "wisdom" as δυσθήρατός (hard to track) might already anticipate his understanding of it 
as a term for inquiry into the divine essence. Philo (Spec. 1.36) used the same term to describe inquiry (ζητεῖν) 
into the divine essence (τὴν οὐσίαν) and the "true God" (τὸν ἀληθῆ θεόν). Moreover, Philo uses διερευνητέον to 
describe this search, forging an interesting parallel to the searching (ἐρευνᾷ) of the Spirit in 1 Cor. 2:10. Cf. Plato, 
Lg. 654e.
42Here, Clement reads προβλήματα in the sense of "riddle." Moreover, it is helpful to note that the 
exercise of defining terms, which permits Clement to read αἴνιγμα, παραβολή, and πρόβλημα as synonymous in 
Psalm 77 (LXX), is entirely a grammatical pursuit. Cf. Eleanor Cook, Enigmas and Riddles in Literature, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 263–65. Moreover, Le Boulluec, SC 279:111, insightfully notes that this 
reading of προβλήματα implicitly recalls Clement's initial arguments on investigation (ζήτησις) from the opening
to book five, which strengthens my argument that Clement has similar concerns in both passages. Cf. Plato, Chrm. 
162b; Aristotle, Pol. 1283b35.  
73
draws between the Isaianic text and Psalm 77:2 (LXX). But to draw the conclusion that the 
treasure hidden in Scripture is in fact σοφία, and justify his use of the Wisdom of Solomon, 
Clement makes one further connection. 
Clement cites 1 Corinthians 2:6–8 with the statement that Paul speaks similarly (τὰ 
ὅμοια ὧδέ πως λέγει) to the Psalmist. For Clement, the Psalmist paved the way for the 
figurative understanding of Isaiah's wisdom to correspond to Paul's wisdom, hidden in a 
mystery. But Paul, Clement claims, adds further detail to the identification of Scripture's 
"hidden treasures." Clement relies on the historical context of the crucifixion to determine the 
identity of those "who crucified the Lord." With the need to defend wisdom, Clement claims 
that it was not philosophers in general—the "lovers of wisdom"—who condemned the Lord, 
but it was clearly the wise among the Jews (τῶν ἐν Ἰουδαίοις σοφῶν) who bears the rebuke of 
the Apostle. Christian philosophers, on the other hand, are those who Paul describes in 1 
Corinthians 2:9–10. They contemplate a reality that has not been seen or heard, but one that 
has been prepared for them: the depths of God. Here, Clement interprets "the depths of God" 
as a second "hidden treasure" to be discovered in the process of investigation.43 In this way, 
"the depths of God" becomes synonymous with "the knowledge of God" that Clement had 
identified as the ultimate aim of Scripture's teaching. In other words, Clement's identification in
this passage of the "hidden treasures" of Isaiah 45:3 as "wisdom" and "the depths of God" is a 
second way of describing the exegesis of Scripture under the imagery of investigation that 
populated his opening arguments of Stromateis 5, now read figuratively as a hunt for treasure.
"The Mystery of God in Christ" (Col. 1–2)
In the previous passage, Clement connected Paul's mystery language in 1 Corinthians 
2:6–8 with the ambiguous figures in Isaiah 45:3. Grounding his argument in the plain 
statement of Psalm 77:1–2 (LXX), Clement had stressed that God's wisdom "hidden in a 
43Cf. Str. 2.7.3 (GCS 15:116); Q.D.S. 20.4 (GCS 17:173). For a similar use of 1 Cor. 2:10, see Theophilus, 
Autol. 2.34 (SC 20:120). Theophilus employs the Corinthian text under the motif of the search and discovery of 
truth, though he omits an explicit referent to "depths" (βάθη). Clement seems to have extended the use of this 
verse one further step to suggest that not only must one search for the things of God, but even God in his nature, 
which he renders as τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ.
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mystery" (ἐν μυστηρίῳ τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην) is identical to the "hidden treasure" (θησαυροὺς
ἀποκρύφους) that God had promised to disclose. To be sure, however, Clement makes multiple 
moves to draw his point in subtle and not altogether clear fashion. In Colossians 1–2, however, 
Clement finds a more explicit statement of the point he wants to draw about symbolic 
interpretation. Clement's earlier reading of 1 Corinthians 2:7 remains a baseline for his 
interpretation of Paul's use of μυστήριον in Colossians.44 Indeed, when he explains the passage 
from Colossians in our present text, he presupposes that the "wisdom hidden in a mystery" is 
the aim of scriptural interpretation.
Rightly, therefore, the divine apostle says, “By revelation the mystery was made known 
to me (as I wrote before in brief, in accordance with which, when ye read, ye may 
understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ), which in other ages was not made
known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed by his holy apostles and prophets” 
(Eph. 3:3–5). For there is an instruction for the mature, about which he says, writing to
the Colossians, “We do not cease to pray for you, asking that you may be filled with the
knowledge of His will in all wisdom and spiritual understanding, that you may walk 
worthy of the Lord, fully pleasing him, bearing fruit in every good work and increasing
in the knowledge of God, being strengthened with all power according to his glorious 
might” (Col. 1:9–11). And once more he says, “According to the stewardship of God 
which was given to me for you, to fulfill the word of God, the mystery which was 
hidden for ages and generations, but now was manifested to His saints. To them God 
wished to make known what are the riches of the glory of this mystery among the 
nations” (Col. 1:25–27). Therefore, on the one hand, there are the mysteries which 
were hidden until the time of the apostles, and were delivered by them as they received 
from the Lord (mysteries hidden in the Old Testament, which "now are manifested to 
the saints"). On the other hand, there are “the riches of the glory of the mystery among
the nations,” which is faith and hope in Christ. He has called this elsewhere the 
“foundation” (cf. 1 Cor. 3:10). And once more, as if anxious to indicate this knowledge,
he writes in this way (οἷον φιλοτιμούμενος ἐμφῆναι τὴν γνῶσιν ὧδέ πως γράφει): 
“Warning every man in all wisdom, that we may present πάντα ἄνθρωπον perfect in 
Christ;” (Col. 1:28) not every man simply, since no one would be without faith. Nor 
does he call every man who believes in Christ "perfect"; but he says "all the man," as if 
he said "the whole man," purified in body and soul. Indeed, because "all do not possess
knowledge," (1 Cor. 8:7) he explicitly adds (διαρρήδην ἐπιφέρει): “Being knit together
in love, and unto all the riches of the full assurance of knowledge, to the 
acknowledgment of the mystery of God in Christ, in which are hidden all the treasures 
44That the crux of Clement's passage here turns on his explanation of μυστήριον is clear. Cf. Le Boulluec 
(SC 279:222), who notes that, "L'enjeu essential est 'le mystère du Christ'."
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of wisdom and of knowledge" (Col. 2:2–3).45
Far from legitimizing a myriad of figural interpretations to Scripture's obscurities, 
Clement here attempts to identify the content of Scripture's mystery by turning to Paul's 
arguments in Colossians 1:25–27. And, perhaps surprisingly, Clement actually restricts the 
potential of Scripture's figural referents. In reality, Clement argues, Scripture only holds two 
"mysteries." The first is christological—that is, those enigmatic references that find their ultimate 
fulfillment in the incarnation of Christ.46 Clement identifies this mystery in the present passage 
as the "foundation" (θεμέλιον), the very term he had earlier used to describe the "common 
faith" (κοινὴ πίστις).47 The second set of mysteries to be found in Scripture are theological—
namely, those which prefigure the higher knowledge of the divine nature. Clement claims that 
these were explicitly "hidden in the Old Testament" (ἀποκεκρυμμένα δὲ ἐν τῇ παλαιᾷ 
διαθήκῃ) but now are revealed to the saints by the Spirit, who searches "the depths of God." 
For Clement, then, all figural interpretation of the Christian Scriptures—including his reading 
of the tabernacle in book five—can be surmised in these two realities.48 
Moreover, such a restriction should not shock Clement's audience at this juncture. He 
anticipated this very position in the opening chapters of book five, which we examined earlier. 
At the outset of book five, Clement termed the proper outcome of theological investigation as 
the "structure of knowledge," with γνῶσις of the Son and the Father built upon the foundation
of πίστις. In the present passage, he recalls this gnostic edifice by once again referring to the 
first mystery found in the Scriptures as "faith in Christ, which elsewhere is called the 
θεμέλιον."49 Moreover, he claims that γνῶσις is not possessed by all (probably a citation of 1 
45Str. 5.60.1–61.4 (GCS 15:366–67)
46Cf. Str. 5.55.1 (GCS 15:363)
47Cf. Str. 5.2.5; 5.26.1 (GCS 15:327; 342). See Le Boulluec, SC 279:222.
48Thus, I agree with Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo, 146, who concludes her investigation into
Clement's figural reading of the tabernacle centered on these two complementary themes.
49Str. 5.61.1 (GCS 15:367)
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Cor. 8:7), and Christians must be unified by love into the knowledge of this "mystery of 
God."50 To be sure, the dual use of μυστήριον in Colossians 1:25–27 provides Clement with the
textual license to read two realities behind Paul's use of the term, regardless of whether Paul 
ever intended such an interpretation. For Clement, the obscurity inherent in the repetition must
be clarified by clearer statements, and his citation of Colossians 2:2–3 seems to justify the 
double referent of μυστήριον in 1:25–27. There, the hidden treasures (cf. Isa. 45:3) are 
explicitly (διαρρήδην) identified as σοφία and γνῶσις, which Clement has attempted to 
emphasize throughout the rest of book five.51
Isaiah 45:3 and Romans 1 Revisited
Clement closes the first half of book five by returning to the arguments that he had 
utilized earlier to show that the unifying theme of his account of Scripture is the progression 
from faith to the knowledge of God. In this passage, it is significant that Clement correlates his 
very specific exegesis of the restrictive symbolism of Christian Scripture from Colossians 1–2 
with Isaiah 45:3, Romans 1, and the Aristotelian distinction between faith and knowledge.
Again the prophet says: “And I will give thee treasures, concealed, dark, unseen; that 
they may know that I am the Lord God” (Isa. 45:3) And David sings about similar 
things: “For, behold, you loved truth; you have explained to me (ἐδήλωσας μοι) the 
obscure and hidden things of your wisdom” (Ps. 50:8 LXX). “Day to day utters a word 
(ῥῆμα)” (what is written plainly), “and night to night proclaims knowledge (γνῶσιν)”
(which is hidden mystically); “and there are no words or utterances whose voices shall 
not be heard” by God (Ps. 18:2–3 LXX), who said, “Shall one do what is secret, and I 
50Str. 5.61.4 (GCS 15:367), citing Col. 2:2. I think it possible that Clement here notes the repetition of the
term "riches" (τὸ πλοῦτος) in reference to a μυστήριον, which occurs in both Col. 1:27 and 2:2. It seems likely 
that Clement would believe that this association provides further evidence to read μυστήριον in a double fashion.
51Cf. Paed. 3.87.4 (GCS 12:284), where Clement claims that "the many treasures orchestrated by the one 
God are revealed through both through the Law and through the Prophets." Although my purposes in this chapter 
are directed toward a reading of Clement's exegesis outside his interpretation of the tabernacle, vestments, and 
high priest in Str. 5.32–40, it seems that the "mystical interpretation" (τὴν μυστικὴν ἑρμηνείαν) he offers there is 
in fact a figurative reading emphasizing the two overarching μυστήρια of the biblical text, which he summarizes 
here through Colossians 2:3: namely, faith and hope in Christ, who is incarnate Wisdom, and the knowledge of 
the divine nature revealed through Christ. Thus, I am in broad agreement with Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and His Use 
of Philo, 145–46, who concludes that "we can infer Clement's own interests in the temple's furnishings and the 
high priest's vestments. They are centered on two complementary themes that form two sides of the same coin: the
incarnation of Christ and the rise of the Gnostic to the higher regions."
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shall not see him?” (cf. Jer. 23:24). For this reason, instruction is called "illumination" 
(φωτισμὸς), which reveals hidden things (τὰ κεκρυμμένα φανερώσασα), since the 
Teacher alone uncovers the lid of the ark, contrary to what the poets say, that “Zeus 
stops up the jar of good things, but opens that of evil.” “For I know,” says the apostle, 
“that when I come to you, I shall come in the fullness of the blessing of Christ” (Rom. 
15:29). The spiritual gift and communication of knowledge, which he desires to give to
them face to face (for such things as these should not be disclosed through a letter), he 
calls “the fullness of Christ" (cf. Eph. 3:19; 4:13), "according to the revelation of the 
mystery which was kept silent for generations, but now has been manifested 
(φανερωθέντος) through the prophetic Scriptures (διά τε γραφῶν προφητικῶν) and 
made known to all the nations, according to the command of the eternal God, for the 
obedience of faith;” (Rom. 16:25–26) that is, those from the nations who believe that 
he is (πιστεύοντας ὅτι ἐστίν). And to a few of these is shown also what these things 
are, which are contained in the mystery (τό τίνα ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐν μυστηρίῳ 
δείκνυται).52
We must first note that Clement cites Isaiah 45:3 once again. However, in distinction 
from his earlier use of the passage, he now includes the latter half of Isaiah 45:3. Earlier in 
book five, Clement needed to emphasize the reason for the presence of obscurity and 
concealment in Christian Scripture, so he omitted the last half of the verse. At this point in his 
argument, though, having established that he believes the knowledge of God to be the aim of 
scriptural investigation, Clement includes the final phrase, which gives the purpose for God's 
revelation of Scripture's treasures: "that they may know that I, the Lord, am God." A seemingly 
innocuous phrase has now been established as the main goal of scriptural exegesis in Clement's
paradigm. Further, Clement correlates this point with a reading of Psalm 50 (LXX) that shows 
the twofold nature of discerning this knowledge when approaching the Scriptures. Some things
are written plainly, and can be understood on a simple reading of the letter. Other things, like 
knowledge (γνῶσιν), are hidden in the text, and they must be discovered by a more precise 
investigation.53 
Clement also returns to the exegesis of Romans, and he connects the "spiritual gift" of 
52Str. 5.64.1–6 (GCS 15:369)
53In making this point, Clement emphasizes once again the contrast between symbolism in the Christian 
Scriptures from the symbolic nature of all other poetic or oracular texts. Scripture differs from these other writings
because the Teacher who furnished this text also reveals the truth hidden within it, unlike the gods portrayed in 
the Greek poets.
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Romans 1:11 with Paul's claims in Romans 15:29: 
"For I know," says the apostle, "that when I come to you, I will come in the fullness of 
the blessing of Christ," and the spiritual gift (τὸ πνευματικὸν χάρισμα; Rom. 1:11), 
that is, the tradition of knowledge (τὴν γνωστικὴν παράδοσιν), which he wanted to 
give them while present with them, he calls the "fullness of Christ" (πλήρωμα 
Χριστοῦ)."54 
The reference to the "spiritual gift" evokes Clement's earlier argument about theological
inquiry in Stromateis 5.2. For Clement, the ability to interpret Scripture in accordance with its 
two overarching mysteries is tantamount to receiving the "spiritual gift" that he earlier 
identified as the building of γνῶσις upon common πίστις. The correlation of Romans 1 with 
Romans 15 also allows Clement to identify a number of phrases as essentially synonymous: 
"spiritual gift" (Rom. 1:11), "fullness of Christ," and the "structure of knowledge."55 In this 
way, Clement shows his reader that his own association of these Pauline texts best expresses the
unity of the Scriptures, which all describe theological investigation as the progression from 
faith to knowledge. 
Finally, Clement recasts the progression from faith to knowledge as one of moving from
the letter of Scripture to its deeper, latent sense. He does this with a subtle allusion back to the 
Aristotelian argument of the opening section. What he originally described as a progression 
from "believing that he is the Son" to "knowing who the Son of God is," Clement here 
describes as a progression from first "believing that he is" (πιστεύοντας ὅτι ἐστίν) to being 
shown subsequently the "things contained in the mystery" (τό τίνα ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐν 
μυστηρίῳ δείκνυται).56 For Clement, a simple reading of Scripture's letter is quite enough to 
54Str. 5.64.5 (GCS 15:369)
55Le Boulluec (SC 279:23) also notes that Clement here renders the terms "spiritual gift" (don spirituel) 
and "fulness of Christ" (la plénitude du Christ) as essentially synonymous. Although Le Boulluec misses the 
correspondence of these terms with Clement's earlier reference to the "structure of knowledge" (τὴν γνωστικὴν 
οἰκοδομὴν), he does suggest the possibility that these phrases allude to the "gnostic tradition" (γνωστικῆς 
παραδόσεως) of Str. 5.63.2. On the phrase πλήρωμα Χριστοῦ, cf. also Eph. 3:19; 4:13.
56Cf. Clement's words from Str. 5.1.3 (GCS 15:326): γνῶναι δὲ ἀνάγκη τίς ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. Le 
Boulluec, SC 279:230–31, rightly sees Clement's address to two groups in these lines, those who read in a simple 
manner and those who search more intently. He suggests that the "things contained in the mystery," the deeper 
things that are shown to those who search more intently, should be identified with the things that "are the riches 
of the glory of this mystery among the nations" (Col. 1:27). It seems to me, however, that Clement explicitly reads
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elicit Scripture's first mystery, which is faith and hope in Christ. This is the foundation to the 
structure of knowledge. Upon a deeper reading, however, one may come to be shown the 
things contained in the mystery, the knowledge of the Father and the Son. This is reading 
Scripture according to its figural sense.
Faith and Knowledge, or the Letter and the Syllables
We may conclude by looking at a brief illustration that Clement provides in book six of 
the Stromateis. In 6.131.2–3, Clement draws on a passage from the Shepherd of Hermas to 
contrast reading "according to the letter" and "according to the syllables." When asked to 
transcribe the book, the Shepherd says, "I took the book, and after retiring to a certain spot in 
the field, I copied the entirety according to the letter (πρὸς γράμμα). For I had not discovered 
the syllables (οὐχ ηὕρισκον γὰρ τὰς συλλαβάς)."57 It is significant that, in light of Clement's 
creative exegesis that we have analyzed from book five, he argues in 6.131 that a simple 
reading of the letter is "faith" and clear to all, while a "reading of the syllables" is the 
explication of the Scriptures according to "knowledge." In a comparison of the story from 
Hermas with Isaiah's "new book" (cf. Isa. 8:1), Clement concludes that "through the exposition 
of the Scriptures (διὰ τῆς τῶν γραφῶν ἐξηγήσεως) there would then come sacred knowledge 
(τὴν γνῶσιν τὴν ἁγίαν)." Not only then does Clement portray this faith-gnosis progression in 
book five as a rehearsal of the two mysteries of Scripture (cf. Str. 5.2.5; 5.26.1; 5.61.1), but in 
book six, he suggests that this progression is also paralleled by a double reading—a 
straightforward reading capable of engendering faith, followed by a deeper reading that leads 
to the discovery of sacred knowledge.58 
this phrase from Col. 1:27 as the "mystery" of faith and hope in Christ, which he understands Paul to call the 
"foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10) on which γνῶσις is built. And though it can never be severed from the knowledge of 
the Son and the Father that is to be constructed upon it, this "mystery" from Col. 1:27 is the common faith 
Clement describes earlier. This becomes more clear, I think, when we relate the current passage back to the 
opening lines of book five and the Aristotelian principle Clement employs there, a point that Le Boulluec does not 
consider.
57Vis. 2.1.3–4 (LCL 25:184–87): ἔλαβον ἐγώ, καὶ εἴς τινα τόπον τοῦ ἀγροῦ ἀναχωρήσας μετεγραψάμην
πάντα πρὸς γράμμα· οὐχ ηὕρισκον γὰρ τὰς συλλαβάς
58For the role of Hermas in Clement's corpus, see Dan Batovici, “Hermas in Clement of Alexandria,” SP 66 
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In the course of this chapter, I have argued that Clement's creative exegesis in book five 
of the Stromateis is surprising in at least two ways. First, Clement actually restricts the figural 
potential of Christian Scripture. Clement's reflection on the symbolic nature of Egyptian 
hieroglyphics, Greek philosophy, and the classical poets teases his audience to anticipate a 
comparison between the Scriptures and these other texts.59 Yet, as we have seen, Clement alters 
his course, and, in a creative exegesis of the Psalms and Pauline material, Clement subverts 
these expectations by claiming that Scripture only has two "mysteries."60
Second, I argued that Clement's identification of faith in Christ as the "foundation" 
(θεμέλιον) and the mysteries hidden in the Old Testament was, in fact, a subtle reference back 
to the initial arguments of book five on the inseparability of faith and knowledge within the 
proper narrative provided by Scripture. More provocatively, perhaps, I suggested that this binary
account of Scripture's narrative—read analogously at different junctures as (1) πίστις/γνῶσις, 
(2) θεμέλιος/ἡ ἐξαίρετος, (3) Son/Father, (4) ὅτι ἔστι/τί ἔστι, and (5) Wisdom/the Depths of
God—is subsumed in Clement's motivation for reading Scripture: exercising faith upon a 
simple reading and, by reading more deeply, discovering the knowledge of God. Not only is 
this purpose illustrated by the Hermas example from book six, but Clement draws inspiration at 
the outset of book five in his citation from the gospels, "Seek and you will find" (Matt. 7:7; 
ζητεῖτε καὶ εὑρήσετε).61 For Clement, the process of theological inquiry is intimately related to 
scriptural investigation, and the reading of Scripture therefore takes a central place in his 
description of the Christian philosophical life.62
This act of double reading, which leads to the understanding of Scripture's two 
(2013): 41-51. On this passage in particular, I think Batovici rightly concludes that, for Clement, "the letter by 
letter reading is the simple faith based on Scripture, who [sic] is accessible to all upon simple reading, while the 
syllabic reading is for the gnostics whose advanced faith unfolds the Scriptures" (49).
59Cf. Str. 5.21.4 (GCS 15:340)
60Str. 5.61.1 (GCS 15:367)
61Str. 5.6.2; 5.11.1 (GCS 15:329; 332–33)
62Cf. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 137, who says that "The ζήτησις of which Clement speaks is therefore 
nothing but the attempt to disclose the hidden and higher meaning of Scripture."
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mysteries, is the process of figural interpretation that Clement outlines in book five. In my view,
scholars have been content to speak of Clement's idea of exegesis in book five—that is, we 
understand that his concerns center around figural reading. However, we neglect Clement's 
most trenchant claims about exegesis (e.g. Scripture contains only two figural mysteries, which 
are discovered by a parallel double reading) because he never states these claims explicitly. 
Instead, Clement's develops these most penetrating claims about scriptural exegesis in the 
course of his own readings of Scripture. In other words, one must move beyond the idea of 
Clement's exegesis and actually parse his exegetical practice to recover these subtle but significant
points about figural reading. In the next two chapters, then, I will outline a number of the tools
and techniques that Clement employs in the creative exegesis of book five.
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5Clement's Grammatical Archive, Part I:
The Properties of a Text
Many are the treasures furnished by the one God, some revealed in the Law, others through the 
Prophets, and others directly from the mouth of God, and still another in tune with the 
sevenfold spirit.  But the Lord is one, and through all these things, he is the same Educator.1
As I suggested in concluding the previous chapter, I think it quite probable that the 
restriction that Clement places on the figural interpretation of Scripture is missed in scholarly 
accounts of book five because it is itself embedded in an act of creative exegesis. Though all 
scholars confess that figural reading is the subject matter of book five, rarely does anyone 
comment on Clement's skill as a grammarian, drawing upon even the smallest details of the 
scriptural texts to make his arguments.2 In other words, to reverse a common idiom, we miss 
the trees for the forest. Clement's interpretation of the tabernacle and discussions of symbolism
throughout book five rightly shows his interest in figural reading. Yet, as we saw in the last 
chapter, the fact that Clement poses and reposes scriptural lemmata throughout book five to 
construct the very framework in which a figural reading of the tabernacle is possible is a more 
1Paed. 3.87.4 (GCS 12:284)
2One notable exception is Alain Le Boulluec. This is not altogether surprising, when one considers that Le 
Boulluec had earlier reflected on the role of exegesis in Clement's heresiological polemic. See, especially, Alain Le 
Boulluec, “Exégèse et polémique antignostique chez Irénée et Clément d’Alexandrie: L’exemple du centon,” SP 17 
(1982): 707-13; Alain Le Boulluec, La notion d’hérésie dans la littérature grecque, IIe-IIIe siècles, (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 
1985), esp. 2:361–438; and Alain Le Boulluec, “L’écriture comme norme hérésiologique dans les controverses des
IIe et IIIe siècles (domaine Grec),” in Stimuli. Exegese und ihre Hermeneutik in Antike und Christentum. Festschrift für Ernst 
Dassmann, JAC Ergänzungsband 23, eds. Georg Schöllgen and Clemens Scholten (Münster: Aschendorff, 1996), 
66-76. Le Boulluec's commentary on Str. 5 does, at times, consider the grammatical exegesis evidenced by 
Clement's argument; see, for example, Le Boulluec, SC 279:113, where he notes that Clement's use of πρὸς 
ἀντιδιαστολήν is a "formule de commentateur ou de grammairien." Although Le Boulluec notes that Clement 
employs this technique "several times," he nonetheless does not reflect more extensively on how this textual 
practice (and others) from the grammatical archive might influence Clement's entire argument on figural reading. 
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crucial observation for understanding his exegetical practice. 
Therefore, in the next two chapters, I will highlight a number of the reading strategies 
and textual practices that Clement uses in his creative exegesis. Allow me to recall our working 
definition of creative exegesis from chapter one:
Creative exegesis is the task of clarifying textual obscurity by employing the literary-
critical tools of the grammarians to discover the textimmanent intention of an author.
As I described in the first two chapters, the phrase "literary-critical tools of the 
grammarians" refers to the repository of tools, techniques, and practices that made up the 
grammarian's set of skills—a repository I have termed the "grammatical archive." Now, to be 
sure, it would be impossible to discuss the specific techniques and strategies from this archive 
in an exhaustive manner. We can, however, circumscribe our discussion by using Clement's 
scriptural exposition from book five of the Stromateis as our template. Such a control on our 
discussion will permit us to identify some of the major techniques to which Clement will 
consistently return in his exegesis. The examination of Clement's use of the grammatical archive
will proceed in two phases. 
In this chapter, I will consider the various strategies that Clement uses, which are 
concerned with the properties of the scriptural text itself. That is, at times throughout his exegesis, 
Clement calls attention to specific features about Scripture that permit him to make subsequent 
exegetical moves. Within this category, one could place certain topics as discerning the author 
of a text, identifying a text's genre, articulating the expectations one has for the ways that a 
given text will communicate (perhaps based on prior questions, such as its genre), and 
questions about a text's process of signification—how one arrives at a text's intention from the 
text's expressions. In the following chapter, I will examine Clement's reading techniques that 
are concerned with the ways a particular text should be read. In this category, one might consider such 
issues as the definition of terms, the identification of synonyms or antonyms, patterns that may 
be discerned within the structure o the text, or, in the case of early Christian exegetes like 
Clement, whether a preference exists for particular scriptural terminology over a pagan 
counterpart. These distinctions are entirely for heuristic purposes, since (a) one cannot 
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distinguish such categories so clearly within the grammatical archive,3 and (b) textual practices
from each category may be employed together to make a particular argument.
4
Properties Assigned to the Text
At the outset of book five of the Stromateis, which we will examine in more detail in the 
next chapter, Clement is concerned to situate his own reading of Scripture's presentation of 
faith and knowledge in relation to the views of his opponents. As he sets the scene for his 
reflections on scriptural interpretation in book five, Clement reflects on three properties of 
Christian Scripture that he emphasizes throughout his œuvre: the authorship of Scripture, the 
narrative of Scripture, and the goal of Scripture.
Authorship of Scripture
In the first chapter of the fifth Stromata, Clement claims that Christian investigation is at 
its core a question of theology, a search for the knowledge of the Son and the Father. Moreover, 
this investigation is entirely dependent on a prior act of revelation. "God is the one who speaks 
and, concerning each one of the things which I seek, provides an answer in Scripture 
(παριστὰς ἐγγράφως)."5 Thus, one may only arrive at the truth inasmuch as he is guided by 
the revelation wrought by the Son, which Clement describes as understanding truth "through 
the Truth" (διὰ τῆς ἀληθείας).6 Clement's reflection on the divine source of Scripture is not 
only provided in this Johannine language at the outset of book five, but, as I will argue in the 
3For instance, though an exegete may ask at a given point either about a text's genre or about how a given 
text should be expected to communicate, are we to imagine that these questions are mutually exclusive? It seems 
more likely that a question about genre inherently concerns one's expectations about a text's communicative 
potential and vice versa.
4As an example, an exegete's determination about issues of authorship will inevitably color the 
expectations one has for the terminology used (or expected) in the text.
5Str. 5.5.4 (GCS 15:329). Here, I follow the translation of Voulet (SC 278:33), who renders ἐγγράφως as 
"in Scripture."
6Str. 5.1.4 (GCS 15:326). Cf. Jn. 14:6–7.
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next chapter, this question of divine authorship provides him with the opportunity to 
emphasize a distinction between scriptural symbolism and the symbolism of all other literature. 
For Clement, since the impassible God could never be accused of jealousy, then there must be a 
different reason than that of the Greek poets for Scripture's symbols.7 Moreover, Clement's 
emphasis on the divine authorship of Scripture implicitly grounds the links he forges between 
diverse scriptural texts, a reading practice we will consider below. What is important to note 
here, however, is that the divine production of Scripture becomes a fundamental theme of 
Clement's creative exegesis.
It comes as no surprise, then, that when Clement quotes from Isaiah 45:3, Clement 
claims that "the Spirit speaks through Isaiah" (λέγει δὲ καὶ διὰ Ἡσαΐου τοῦ προφήτου τὸ 
πνεῦμα).8 Yet, this is not Clement's preferred manner of speaking about divine authorship. 
Instead, Clement prefers two different images to speak of Scripture's divine arrangement. First, 
Clement describes God's oversight of the Scriptures as that of the director (χορηγός). As a 
conductor would direct the choir in a musical arrangement, so God has directed the choir of 
biblical writers in the arrangment of the Scriptures. In Str. 6.42.1, Clement argues that "the 
same God is the director of both testaments."9 Nevertheless, though the Christian Scriptures are
composed of two testaments, Clement argues that they must be understood as a unity: "the Law
does not fight against the Gospel, but rather it sings in harmony (συνᾴδει) with it. For how 
could it not, since there is one director (χορηγοῦ)—the Lord—for both?"10 Clement's 
insistence on the divine authorship of the Scriptures carries an implication for reading the two 
testaments as a unity. This implication of authorship for a text's readers was not merely a 
Christian innovation, but as we saw in the Alexandrian grammarians and even Heraclitus, the 
need for consistency between an author's texts was a fundamental presupposition of ancient 
7Str. 5.24.2 (GCS 15:340–41)
8Str. 5.23.2 (GCS 15:340)
9Str. 6.42.1 (GCS 15:452): ὁ αὐτὸς θεὸς ἀμφοῖν ταῖν διαθήκαιν χορηγός
10Str. 2.147.2 (GCS 15:193): οὑ δὴ μάχεται εὐαγγελίῳ ὁ νόμος, συνᾴδει δὲ αὐτῷ. πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἑνὸς 
ὄντος ἀμφοῖν χορηγοῦ τοῦ κυρίου;
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readers. We will examine this point in more detail below, when we look at the reading 
strategies Clement uses here in book five. We may point to one further instance of χορηγός in 
Clement's corpus that will reveal the second way he characteristically speaks of God's 
authorship. In the Paedagogus, Clement describes Scripture's divine arrangement in terms that 
recall his arguments in book five: 
Many are the treasures furnished by the one God (θησαυροὶ δὲ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς πολλοὶ 
χορηγούμενοι θεοῦ), some revealed in the Law, others through the Prophets, and others 
directly from the mouth of God, and still another in tune with the sevenfold spirit.  But 
the Lord is one, and through all these things, he is the same Educator.11
As in the Stromateis, Clement here describes the content of Scripture as the treasures that 
God himself offers. Perhaps the reference to the Law and the Prophets as scriptural categories 
are clear enough, but what does Clement mean by his suggestion that some of these treasures 
are received  "by the divine mouth" (τῷ θείῳ στόματι)? Is he still speaking of Scripture here? 
To answer this question, we must turn to the second image that Clement employs to speak of 
divine authorship. 
The second image by which Clement emphasizes the divine source of the Scriptures is 
his repeated claim that Christians are taught by the "voice of the Lord." In the seventh book of 
the Stromateis, we find Clement stating this point explicitly, when he says, "we are instructed into
the knowledge of truth by the voice of the Lord."12 It is not obvious, however, that such a 
passage must refer to the Scriptures, but there are good reasons to believe this is the case. In his 
Protrepticus, Clement provides us with a short summary of his understanding of the relation of 
the Word to the people of God as revealed throughout the Old Testament. He recounts how the 
Word was present, exhorting his people in the past. 
Let us run to the Savior, the Lord, who even now, as ever, exhorts (προὔτρεπεν) men to 
salvation, as he did by wonders and signs in Egypt, and in the wilderness by the 
burning bush and the cloud that, through his loving grace, followed the Hebrews like a 
11Paed. 3.87.4 (GCS 12:284): Θησαυροὶ δὲ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς πολλοὶ χορηγούμενοι θεοῦ, οἳ μὲν διὰ τοῦ νόμου, οἳ 
δὲ διὰ προφητῶν ἀποκαλύπτονται, οἳ δὲ τῷ θείῳ στόματι, ἄλλος δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος τῇ ἑπτάδι ἐπᾴδων· εἷς δὲ 
ὢν ὁ κύριος διὰ πάντων τούτων ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν παιδαγωγός
12Str. 7.95.6 (GCS 17:67)
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handmaid. By the fear that these signs inspired he exhorts (προὔτρεπεν) the 
hardhearted; but then, through all-wise Moses and truth-loving Isaiah and the whole 
prophetic choir, he converts to the Word by more rational means those who have ears.13
Clement describes the ministry of the Word as one of exhortation, progressively leading
God's people through each stage. Yet, Clement adds a further detail to the picture. Comparing 
the Word's action to that of the doctor, who employs various remedies for different ailments,14 
Clement uses Hebrews 1 to describe the Word's exhortation. As the doctor uses many remedies,
So also the Savior employs many voices and many ways (πολύφωνος καὶ πολύτροπος) 
to lead men to salvation.  By threatening, he warns; by rebuking, he converts; by 
offering a lament, he shows pity; and by singing, he encourages.15
Clement's use of Hebrews is subtle, but his point is that the Word has been leading men
to salvation (εἰς ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίαν) through "many voices" (πολύφωνος).16 That is, in the 
history of Israel, the Word has used various events, figures, and outcomes to direct his people 
to salvation. Nevertheless, since his people did not believe in the voice mediated through the 
prophets, Clement concludes starkly: "the Word Himself now speaks to you in clear view 
(ἐναργῶς), putting to shame your unbelief (ἀπιστίαν)."17 Earlier, Clement had described this 
13Prot. 1.8.1–2 (GCS 12:8)
14Clement will return to this medicinal analogy in Paed. 1.3.1–3 (GCS 12:91).
15Prot. 1.8.2–3 (GCS 12:8–9)
16Clement's subtle change to the phrase from Heb. 1:1 has hidden the allusion from many, but it seems 
that his alteration of πολυμερῶς to πολύφωνος is a means to draw attention to the voice of the Word that has led 
men throughout the divine pedagogy. Walther Völker, Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus, (Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1952), 100–02, notes the allusion, though he makes no attempt to discern the reason for Clement's 
alteration: "Wie im Leben des einzelnen, so ist der Logos auch im Verlauf der Heilsgeschichte als der große 
Erzieher wirksam. Er steht als leitende Kraft hinter allem historischen Geschehen . . . Jedem gibt er das Passende 
zur rechten Zeit, daher wendet Clemens in diesem Zusammenhang gern das Wort Hebr. 1,1 an: πολυτρόπως καὶ 
πολυμερῶς. In Ägypten bedurfte es der Zeichen und Wunder, die Verkündigung des Moses und der Propheten 
bewegte sich bereits auf einer höheren Ebene" (101).
17Prot. 1.8.4 (GCS 12:9). My translation of ἐναργῶς as "in clear view" is indebted to the insightful essay 
on Epicurean epistemology by A. A. Long, “Aisthesis, Prolepsis and Linguistic Theory in Epicurus,” BICS 18 (1971):
114-33. For a more detailed look at the role of ἐνάργεια in Clement's understanding of the Incarnation and 
Scripture, see H. Clifton Ward, “We Hold These ἀρχαί to be Self-Evident: Clement of Alexandria, ἐναργεία, and the
Search for Truth,” SP (forthcoming). Both the ancient philosophical and ancient rhetorical traditions were 
concerned to emphasize the sense of sight—that which appears "clear" and "evident." Thus, they each adapted 
discussions of ἐνάργεια towards their own ends. For an argument that the Hellenistic literary critics borrowed 
ἐνάργεια from contemporary philosophy, see G. Zanker, “Enargeia in the Ancient Criticism of Poetry,” RhM 124 
(1981), 308–10. For the use of ἐνάργεια in ancient rhetoric, see Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 29–53; 
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contrast more explicitly: "Our ally and helper is one, the Lord himself, who from the beginning
spoke through prophecy, but now exhorts to salvation in clear view."18 For Clement, the 
mediated voice of the Logos had earlier spoken through the Old Testament and only recently 
had the Word appeared, whose immediate voice now speaks open and in clear view as the 
Lord, our Teacher (διδάσκαλος).19 
This discussion in the Protrepticus, then, clarifies Clement's intention in book seven of the
Stromateis. There, to clarify his point that "we have the Lord as a first principle of teaching, 
guiding us, from the first to the last, to knowledge 'in many and various ways' (πολυτρόπως 
καὶ πολυμερῶς) through the Prophets and the Gospel and the blessed Apostles," Clement says, 
"we are instructed into the knowledge of truth by the voice of the Lord (φωνῇ κυρίου 
παιδευόμεθα)."20 The recollection once again of Hebrews 1:1 calls to mind Clement's argument
from the Protrepticus, and it confirms the Scriptures—composed of Prophets, Gospel, and 
Apostles—as the medium through which the Word speaks πολύφωνος.21 It seems likely, then, 
that when Clement claims in the Paedagogus that God furnishes some of the treasures contained 
in Scripture τῷ θείῳ στόματι, his use of this obscure phrase is tantamount to a claim that 
Christians are likewise instructed "by the voice of the Lord."22 Both phrases become a 
metonymic reference to the teaching of the incarnate Lord in the New Testament.
By his use of these two images, then, Clement emphasizes the divine source of 
Scripture.23 Yet, Clement's frequent return, often implicitly, to Scripture's divine origin, is only 
Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 194–98; and Heinrich F. Plett, Enargeia in Classical Antiquity and the Early Modern Age: The 
Aesthetics of Evidence, (Leiden: Brill, 2012). Clement often correlates hearing clearly with exercising faith (πίστις). For
a discussion of Clement's understanding of faith, see Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 118–42.
18Prot. 1.7.6 (GCS 12:8): εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς <ὁ> ἐπίκουρος καὶ βοηθὸς ἡμῖν ὁ κύριος, προμηνύων ἀρχῆθεν 
προφητικῶς, νῦν δὲ ἤδη καὶ ἐναργῶς εἰς σωτηρίαν παρακαλῶν
19Prot. 1.10.1 (GCS 12:10)
20Str. 7.95.3–6 (GCS 17:67).
21Cf. Prot. 1.8.3 (GCS 12:8–9).
22Cf. Str. 7.95.4 (GCS 17:67): "by the Lord's Scriptures and his actual voice" (τῇ κυριακῇ γραφῇ τε καὶ 
φωνῇ)
23By focusing on these two images, I do not intend to minimize Clement's articulation that God speaks 
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the initial move required in his creative exegesis. As we saw in the first chapter, a number of 
other grammatical considerations depended on the identification of a text's author, and for 
Clement, this is no different. The identification of God as the primary author of Scripture 
provides Clement the opportunity to reflect on such issues as the narrative and the goal of the 
Scriptures.
The Narrative and Goal of Scripture
Indeed, in our reading of book five, we noticed that Clement's reflection on the 
authorship of Scripture prepares the way for a consideration of its plot and narrative. In its 
opening chapters, Clement identified two sets of opponents. The first opponent claimed that 
πιστίς was concerned only with the Son, whereas γνῶσις dealt entirely with the Father. His 
Valentinian opponent, on the other hand, considers faith and the incarnation entirely 
superfluous, since salvation is gained by nature instead of faith. Against both of these 
understandings, however, Clement argues that Scripture actually correlates faith and knowledge 
as a progressive pedagogical ascent to the Father through the Son. Using Romans 1:17 as his 
basis, Clement claimed that Scripture actually teaches what only appears as a twofold faith but 
is in reality two sides to the same coin: "a single faith that admits of growth and perfection."24 
Of course, it is possible to read Clement's arguments at the outset of book five and miss the 
subtle link that he makes between theological inquiry and the reading of Scripture. 
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that Clement situates his own reading of Scripture 
alongside two opposing readings. In other words, Clement understands the creative exegesis he
offers in book five to be an alternative narrative, a distinct way of viewing Scripture's teaching 
in contradistinction to these opponents. Notice what Clement says in the very first line of book 
five:
There are some who make the following distinction: whereas our faith concerns the 
"through" Scripture's human authors. Indeed, I have already shown that Clement's use of this phrase in 
introducing the quotation from Isaiah 45:3 is a characteristic way for Clement to return to the issue of Scripture's 
divine origin.
24Str. 5.2.4 (GCS 15:327)
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Son, knowledge concerns the Father. But it has escaped their notice (λέληθεν δὲ αὐτοὺς)
that while we must truly believe (πιστεῦσαι ἀληθῶς) the Son that he is the Son (and 
that he came and how and why and about his passion), it is also necessary to know 
(γνῶναι) who the Son of God is.25 
Clement critiques anonymous opponents who have misinterpreted the scriptural 
terminology of πίστις and γνῶσις, which Clement intimately relates to the Father-Son 
language of the gospels. The identity of these opponents is not obvious, but their position is 
clear: Christian "faith" is related to the Son, while "knowledge" is related to the Father. Clement
maintains, however, that the failure of his opponents here is indeed a failure to understand the 
intricacies of the Scriptures, which present faith and knowledge as inherently inseparable. 
Clement claims that this reading "has escaped their notice" (λέληθεν δὲ αὐτοὺς). This is a 
phrase found often in ancient literary scholarship, by which critics often took notice of details 
that happened inconspicuously in texts.26 In the scholia on the Iliad, for instance, characters may
be mentioned en passant at one place because they will become important later.27 Elsewhere, 
speakers may indirectly address interlocutors or even the audience "between the lines."28 For 
his purposes, Clement claims that these opposing readers have failed to notice the reciprocity of
faith and knowledge in the Christian texts. To be sure, the indirect nature of the term λανθάνω 
may suggest that this relationship between πίστις and γνῶσις is not straightforward. 
Nevertheless, Clement argues that it is, in fact, the common teaching of the Johannine gospel 
and Paul in Romans and the Corinthian correspondence. These opponents dissect the truth, 
misalign the roles of faith and knowledge, and completely misunderstand the relationship 
between the Son and the Father. But Clement is fully aware that there is more than one way to 
misunderstand the truth, and he immediately turns his attention to another opponent who 
25Str. 5.1.1–2 (GCS 15:326)
26On the use of λεληθότως in ancient scholarship, see Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 57 and 211.
27Cf. schol. bT Il. 1.242 ex.
28Cf. schol. bT Il. 11.766 ex., in which Nestor is said to instruct Patroclus "indirectly" (λεληθότως); or 
schol. bT Il. 11.116–7 ex., where the use of a simile "indirectly" expresses to the audience the dishonorable 
character of the Trojans. 
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constructs yet a different narrative.
The precepts both of the Old and of the New Testament are, then, superfluous 
(παρέλκουσι), if one is saved by nature (φύσει σῳζομένου), as Valentinus would have it,
or is a believer and elect man by nature (φύσει ἐκλεκτοῦ ὄντος), as Basilides thinks; and
nature would have been able, one time or other, to have shone forth, apart from the 
Savior’s appearance.29
If his first opponents misunderstood the role of faith in Scripture's portrayal of the 
Christian pedagogy, then the Valentinians here completely disregard the role that faith plays at 
all. The pedagogical narrative that Clement constructs in book five is dependent on the major 
roles of faith and the Incarnation. Yet, in this alternative account of Scripture's narrative, there 
would no longer be the need for either faith or the Savior's appearance. If, however, one admits 
that the Savior's appearance was in fact necessary, since one may only know the Father through 
the Son, then the elect can no longer be said to be saved by nature. On the contrary, they are 
saved by instruction, purification, and the doing of good works, taught as it were by the voice 
of the Lord. Clement's argument against the Valentinians here turns to the Abraham narrative of 
Genesis 12, where Abraham exercised faith upon hearing the voice of the Lord say, "I will give 
this land to you and your seed." Clement points to the significance that Abraham's πίστις was 
counted to him as righteousness. If Abraham is therefore shown to be elect and saved by faith, 
then he is clearly not saved by nature. Thus, Clement claims that his opponents' narrative has 
failed (λέλυται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὑπόθεσις), while simultaneously believing that his own understanding
of Scripture's portrayal of faith and knowledge has been confirmed.30 
Of course, the narrative of Scripture cannot be strictly divorced from the aim to which 
Scripture's narrative points.31 Thus, in a section concerned with these literary features, it is not 
surprising that Clement draws attention to the goal of Scripture. After outlining the progression
29Str. 5.3.3 (GCS 15:327)
30On ὑπόθεσις in ancient scholarship, see Kassel, “Hypothesis.”; Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 
105–33; and Nünlist, Ancient Critic at Work, 23–68.
31Cf. Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories, 108, who notes, "the ὑπόθεσις of a text evidently is what the 
author aims at, his personal and freely chosen τέλος." 
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from faith to knowledge, Clement claims that the harmony (συμφωνία) of this process 
articulated in the Christian Scriptures moves toward one aim (εἰς ἓν πέρας): salvation.32 
Clement elsewhere develops this link between Scripture's aim and Paul's programmatic 
statement in Romans 1:17.
“And the righteous one shall live by faith,” which is according to the testament and the
commandments, since these testaments—two in name and time —are given 
economically for maturation and progress, are one in power, whether "Old" or "New," 
and are furnished (χορηγοῦνται) by the one God through his Son. About this testament
also, the Apostle says in the letter to the Romans: “For the righteousness of God is 
revealed in it from faith to faith,” teaching one salvation perfected (τετελειωμένην) 
from prophecy to gospel through one and the same Lord 
(δι’ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κυρίου).33
For Clement, the unity of God's divine pedagogy and the unity of the Scriptures are 
grounded in the single God who has furnished the Scriptures and created the cosmos. A focus 
on the narrative and theme of Scripture was common in the second century C.E., especially in 
the heresiological disputes of Christians with Valentinians.34 It is not my intention to claim that 
Clement elevates the concept of ὑπόθεσις in a way similar to Irenaeus, whose emphasis on this 
concept is well-known.35 I do want to suggest, however, that Clement's detailed attention to the
narratives constructed by his opponents in book five reveals the literary foundations to his own
textual practices. Regardless of whether one considers Clement's reading to be as clearly 
superior as he believes it to be, it is important to note that his fundamental complaint against 
32Str. 5.2.2 (GCS 15:327)
33Str. 2.29.2–3 (GCS 15:128). Clement's gloss of ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν with ἐκ προφητείας εἰς 
εὐαγγέλιον seems perhaps to share features with Origen's reading of Romans from an economical standpoint.
34See, especially, Le Boulluec, “Exégèse et polémique antignostique”; and Ayres, “Irenaeus vs. the 
Valentinians”. On the intellectual culture in which these polemical strategies of exegesis develop, see Christoph 
Markschies, Kaiserzeitliche christliche Theologie und ihre Institutionen: Prolegomena zu einer Geschichte der antiken christlichen Theologie, 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). Again, this broader narrative of the development of Christian exegesis that 
correlates the implementation of literary-critical tools with the polemics against Valentinians is compellingly 
argued by Ayres, As It Is Written.
35For a summary of the literature and helpful argument on Irenaeus' intentions in employing rhetorical 
and literary concepts, see  Briggman, “Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1”; and Anthony Briggman, 
“Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 2,” VC 70 (2016): 31-50. 
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these opponents emphasize that their fundamental failure, at least in his mind, was a 
misreading of Scripture's expressions. They did not read the letter of Scripture properly, and as a
result, they falsely construed Scripture's teaching. But how is one to provide a more appropriate
reading of Scripture's letter? What techniques  or reading strategies does Clement apply to the 
text to understand its narrative in a way different from these opponents? This will be the 
concern of our next chapter.
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6Clement's Grammatical Archive, Part II:
The Practices Applied to a Text
“And the righteous one shall live by faith,” which is according to the testament and the 
commandments, since these testaments—two in name and time —are given economically for 
maturation and progress, are one in power, whether "Old" or "New," and are furnished by the 
one God through his Son.  About this testament also, the Apostle says in the letter to the 
Romans: “For the righteousness of God is revealed in it from faith to faith,” teaching one 
salvation perfected from prophecy to gospel through one and the same Lord.1
In chapter five, I examined the textual practices that Clement culled from his 
grammatical archive, as they pertained to the properties of the text itself. In this chapter, then, I will 
analyze a few of the textual practices that Clement applies to the text for the purpose of reading
it. Once again, it is important to note that this is not intended to be an exhaustive description 
of Clement's repertoire of reading practices. Instead, I want to emphasize those practices that 
we can observe in the creative exegesis of book five, as Clement is concerned with the textual 
obscurity presented by the Scriptures and how he might clarify its intentions. 
In one sense, this exercise is dependent on the brilliant work of Robert Grant.2 Though 
the book itself is relatively short, the publication of The Letter and the Spirit in 1957 was a 
significant step forward for English scholarship in the consideration of early Christian exegesis 
in its Greco-Roman context.3 To be sure, Grant's work maintains some positions that are today 
rightly considered untenable,4 but the sensibility he displays to situate Christian reading 
1Str. 2.29.2–3 (GCS 15:128)
2Grant, Letter and the Spirit.
3It is important to register the qualification that, although Grant's monograph represents a significant 
contribution to English scholarship on early Christian reading, these questions were not entirely omitted by the 
broader scholarly world. This can be seen in the work of Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie.
4For example, one need only revisit his claim that, although the "difference between Alexandria and 
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alongside the practice of interpretation in the broader ancient world is entirely correct. I am 
not convinced by Grant's suspicion that the literary-critical techniques used by early Christian 
readers on the Scriptures were a subsequent step intended to verify theological presuppositions.
As we saw in chapter three, we have evidence of a number of ancient readers, Christian and 
pagan alike, who suggest that access to the theological truths within a given text is granted to 
those who have the ability to interpret in the right manner. Nevertheless, as verification of his 
decision to compare Christian and Greek readers, Grant outlined a number of technical terms 
both traditions shared in an appendix to The Letter and the Spirit. He registered the caution that the 
terms were exceedingly fluid, but substantiated the need to understand the role that each term 
played for early Christian exegetes.5 
As a means of structuring this chapter, and in order to emphasize the consistency of 
Clement's textual practices, I will examine the strategies of Clement's grammatical archive 
according to our definition for creative exegesis. Thus, we may divide our definition into the 
following three phrases (given in a slightly different order for the sake of the current chapter):
Antioch can be exaggerated," Antiochene exegetes had "a closer relationship to Jewish exegesis," were influenced 
by "Aristotelian rather than Platonic philosophy," and developed "a theology concerned as much with the 
humanity as with the divinity of Christ." See Grant, Letter and the Spirit, 105.
5For this important appendix, see Grant, Letter and the Spirit, 120–42. Grant concludes this appendix with 
five general theses that, he claims, can be generated from investigation of these technical terms (141–42): (1) 
"The content is theologia or physiologia"; (2) "This content was delivered in hints, suggestions, and indications"; (3) 
"The resulting for is ainigma, allegoria, parabolé. The content, in so far as it can be differentiated from the form, is 
mystérion, symbolon, typos (in various senses)"; (4) To understand form and content, the exegete needs to use exégésis 
and theõria, preferably 'spiritually' and with anagõgé, in order to "know", to have "understanding", and to reach a 
solution of these mysteries"; (5) "This true meaning, the same as the content mentioned above, can also be called 
hyponoia, or a recognition of the oikonomia underlying scripture." For his part, Grant's methodology is instructive, 
and he is entirely correct that these technical terms do have a broad semantic range. Thus, no argument 
concerning early Christian exegesis can be sustained that is dependent solely on one specific term or another. 
Nevertheless, I am not persuaded by Grant's theses for two reasons in particular. First, and most significant, Grant's
concluding theses attempt to generalize definitions for these terms that are true for all Christian interpretation. In 
my view, the fluidity of the terms and the fact that individual exegetes employ the same term in different ways 
disallows such generalization. One must instead consider the interaction of individual interpreters with this 
exegetical terminology in detail before any broad characterizations about Christian exegesis in general could ever 
be drawn. Second, there are a number of significant technical terms given no discussion at all. For instance, there 
is no entry on any of the following terms: πρέπον, σκοπός, or ὑπόθεσις. Additionally, Grant's discussion of some 
terms is much too brief to be helpful. Three sentences devoted to ἀμφιβολία is a pertinent example of this 
unfortunate brevity, considering the significance of this term in the heresiological polemics of the second century. 
Conversely, his loquacious entry of three pages on ἀλληγορία renders undue significance to a term that was not of
primary importance to early Christian readers.
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(1) Creative exegesis is the discovery of the textimmanent intention of an author . . . 
(2) . . . by clarifying textual obscurity . . . 
(3) . . . through the literary-critical tools of the grammarians.
These three phrases will serve as the framework for our discussion in the rest of the chapter.
The Textimmanent Intention
In chapter one, I argued that that goal of employing the tools from one's grammatical 
archive was to be found in discerning the intention of a given text. 
In Clement's discussion of symbolism and scriptural interpretation, this priority is no 
different. Just prior to his discussion of Scripture's mysteries, Clement draws his reader into the
reasons for his labored discussions on symbolic texts. The key point that he wants to put across 
is that symbolic texts
must be understood figuratively, not absolutely in all their expressions (πάντα τὰ 
ὀνόματα), but in those expressions which signify (σημαντικά) the general sense (τῆς 
διανοίας τῆς καθόλου). And we shall find (ἐξεύροιμεν) these expressions indicated by 
symbols (διὰ συμβόλων) under the veil of allegory (ὑπὸ παρακαλύμματι τῇ 
ἀλληγορίᾳ).6
In keeping with our definition, it is clear from this passage that Clement's conception of
creative exegesis mandates the search for the intention (τῆς διανοίας) of the passage under 
consideration. Moreover, Clement confirms the literary nature of Christian inquiry (ζήτησις) 
that has been his focus since the first chapter of book five. His use of the verb ἐξευρίσκω, 
applied here for the first time explicitly to textual research and discovery, provides a clear link 
to his earlier use of the imagery drawn from Matthew 7.7 Yet, Clement adds an additional layer 
to the expression-intention dichotomy. For Clement, one may not read every expression 
6Str. 5.58.6 (GCS 15:365)
7Cf. Str. 5.11.1 (GCS 15:332–33)
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figuratively, but only those that must be given a figurative reading to maintain the general 
intention of the text.8 Clement maintains, then, an understanding that certain texts are clear as 
they are presented, and therefore, they are not in need of exegetical clarification.9 We will 
examine this process of exegetical clarification in more detail in the following section.
This distinction between words and intention, however, becomes a means for Clement 
to attend to the polemical battle for scriptural interpretation. He is often quite happy to 
contrast those who look to Scripture's expressions (τὰς λέξεις) with those who seek its 
intentions (τὰς διανοίας).10 We see once again, under the language of semiotics, the 
grammatical distinction between word and thought, λέξις and διάνοια. In book seven of the 
Stromateis, Clement parallels an understanding of Scripture's expressions (τὰς λέξεις) with the 
ability to show its meanings (τὰ σημαινόμενα ἐνδειξώμεθα).11 For Clement, then, the purpose 
of literary investigation is the discovery of τὰ σημαινόμενα; that is, the things signified by the 
text of Scripture. One must attend to both the textual phrases and the meaning intended by 
them. Castigating his opponents, Clement claims that their failure resides in attending to words
alone (τοῖς ὀνόμασι μόνοις) rather than seeking their meaning (τὰ σημαινόμενα).12 For 
Clement, the verb σημαίνειν—perhaps more clearly than διάνοια—subtly links the discovery of
the intention with the necessity to attend to the words and expressions of the text themselves. 
The terminology of "signification" does not presuppose a figurative meaning,13 but rather it 
presupposes attention to the sign prior to discovery of the meaning. The exegete must apply 
8Le Boulluec, SC 279:216, rightly claims that "il énonce un principe d'exégèse qui modère le recours à 
l'allégorie en le soumettant à la cohérence propre du texte commenté."
9Indeed, this is conspicuously reminiscent of the first division of the Egyptian hieroglyphics that Clement
mentions earlier in book five. There, he speaks of a mode of symbolism that "expresses the 'proper' meaning by 
the very appearance of the sign" (κυριολογεῖται κατὰ μίμησιν). See Str. 5.20.3 (GCS 15:339).
10For this contrast, see Str. 6.132.3 (GCS 15:498).
11Str. 7.1.3 (GCS 17:3)
12Str. 7.96.3 (GCS 17:68)
13Contra Grant, Letter and the Spirit, 135, who argues that this term points to "the underlying allegorical 
content of a work being interpreted; it is practically equivalent to ainissesthai or ménuein, but suggests that the 
allegory is fairly evident to the reader."
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certain grammatical tools, which we will survey below, and thereby he will uncover the 
meaning (τὸ σημαινόμενον) of Scripture's words. Clement argues that the purpose of his 
exegesis is to express Scripture's thought alone (τὸν νοῦν μόνον), and not merely its 
expressions (οὐ τὴν λέξιν).14 
We must be careful, however, of reading too much into the distinction between 
expression and intention. Some scholars have argued, for instance, that διάνοια is nearly 
synonymous with ὑπόνοια in early Christian exegesis, and therefore, a search for the intention 
of Scripture is necessarily a move toward figural reading. Robert Grant, for example, points to 
Philo's claim that the text serves as a "symbol of a hidden intention" (σύμβολον διανοίας 
ἀφανοῦς), such that texts have a literal script (ταῖς ῥηταῖς γραφαῖς) and an underlying 
allegorical intention (ταῖς καθ᾽ ὑπόνοιαν ἀλληγορίαις).15 But we should be cautious of linking 
διάνοια with an underlying or hidden meaning generally.16 Clement, contrary to Philo, rarely 
uses ὑπόνοια, and though at times his use of διάνοια may follow Grant's understanding, this is 
not evident in every case. We must be aware that, for Clement, there are certain expressions 
which may not be rendered figuratively. These texts express their intention upon a 
straightforward reading; there is no obscurity to be resolved. But not all texts are categorized in
this way, and therefore, creative exegesis must focus on the task of clarification.
Clarifying Textual Obscurity
If my argument in chapter one is compelling, and the grammatical tradition may best 
be viewed as an attempt at expressing clarity from the obscurity presented by a text, then 
Clement's adaptation of this principle in his own creative exegesis is hardly difficult to imagine. 
As Francesca Schironi has argued, the fundamental assumption of the Homerum ex homero reading 
strategy—which I argued earlier was itself intended to provide clarification of textual 
14Str. 7.1.4 (GCS 17:3)
15Grant, Letter and the Spirit, 125–26. Cf. Philo, Praem. 61; 65 (LCL 341:348–49; 352–53). 
16Cf. Isocrates' silence (fourth century B.C.E.) as to whether his interpreter had, at the end of the day, 
understood the ὑπονοίαις of his διανοίας; see Panath. 265 (LCL 229:536–37)
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obscurity—for Aristarchus and the Alexandrian grammarians was that there are "internal and 
rational rules" to Homeric poetry. From this perspective, "since Homer is internally consistent, 
then any questionable word, phrase, or episode can be explained or rejected using Homeric 
poetry itself as evidence."17 Of course, for Clement and other early Christian readers, concerned
not with the Homeric corpus but with a text furnished by God himself, the outright rejection 
of scriptural passages was not a valid option.18 Indeed, as Clement argues, God did not speak 
obscurely because of jealousy, but specifically to engage the readers of Scriptures in this hunt 
for its internal consistency, where truth is to be found.19 Rather than athetizing the text of 
Christian Scripture, the explanations of the supposed obscurities of the Bible would turn for 
Clement on the creative exegesis of the words, phrases, and episodes in the text. 
Clement often glosses the act of exegesis explicitly as clarification (σαφηνίζω). We have 
already seen how this terminology can be traced back to the Homeric scholarship in Ptolemaic 
Alexandria, and it remained a valuable term in the second and third centuries C.E. Jaap 
Mansfeld has shown the importance of the concept of clarity (σαφήνεια) to Neoplatonic 
philosophers, which he also compellingly observes in Galen's medical exegesis. For these 
readers, the process of discovering clarity might only be found by adducing it from other 
passages in Plato or Hippocrates, respectively.20 In Clement of Alexandria, we find a similar 
perspective. This process of clarification may operate in two ways. 
First, Clement emphasizes the possibility of a horizontal clarification—the use of one 
passage to clarify another more ambiguous text. This horizontal clarification accounts for an 
author's ability to portray his own intentions more clearly through the course of his writing, as 
17Schironi, “Greek Commentaries,” 436.
18Philo likewise refused to athetize any passages of the Pentateuch. See Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and Homeric 
Scholarship in Alexandria, 134–39. Niehoff concludes with apt words about Philo's methodology: "In first-century 
Alexandria, [Philo] was the first scholar to anchor a consistently allegorical approach in serious literal scholarship, 
thus offering a new theory of allegory, which is rooted in Aristotelian notions of authorial intention" (139). It is 
my contention in this study that Clement's use of Philo is not predicated on agreement in readings but rather in 
appreciation for Philo's ability to ground his figural readings in the literal sense. In other words, for Clement, it 
was Philo's methodology, not its results, that was worthy of imitation.
19Cf. Str. 5.24.2 (GCS 15:341)
20See Mansfeld, Prolegomena, 155–61.
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details are added to earlier obscure statements or phrases. In Paed. 2.103, Clement offers an 
explanation of the exhortation in Luke 12:29: "Do not seek for what you will eat or drink." 
Clement argues that this should not be read as a general prohibition of all food or drink, but 
rather against ostentatiousness and overindulgence. To justify this reading, Clement notes that 
"the phrase which follows clarifies (σαφηνίζει) the meaning." The addition of "do not be 
presumptuous" in the latter half of the verse illuminates the proper meaning of the former.21 
This is obviously also Clement's logic in Str. 5.61.3–4, when he argues that πάντα ἄνθρωπον 
could not mean every man, since then no one would lack faith. Rather, he continues "because 
'all do not possess knowledge,' he explicitly adds (dιαρρήδην ἐπιφέρει): 'Being knit together in 
love' . . ."22 For Clement, πάντα ἄνθρωπον means "the whole man," since Paul continues by 
suggesting in the following verses that God himself must do this work of maturation. The later 
verses clarify the earlier verses in this immediate context. 
But this passage from book five highlights another aspect of horizontal clarification: the
ability of clear texts from elsewhere in Scripture to clarify obscure ones. Clement imports 1 
Corinthians 8:7 ("knowledge is not for all") as a means of clarifying Paul's logic in Colossians. 
Elsewhere, this same horizontal clarification allows texts from each testament to clarify one 
another. For instance, in Prot. 1.9.4, Clement claims that the text of Isaiah 54:1 offers 
clarification (σαφηνίζει) to the message of salvation and eternal life that is only hinted at 
(αἰνισσονταί) by the two "voices" (φωναί) of the gospels—the angel Gabriel (cf. Lk. 1:13–17)
and John the Baptist (cf. Jn. 1:20–23). Inasmuch as the Isaianic passage represents the "Lord 
himself speaking in Isaiah" (αὐτὸς ἐν Ἡσαΐᾳ ὁ κύριος λαλῶν)—that is, the Word who has 
guided humanity to salvation in "many voices and many ways" (πολύφωνός καὶ πολύτροπος; 
cf. Heb. 1:1)—, then this text may therefore clarify the message of the two "voices" who 
prefigure the incarnate Word who will exhort men to salvation, no longer obscurely, but clearly
(ἐναργῶς) in the flesh. The message of Isaiah and that of the Gospels is one and the same, a 
point which Clement bases on his understanding of the authorship of Scripture, which we 
21Paed. 2.103.1–3 (GCS 12:218–19)
22Str. 5.61.3–4 (GCS 15:367)
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discussed earlier.
Clement also uses the language of clarity to describe a reader's progression into the 
understanding of Scripture's deeper meaning—a vertical clarification. The initiation of this 
vertical process belongs to the Lord himself, who has taught the apostles the mystery contained
in the Old Testament: "For the prophecy (ἡ προφητεία) is full of knowledge, since it was given 
by the Lord (παρὰ κυρίου δοθεῖσα) and once more it was clarified by the Lord (διὰ κυρίου 
πάλιν σαφηνισθεῖσα) to the apostles."23 Clement argues that Scripture is clarified when its 
mysteries are revealed, and this process of creative exegesis was initiated by the Word who had 
himself first given the Scriptures.24 Clement describes the overarching goal of this exegesis as a 
penetration to the "exact clarity" (τὴν ἀκριβῆ σαφήνειαν) of the Scriptures, the discovery of 
truth by means of the connection between the two testaments.25 Indeed, in Q.D.S. 26.1, Clement
equates the clear meaning (σαφηνισμόν) of Scripture with the mystery contained under the 
words (κατὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν). The process of clarification then operates at both the surface level 
of the text, but it also penetrates to the deeper, inner meaning of Scripture. But does this 
process of clarification operate similarly beyond the confines of book five of the Stromateis? To 
answer this question, we must first look at some of the technical terms from Clement's 
grammatical archive before noting how they powered his reading practices.
Clarity (σαφής, ἀναφανδόν, φανερός)
Outside of the confines of the creative exegesis found in Str. 5, Clement's most 
prominent use of the language of clarity comes in his appellation of terms related to the 
adjective σαφής. Clement's preferred means for describing the clear statements of Scripture is 
the use of the adverb σαφῶς. For Clement, Deuteronomy 32:10–12 (LXX) describes the 
23Str. 6.68.3 (GCS 15:466): γνώσεως γὰρ πλήρης ἡ προφητεία, ὡς ἂν παρὰ κυρίου δοθεῖσα καὶ διὰ 
κυρίου πάλιν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις σαφηνισθεῖσα
24For other examples of this broad sense of clarification, see Paed. 1.51.3 (GCS 12:120–21); Str. 7.100.6 
(GCS 17:70–71). Once again, this clarification is dependent upon an understanding of textual authorship.
25For these two concepts, see Str. 7.100.6; 7.109.6 (GCS 17:70–71; 78). One could compare these claims 
with Str. 6.68.3 (GCS 15:466), where Clement argues that the Old Testament is "full of knowledge" (γνώσεως 
πλήρης), which is initially clarified (σαφηνισθεῖσα) by the same Lord who gave it (δοθεῖσα).
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Educator and his guidance, identifying him clearly (σαφῶς) as "the Word who guides all 
humanity" (ὁ πάσης τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος καθηγεμὼν λόγος).26 Further, to justify his reading of
ἀρχή from John 1:1 in a Christological sense,27 Clement claims that Hosea teaches clearly 
(σαφῶς) that the "beginning" is indeed the Son: "And the sons of Judah and the sons of Israel 
will be gathered into one, and they will appoint themselves one head (ἀρχὴν μίαν), and they 
will rise from the earth, for great will be the day of Israel" (cf. Hos. 2:2).28 It is perhaps 
surprising that the claim of the Old Testament here serves to ground the New Testament 
ambiguity. Hosea's statement that the people of God will be gathered into one ἀρχή is the 
baseline for Clement's reading of John in the Eclogae Prophetae. Of course, it is not merely a 
characteristic of Scripture to speak clearly, since other texts may be understood to speak in a 
straightforward manner about their subject matter. Clement says that Cleanthes, for instance, 
speaks σαφῶς about the nature of God as the ultimate good.29
Additionally, Clement argues that one can deduct truths from these clear statements of 
Scripture. In Str. 1.25.4–5, for example, Clement claims that it is clear (σαφὲς) from a 
straightforward reading of Exodus 31:1–5 that all wisdom and technical expertise comes from 
God.30 Similarly, Clement argues that 1 Peter 2:9 makes clear (clarum) that "we are a chosen race
by the election of God."31 Thus, the noun σαφήνεια expresses the intent of scriptural 
interpretation for Clement. In Str. 7.109.6, Clement claims that his opponents are incapable of 
drawing out the precise clarity (τὴν ἀκριβῆ σαφήνειαν) of the Scriptures. Elsewhere, Clement's
own exegesis of the decalogue serves as the model of the clarity which comes with knowledge 
26Paed. 1.55.2–56.1 (GCS 12:122–23)
27Ecl. 3.1 (GCS 17:137)
28Ecl. 4.1–2 (GCS 17:138)
29Prot. 6.72.3 (GCS 12:55)
30Str. 1.25.4–5 (GCS 15:16)
31Adumbr. 1 Pet. 2:9 (GCS 17:204): Quoniam vero »electum genus« sumus dei electione, abunde clarum 
est.
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(ὑπόδειγμα εἰς σαφήνειαν γνωστικὴν).32 In fact, Clement claims that the Scriptures are 
intentionally spoken obscurely, so that readers who possess the requisite skills can perceive the 
clear meaning of the teaching (σαφήνειαν διδασκαλίας) in the Scriptures.33 
 Moreover, though it is a rare term in Clement, the adjective ἀναφανδόν is employed 
synonymously to differentiate between clear texts and those with figurative potential.34 Thus, 
Clement contrasts Moses' prohibition against eating the hare or the hyena, which is given 
through enigmas (δι’ αἰνιγμάτων), with the direct command (ἀναφανδόν) in Exodus 20:14 
not to commit adultery.35 The command forbidding adultery and the figurative prohibition have
the same meaning, though the former needs no interpretation as it is spoken clearly. 
Less frequent in Clement's work are statements that use the language of "manifest" 
(φανερός) to describe Scripture's claims, and Clement employs this language in a slightly 
different manner than the clarity denoted by σαφής and ἀναφανδόν. Clement uses φανερός to 
denote items that were formerly ambiguous or obscure, but are now open and evident before 
the reader. As opposed to his use of σαφῶς for the individual texts of Scripture that speak 
clearly, Clement applies the "manifest" language to the figures or events described in the texts of 
Scripture, rather than the texts themselves. For instance, the timeline for the construction of the
temple is φανερόν, since Ezra gives the date of its completion (cf. Ezra 6:15).36 The incarnation 
of the Word was "hidden in the enigmas of prophecy" and becomes manifest when the 
32Str. 6.133.1 (GCS 15:499)
33Str. 1.45.1 (GCS 15:30). It is at this point that Clement introduces the necessity of dialectic for scriptural
interpretation. We will discuss this phenomenon below, in the chapter on the Christian reader and gnostikôs.
34For other uses of ἀναφανδόν, which are not restricted to the Scriptures, see Prot. 4.62.2; 7.76.2; Str. 
5.80.4; 5.88.3 (GCS 12:47; 12:58; 15:379; 15:384).
35Paed. 2.89.1 (GCS 12:211). Clement suggests that Moses' prohibition against eating the hare (cf. Deut. 
14:7) has the same meaning as his clear statement (ἀναφανδόν) with the prohibition against adultery in Exod. 
20:14. Of course, we must note also that Clement here is reading Moses through the Epistle of Barnabas. In Ep. Barn. 
10:6–7, we find the prohibition against eating the hare (τὸν δασύποδα) and hyena (τὴν ὕαιναν), and Clement in 
general retains the figurative reading first given in Barnabas. The key point for my argument on terminology here 
is not the source of Clement's reading, but rather the characteristics that differentiate the prohibition against hare 
and hyena from the statement to refrain from committing adultery.
36Str. 1.126.1 (GCS 15:78)
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meaning of the prophetic symbols are revealed in the actions of the Gospels.37 In each of these 
examples, φανερός (or its cognates) is used to describe the reality to which the text points and 
not the text qua clear text per se.
We may therefore summarize these terms of "clarity" in two general points. First, 
Clement suggests that, contrary to statements that operate through enigmas and obscure 
speech, there are scriptural texts that are inherently clear, whose meaning is obvious in a 
straightforward reading of the text. Second, this clarity can function both horizontally, as the 
clear statements serve to regulate more ambiguous ones, and also vertically, such that the clarity
one seeks is a deeper understanding of the text itself.
Explicitness (διαρρήδην, ἄντικρυς)38
Clement's two preferred terms to express the explicitness of scriptural claims retain a 
similar reciprocity to that seen the terms of clarity above. That is, σαφής spoke to the clarity of 
texts, whereas φανερός concerned the manifest realities revealed by clarity. Similarly, Clement 
uses διαρρήδην to refer to texts or writers that speak "explicitly," and ἄντικρυς is the 
characteristic of openness that results from explicit texts. When a passage is spoken "explicitly," 
the meaning is understood to be obvious on the surface of the text. Certain texts require an 
explanation to discern its proper intention, but a statement spoken διαρρήδην reveals its 
intention in the very appearance of its words. For example, in Str. 2.131–36, Clement claims 
that Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 11:1 ("Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ") is an explicit 
charge to seek the likeness of God. For Clement, Paul more directly states this aim than Genesis 
1:26, since one achieves it by imitating the one who is from God.39 In a discourse about God's 
nature as a just Father (cf. Jn. 17:24–26), Clement identifies two statements that speak 
37Str. 5.55.3 (GCS 15:363)
38See Str. 2.136.5–6 (GCS 15:188), where the "open" understanding of the meaning is derived from the 
"explicit" statement: "Imitate me as I imitate Christ."
39Cf. Plato, Tht. 176b (LCL 123:128–29). In Exc. 19.4 (GCS 17:113), Clement suggests that Paul's explicit 
(διαρρήδην) statement in Col. 1:15–16 states "more clearly" (σαφέστερον) about the generation of the Son as the 
image of the Father.
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explicitly concerning the subject matter, one from the Old Testament and one from the New.40 
First, Wisdom claims διαρρήδην about God that "mercy and wrath are with him" (Wisd. 
16:12). For Clement, the coherence of mercy and wrath in God's justice is seen in their shared 
goal of the salvation of mankind. According to Clement, "the Word himself" (ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος) 
also speaks "explicitly" on this subject, when he avers that "there is none good except my 
Father in heaven" (Matt. 19:17) and that the "Father makes the sun shine upon all" (Matt. 
5:45).  Clement particularly emphasizes that such explicit statements are derived from various 
points in the Christian Scriptures, confirming the unity of the whole. Moreover, these explicit 
statements lead Clement to the "most clear" (σαφέστατα) conclusion that the Creator and the 
ultimate good is "one and the same God" who is also the Just Father.41 Thus, in his appeal to the
scriptural statements offered διαρρήδην, Clement suggests, first, that the Scriptures speak 
coherently across the testaments, and second, that at the very least their consistent subject 
matter is the "one and the same God," who is both merciful and just.
The term ἄντικρυς42 is used by Clement to denote the open nature of the details to 
which the Scriptures speak. In Str. 4.35.1, the clear statement of Matthew 6:32–33 to "seek first
the kingdom of heaven" exhorts believers plainly (ἄντικρυς) to pursue the life of the gnostikôs 
and search for truth. In book three of the Stromateis, Clement argues that 1 Timothy 4:1–5 is 
spoken ἄντικρυς about his opponents who are either too stringent or too casual in their views 
on marriage. Instead, Clement argues that the Scriptures teach moderation and self-control.43 As
can be seen in these examples, when Clement employs ἄντικρυς in reference to the Scriptures, 
it concerns the teaching of the Scriptures rather than the text itself. But it is important to note 
40The argument regarding God as Just Father is found in Paed. 1.71–74 (GCS 12:131–33). For the use of 
διαρρήδην within his logic here, see Paed. 1.72.
41Paed. 1.73.1 (GCS 12:132)
42Cf. Str. 7.6.2 (Son of God) with 7.84.5 shows that ἄντικρυς can be applied narrowly and broadly. 
Significantly, the open statement suggests the coherence (ἀκολουθία) between texts. Contrast Str. 3.8.4–5 where 
Clement says that Basilides' words plainly detract from the unity of the scriptural witness
43Str. 3.85–86 (GCS 15:235–36). On Clement's "discourse of desire," see David G. Hunter, “The Language
of Desire: Clement of Alexandria’s Transformation of Ascetic Discourse,” Semeia 57 (1992): 95-111. See also the 
helpful discussion of Clement's anthropology by John Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 135–51.
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that ἄντικρυς operates on a broad and narrow level for Clement.
On a broad level, multiple passages of Scripture can speak ἄντικρυς about a specific 
teaching. In this way, one can identify themes that are significant in Clement's thought. For 
instance, Clement says, "that there is a Son of God, and that this Son is the Savior and Lord that 
we assert him to be, the divine prophecies express openly (ἄντικρυς αἱ θεῖαι παριστᾶσι 
προφητεῖαι)."44 We will see later in the current chapter that this claim is indeed, in Clement's 
view, one of the main teachings of Scripture. On a narrow level, however, a statement that 
teaches a subject ἄντικρυς can be used as a baseline to discover the teaching of another passage.
Thus, in Str. 7.84, Clement provides an interpretation of 1 Corinthians 6:1: "Do any of you 
who have an issue with another dare to go to law before the unrighteous rather than the 
saints?" Clement says that this verse must be read in light of the open (ἄντικρυς) teaching of 
Jesus to pray for one's enemies (cf. Matt. 5:44), and the resulting interpretation stresses the 
contrast between those who would take the unrighteous to court in retaliation and those "who 
ask in prayer that their persecutors would experience similar retribution in return."45 The 
teaching of the Lord grounds Clement's reading of the Pauline claim; the clear matter serves as 
a baseline for the more ambiguous.
From the foregoing evaluation, it is evident that Clement—like all ancient readers—
believed that certain texts were clear (σαφής), and, from such texts, the facts, events, and 
details of the subject matter were openly proclaimed (ἄντικρυς) and manifest (φανερός) to its 
reader. These passages are clear upon a straightforward reading, and they can serve to regulate 
the interpretation of passages that are more obscure. Such a practice to creative exegesis should 
be expected, when one considers that the process is entirely from beginning to end a process 
of clarification and explanation, of discerning the intent inherent in the text. This process of 
textual discovery, however, can be achieved by employing any number of reading practices.
44Str. 7.6.2 (GCS 17:6)
45Str. 7.84.3–7 (GCS 17:60)
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Further Literary Tools of the Grammarians
There are two further textual practices that Clement employs in book five of the 
Stromateis. Both of these practices flow from Clement's convictions on the authorship of 
Scripture that we examined in the previous chapter. On the one hand, Clement presumes that 
Scripture speaks coherently from beginning to end.  On the other hand, because Scripture is 
furnished by one and the same God, terms should be carefully defined, in order to render 
proper judgment on the ability of individual words to convey distinct concepts. 
Textual Coherence
Clement's claims about the divine origin of the Scriptures had repercussions for the 
reading practices he used on the Bible. In this regard, there was no more significant procedure 
for Clement's exegesis than his attempt to understand Scripture as a coherent whole. At the 
outset of book five, in his defense of the inseparability of faith and knowledge in the Christian 
economy, Clement appeals to the Pauline claim in Romans 1:17 that "the righteousness of God 
is revealed from faith to faith" (ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν). Clement interprets this as a progression
that appears twofold, but in reality is a single process of growth towards perfection. In other 
instances, Clement appeals to Romans 1:17 to make a similar argument about the Scriptures. 
Though there are two testaments, they are only "two" with regard to time, but should be 
understood more specifically as a single progression.
“And the righteous one shall live by faith,” which is according to the testament and the
commandments, since these testaments—two in name and time —are given 
economically for maturation and progress, are one in power, whether "Old" or "New," 
and are furnished (χορηγοῦνται) by the one God through his Son.  About this 
testament also, the Apostle says in the letter to the Romans: “For the righteousness of 
God is revealed in it from faith to faith,” teaching one salvation perfected 
(τετελειωμένην) from prophecy to gospel through one and the same Lord 
(δι’ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κυρίου).46
46Str. 2.29.2–3 (GCS 15:128)
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Once again using the verb χορηγέω to draw attention to the fact that the Scriptures 
have been furnished by "the one God through his Son" (διὰ υἱοῦ παρ’ ἑνὸς θεοῦ), Clement 
claims that one must have a reciprocal comprehension of Scripture's unity. Since they come 
from one God, the Scriptures teach of one salvation accomplished from the Old Testament to 
the New Testament through the one Lord. Moreover, one must understand exactly how these 
testaments should be related in the interpretation of any given passage to comprehend the truth
of God's teaching. We have already seen Clement's claim that the Law never "fights" (μάχεται) 
with the Gospel, but rather harmonizes (συνᾴδει) with it.47 And it is this harmony that must be
discovered by the interpreter. 
Clement models just such a process of seeking the unified teaching of the Old and New 
Testaments in the creative exegesis of book five. Clement reads Isaiah 45:3 through the lens of 
the Wisdom of Solomon to identify the treasures promised in the former with the wisdom 
described in the latter. Isaiah and Wisdom can rightly be read together, inasmuch as they 
proclaim the same truth progressing from prophecy to gospel. Similarly, Clement argues that 
the alongside these texts from Isaiah and Wisdom, the Psalms and Paul speak "similar things" 
(τὰ ὅμοια). Though the exegetical link begins with an understanding of the divine origin of all
these texts, Clement's argument maintains that it is the treasure hidden by God within Scripture 
that they all equally share and illuminate. Thus, Paul's claim that the Spirit reveals the "depths of
God" can be read as tantamount to Isaiah's promise that God will reveal the "dark and hidden 
truths." These become synonymous statements of Scripture's subject matter.
Although Clement does not employ the term in book five, these exegetical moves surely
reflect his commitment to the textual ἀκολουθία of Scripture.48 In Str. 1.179.4, Clement 
47Str. 2.147.2 (GCS 15:193)
48On the concept of ἀκολουθία in Clement's corpus, see the lucid discussions of Laura Rizzerio, “La 
nozione di ἀκολουθία come ‘logica della verità’ in Clemente di Alessandria,” RFNS 79 (1987): 175-95; and Raoul 
Mortley, Connaissance Religieuse et Herméneutique chez Clément d’Alexandrie, (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 102–08. Mondésert, Clément 
d’Alexandrie, 125–26, suggests wrongly, I think, that the use of ἀκολουθία in heresiological disputes does not 
properly relate to Clement's understanding of the interpretation of Scripture. On the importance of such 
grammatical practices as a direct development of these disputes, see Ayres, As It Is Written. Cf. Méhat, Étude sur les 
‘Stromates,’ 39–41, who applies ἀκολουθία to the literary sequence of Clement's own "trilogy"; and Lilla, Clement of 
Alexandria, 83–84, who emphasizes the term in ethical discourse. A commitment to Scripture's ἀκολουθία will 
continue to be a grammatical interpretive technique in the Christian tradition at least until the fourth century C.E. 
See Jean Daniélou, “Akolouthia chez Grégoire de Nysse,” RevSR 27 (1953): 219-49; Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, 
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summarizes this unifying sensibility: "As much as we are able, we must approach Scripture in a
more dialectical manner to hunt down the sequence of the divine teaching (τὴν ἀκολουθίαν 
τῆς θείας διδασκαλίας)."49 In an article on the concept of ἀκολουθία in Gregory of Nyssa, Jean
Daniélou briefly recognized Clement's use of its textual implications. Daniélou claimed, "The 
interesting point about Clement's remark (in Str. 1.179.4) is that it shows that the investigation 
of scriptural ἀκολουθία consists in applying to Scripture the methods utilized by grammarians 
for the explanation of literary texts."50 Indeed, Clement's concatenation of texts in Str. 5, 
ranging from Isaiah and Wisdom to the Psalms and Paul, presupposes an inherent coherence to 
the subject matter treated in the Scriptures.51 This concept of a coherent sequence within the 
teaching of Scripture will drive Clement's exegesis on two levels: his narrow understanding of 
individual texts and his broad correlation of texts from both testaments. 
On a narrow level, the concept of ἀκολουθία may be used in the reading of specific 
individual passages. For example, in a reading of Psalm 18:5–6 (LXX), Clement suggests that, 
although the Psalmist says in verse five that "in the sun he has set his tabernacle," the 
interpreter who understands this rightly as a reference to the second coming (περὶ τῆς 
παρουσίας τῆς δευτέρας) recognizes the presence of hyperbaton in the Psalm. This phrase 
from verse five must be arranged κατὰ ἀκολουθίαν to make sense of the passage.52 More 
broadly, though, Clement speaks of this coherence, this textual ἀκολουθία, as a safeguard to the
unity of the divine teaching that comes through both the Old and the New Testaments. He 
claims that all the Pauline letters "preserve the sequence from the Law to the Gospel (τὴν 
ἀκολουθίαν σῴζουσαι τοῦ νόμου πρὸς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον)."53 Applied directly to his understanding
242–46. 
49Str. 1.179.4 (GCS 15:110)
50Daniélou, “Akolouthia chez Grégoire de Nysse,” 238.
51This is evidence of the presumption among early Christian readers, to which Dawson, Christian Figural 
Reading, 216, points, that "the Christian Bible is read Christianly when it is seen to depict the ongoing historical 
outworking of a divine intention." 
52Ecl. 56.1–2 (GCS 17:152–53)
53Str. 3.86.1 (GCS 15:235)
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of Christian exegesis, Clement avers that those who rightly interpret the Scriptures are the ones 
who "clarify the truth by means of the coherence of the testaments" (τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τῆς 
ἀκολουθίας τῶν διαθηκῶν σαφηνίζοντες).54 When the consistency between the two testaments
is preserved, then one may discover the consequent (ἀκόλουθον) reality: "For it follows that 
there is one unchangeable gift of salvation given by one God, through one Lord, which benefits
'in many ways' (cf. Heb. 1:1)."55 Because the Scriptures are furnished to the Church by the one 
God, then there is a consistency—a textual ἀκολουθία—to its message.  As one of the most 
significant means by which Clement clarifies the obscurities of Scripture, the concept of 
ἀκολουθία, as Daniélou reminds us, has a veritable pedigree in the grammatical and rhetorical 
traditions.56
Definition of Terms
There are at least two instances in his argument from book five of the Stromateis where 
Clement builds his exegesis upon a distinct definition of terms. In the first chapter, Clement 
argues against his opponents who want to draw a sharp distinction between faith and 
knowledge by articulating the viewpoint that the scriptural terms "Father" and "Son" cannot be
disjoined. "Now, knowledge is not without faith, nor is faith without knowledge, as indeed 
54Str. 7.100.5 (GCS 17:70)
55Str. 6.106.4 (GCS 15:485)
56Clement also calls attention to an ontological function for ἀκολουθία. Under this heading, we may place 
the numerous instances where Clement argues that the moral purpose of the Christian is an assimilation to the 
divine. For Clement, this is a direct reading of Genesis 1:26, "Let us make man in our image (κατ᾿ εἰκόνα) and in 
our likeness (καθ᾿ ὁμοίωσιν)." Clement discusses this assimilation at length in Str. 2.131–36, drawing upon the 
Platonic injunction to attain the greatest possible likeness to God (cf. Plato, Tht. 176B). On the Platonic formula 
ὁμοίωσις θεῷ in Clement, see Völker, Der wahre Gnostiker, 579–97; Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 57–59, 106–17; Dietmar 
Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneignung in den Stromateis des Clemens von Alexandrien, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1983), 173–89. Surely
Plato has influenced Clement's thought on this score, but in the course of Clement's exegesis in Str. 2.131–36, it 
becomes evident that he finds the clearest exposition of Genesis 1 in the Pauline injunction to imitate Christ (1 
Cor. 1:11). Clement argues that this process is an act of conforming oneself to the image of the Word (Str. 2.132.4;
cf. Paed. 1.102.4; Str. 2.4.1: ἀκόλουθα τῷ λόγῳ). Indeed, Clement will often read Christ's command from the 
gospels to "Follow me!" (ἀκολούθει μοι) according to this sense (see Paed. 2.36.2; cf. Matt. 19:21). Thus, it is not 
surprising to find a similar reading of this imperative in Clement's speech Quis dives salvetur, constructed as it is upon
a reading of Mark 10:17–31 where this command once again appears (cf. Q.D.S. 4.6; 16.1; 23.1–3). On the theme 
of imitation in Clement's moral thought, see Olivier Prunet, La Morale de Clément d’Alexandrie et le Nouveau Testament, (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), 231–34; Havrda, “Grace and Free Will”.
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neither is the Father without the Son. For insofar as he is 'Father,' he is 'Father of the Son,' and 
the Son is the true teacher about the Father. Moreover, in order to believe in the Son, we must 
know the Father, with respect to whom is the Son."57 Certainly this argument is employed to 
combat his opponents by linking the progression between faith and knowledge. But this 
exegesis is dependent upon the claim that one can only be called a father if he has a son or 
daughter. The logic is dependent on defining these terms.
Later in book five, Clement subtly identifies the terms παραβολή, αἴνιγμα, and 
πρόβλημα in a reading of Psalm 77 (LXX). And though he does not explicitly articulate that he 
is making a grammatical point at this juncture, his argument only works if one understands 
πρόβλημα as a "riddle," which is ostensibly not its primary sense.58 But this identification 
allows him to draw one further parallel in the Pauline teaching of the New Testament. If 
παραβολή, αἴνιγμα, and πρόβλημα are synonymous terms for a riddle in need of a solution, 
then Paul "speaks similarly" (τὰ ὅμοια ὧδέ πως λέγει) when he argues that the wisdom of 
God, though hidden in a mystery, is the solution to the prophetic enigma.59 Not only is this 
connection dependent upon his presupposition of a textual ἀκολουθία, but it is built upon his 
definition of these scriptural terms.
Conclusion: Reading Creatively
In this chapter, I have outlined a few of the reading practices that Clement employs to 
make sense of the text of Scripture. Of course, not all of these strategies can be seen in other 
Christian readers, nor would one expect them to be. Every Christian reader, including Clement, 
chooses to use reading strategies that he or she finds appropriate at a given time. Others may 
find these reading practices helpful, or they may see them as detrimental to a good reading of 
the text. But we must account for the types of practices—the how of reading—in order to 
understand the process of exegesis in early Christianity. In fact, this is the advantage of 
57Str. 5.1.3–4 (GCS 15:326)
58Cf. Cook, Enigmas and Riddles in Literature, 263–65. 
59Str. 5.25.2 (GCS 15:341)
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understanding such differences as the creative aspect in the term "creative exegesis." This 
coincides with the first sense of "creative" that I described in chapter one. Clement chooses the 
grammatical skills and reading practices he deems necessary to give a good reading of the 
biblical text, and in this sense, it is a proper reading. But, just as ingenuity varies among 
individuals, so the choice of exegetical technique varies in the reading of Christian Scripture. It 
is necessary to see this to understand fully how Christians read the text.
At the same time, as I argued in chapter one, the concept of creativity inherent in this 
conception of creative exegesis has a second important sense. Though it is a rarer meaning in 
the modern use of "creative," the word may also signify the process of construction or 
production itself—the ability "to create." In the next chapter, this sense of creativity takes 
center stage.
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7Reading as "Creative Exegesis," Part I:
Scripture and Memory
I fell in with the final one—supreme in mastery. I tracked him down to his hiding place in 
Egypt and stayed with him. He was the true Sicilian bee, plucking flowers from the meadow of 
the prophets and apostles and producing a pure substance of knowledge in the souls of his 
hearers.1
The whole responsibility of inventio, of discovery, is transferred to the reader, and the function of
inventio is to make, not res, but signa meaningful.2
As I suggested in the introduction to this project, one could look at this study as a tale 
of two halves, with each half contributing to the whole picture of how "creative exegesis" is a 
helpful term to describe the scriptural exegesis of Clement of Alexandria. In the first half of this
study, I argued that the grammatical and rhetorical traditions served as the foundation to 
Clement's exegetical practice. In particular, the repertoire of tools and techniques of literary 
analysis learned at the hands of the γραμματικός—which I have termed the "grammatical 
archive—provided the textual practices that Clement employed to interpret the Scriptures. 
When I speak of "creative exegesis," I mean to emphasize the foundations that the grammatical 
archive played for early Christian readings of the sacred text. But what is intended by the 
adjective "creative"? This will be the subject of the last half of this study.
Let us recall the definition of creative exegesis as I have developed it in this study:
Creative exegesis is the task of clarifying textual obscurity by employing the literary-
1Str. 1.11.2 (GCS 15:8–9): ὑστάτῳ δὲ περιτυχὼν (δυνάμει δὲ οὗτος πρῶτος ἦν) ἀνεπαυσάμην, ἐν 
Αἰγύπτῳ θηράσας λεληθότα. Σικελικὴ τῷ ὄντι ἦν μέλιττα προφητικοῦ τε καὶ ἀποστολικοῦ λειμῶνος τὰ ἄνθη 
δρεπόμενος ἀκήρατόν τι γνώσεως χρῆμα ταῖς τῶν ἀκροωμένων ἐνεγέννησε ψυχαῖς
2Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 158. 
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critical tools of the grammarians to discover the textimmanent intention of an author.
It will be clear to the attentive reader that the one aspect of this definition that we have yet to 
discuss is the complementary verb: "to discover." As with all the other facets of this definition, I
do not use this term unintentionally. As I will argue in the next two chapters, this verb 
describes the "creative" aspect to early Christian exegesis.
Exegesis as Invention
In the opening chapter to the Stromateis, Clement reflects on the process and necessity of 
writing. Should one's writings be open to all, or might there be a legitimate reason to withhold
information from some?3 Throughout the first chapter Clement offers reasons for putting pen 
to paper in an apology for writing the Stromateis, suggesting that his work will preserve the 
tradition of those who had transmitted the true knowledge of the Scriptures prior to him.4 
Indeed, though the Stromateis may conceal truth, it is expressly so that those who can track it 
down might discover the seeds of knowledge hidden within.5 This first chapter has been the 
subject of a number of scholarly investigations. Dietmar Wyrwa has helpfully shown the links 
between Clement's arguments and Plato's Phaedrus.6 Alain Le Boulluec has supplemented Wyrwa's
work by showing in particular how Clement "modifies the problematic imported from the 
Greek tradition" with specific references to the Scriptures.7 Le Boulluec's essay in particular 
shows clearly how Clement's appeal to the Scriptures adapts the Platonic background to his 
claims about writing. Yet, it is only at the end of his essay, however, that Le Boulluec mentions 
the striking illustration that I quoted at the outset of this chapter from Stromateis 1.11, wherein 
3Cf. Str. 1.1.1 (GCS 15:3)
4Str. 1.11–14 (GCS 15:8–11)
5Cf. Str. 1.20.4 (GCS 15:14). Clement employs the analogy of a "hunt" in Str. 1.21, with truth as the 
object to be discovered.
6Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneignung, 30–46.
7Alain Le Boulluec, “Pour qui, pourquoi, comment? Les Stromates de Clément d’Alexandrie,” in Alexandrie 
antique et chrétienne: Clément et Origène, (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2012), 111-23.
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Clement describes the actions of his teacher Pantaenus culling the "pure substance of 
knowledge" from the Scriptures just as a bee extracts honey from a flower.8 What purpose does 
this imagery serve for Clement's understanding of scriptural exegesis? A good case can be 
made, I think, that Clement is thinking about exegesis as a process of rhetorical invention.9 This
is especially the case when one considers that, for ancient readers, the exegetical task was often 
considered a search, a hunt to "discover" the ideas inherent within a text. In Greek, the term 
used was εὑρίσκω—a term that we will find peppered throughout Clement's discussions of 
scriptural exegesis—but the Latin equivalent inventio (also operational within literary discussions
in the second century C.E.) may better key us in to some of the nuances of this "discovery."
Inventio received its most detailed treatment in antiquity within the domain of rhetoric, 
but the classicist Rita Copeland has examined the concepts of rhetorical invention and its 
surprising links with the methodologies of grammatical exegesis in her brilliant book Rhetoric, 
Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages. Copeland suggests that the translation of written works 
into the vernacular in the late Middle Ages offers a particularly acute paradigm for the ways in 
which grammatical exegesis and the language of the commentary supplant and displace ancient
rhetoric as the preeminent academic discourse. In the operations of translation, the work of 
grammarians, which had historically been attuned to the descriptive function of explaining a 
text, encroaches upon the rhetorical realm of productivity. As Copeland argues about rhetorical 
inventio, "as the orator fitted a speech to the particular circumstances of persuasion, so in a 
certain sense the medieval exegete remodels a text for the particular circumstances of 
interpretation."10 In this way, Copeland emphasizes the rhetorical character of academic 
commentary in the Middle Ages and suggests that "the rules by which orators compose have 
here become the rules by which grammarian-exegetes read."11 In other words, the nexus of 
8See Str. 1.11.2 (GCS 15:8–9)
9It seems that Le Boulluec, “Pour qui, pourquoi, comment?”, 120, is approaching this insight, when he 
calls recollection (la remémoration) a noble and principal act (un acte noble et capital) as it is reminded of the 
thought of one's master who holds the truth.
10Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 63–64.
11Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 64.
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grammar and rhetoric is found in the realm of hermeneutics, the interpretation of a literary 
text that is simultaneously offered as a descriptive and productive invention.12 Grammatical 
exegesis unites with the heuristic motives of hermeneutics to make a text both intelligible and 
interpretable.
Copeland, however, focuses her scholarly energies entirely on the tradition of rhetorical 
and grammatical handbooks as they plow the ground for medieval translation. In fact, she 
deliberately sets the Christian tradition to the side in her examination of commentaries from 
the arts curriculum.13 But Copeland's study is a beneficial lens from which to view our current 
interests, given that she is entirely interested, not in the "actual scope of grammatica" but rather 
in the "interpretive methods derived from the grammarians."14 In other words, Copeland's 
interests run parallel to my own in looking at the methods and techniques of grammatical 
interpretation for what it may explain of the reading practices more broadly. Consider her 
summary of Augustine's own ars grammatica, the De doctrina christiana:
Classical rhetoric deals with the ambiguities of meaning from the perspective of the 
orator, of the producer of the utterance. The facts of the case, the res, are ambiguous, and
meaning is contingent upon the orator's effective use of language, of signa. It is up to the
orator to argue the case from the most persuasive angle. Augustine's sacred rhetoric 
takes up ambiguities of meaning from the perspective of the reader. The "facts" of the 
"case," that is, the res or doctrine, are determinate and unitary, and what is ambiguous 
are the words, the signa. It is the responsibility of the reader to interpret these signs and 
to produce an account of their meaning. The whole responsibility of inventio, of 
discovery, is transferred to the reader, and the function of inventio is to make, not res, but 
signa meaningful.15
To be sure, Copeland's analysis of Augustine's De doctrina christiana is among the best 
English analyses of the broad intentions of this text that I have come across, showing how 
Augustine treats that task of scriptural interpretation as essentially a task of invention, grounded
12Cf. Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 2: "the two disciplines overlapped in the character of 
their most fundamental procedures, rhetorical inventio and grammatical or hermeneutical enarratio."
13Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 6.
14Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 5–6.
15Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 158. 
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in the techniques of the grammarian.16 Thus, De doctrina christiana can rightly be classified as an ars
grammatica, but only if one gives credence to the rhetorical character of its paradigm for textual 
interpretation. As Copeland suggests, for Augustine "it is in Scripture that one discovers—
invents or comes upon—the doctrine or res that one will expound."17 Indeed, Copeland 
contrasts Augustine's interpretive scheme with the processes of classical rhetoric to emphasize 
the implications of his "sacred rhetoric as hermeneutical performance" for the medieval arts 
tradition. But what of Christian exegetes that have preceded Augustine? Should these be 
deliberately set aside, or might they too offer a "hermeneutical performance"—an inventio—in 
the mold of Augustine's? I suggest that Copeland, in the omission of this Christian exegetical 
tradition, overlooks a series of readers who were already concerned with the nexus of rhetoric 
and grammar in the interpretation of the text of Scripture.
Over the course of the next three chapters, then, I will show that Clement provides us 
with one of these examples of such hermeneutical invention in early Christian exegesis. In this 
chapter, I will argue that Clement's description of Pantaenus' exegesis as a "bee that culls 
honey" does not reveal a preference for oral teaching to writing, as is often argued, but rather, 
this imagery is a powerful metaphor for the process of memory and composition. Seen in this 
way, Clement's defense of writing in the first chapter of the Stromateis becomes itself an 
argument for the type of scriptural exegesis that Clement will display in his work. In the next 
chapter, I will show how memory is paralleled in Clement's writing by some common tropes 
of recollection. In the last chapter, I will argue that this process of exegetical invention is seen 
most clearly in Clement's collection of thematic constellations, which provide the context for 
his scriptural reading. If my argument is correct, then the creative aspect to Clement's "creative 
16On the rhetorical character of Augustine's hermeneutics in the De doctrina christiana, I would also point 
readers to Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 53–63. Eden, however, throughout her book wants to 
emphasize the role of interpretatio scripti in ancient hermeneutics. I would rather point to the role of inventio for 
textual interpretation, as the nexus of grammar and rhetoric, of which interpretatio scripti is one part of many.
17Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 156. Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in 
Medieval Culture, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 10–12 refers to this act of literary invention as 
"creative thinking." It is Carruthers' gloss that serves as inspiration for my use of the adjective in the term "creative
exegesis," by which I intend to elicit the invention, or "hermeneutical performance," at the heart of all early 
Christian scriptural exegesis.
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exegesis" is rightly characterized by Copeland's description of a "hermeneutical performance," 
an imaginative collection Scripture's texts and themes that, to use Clement's analogy, provide a 
fresh reading of both the letters and syllables of Scripture.
Metaphors for Memory in Antiquity
Before we turn to the metaphors for memory that Clement employs, let us first look at a
series of larger metaphors for memory in antiquity to which Clement's choice imagery can be 
paralleled. In her work The Book of Memory, Mary Carruthers analyzes a number of metaphors that
the ancients employed to discuss the work of memory and recollection. The most common 
metaphor for memory in antiquity was the wax tablet or wax-in-seal upon which images are 
imprinted. Since it has clear implications for the link between memory and recollection, I will 
consider the wax tablet metaphor in more detail in the following chapter. For now, let us give 
attention to the other metaphors Carruthers investigates, beginning with what is the second 
most common image: the treasury or storehouse.18 
The Imagery of a Treasury
As Carruthers argues, the metaphor of the wax tablet was intimately related to the 
concept of a "treasury."  Whereas the wax tablet emphasized the process of creating a memorial 
image and storing the image in one's memory, the figure of a treasury referred to the contents and
organization of one's memory.19 This can be seen clearly in the two English words derived from 
the original Latin. One stocks an "inventory" of materials, from which he composes an 
"invention." Indeed, there is a significant relationship between the two senses of the term. Yet, 
as Carruthers notes in a subsequent book on the process of "thinking" (cogitatio in medieval 
terminology), both senses of inventio lead to the perspective from which we may talk of 
18For her most detailed discussion of metaphors for memory and recollection, see Carruthers, Book of 
Memory, 18–55.
19Carruthers, Book of Memory, 37.
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someone having an "inventive mind."20 
Unlike the modern conception of a filing cabinet, this ancient metaphor was intended 
to emphasize the usefulness of the contents rather than their accuracy. Treasuries "contain 
'riches,' not documents."21 Once one had collected these riches within the treasury of their 
memory, there exists a collection, an "inventory," from which one could bring images together 
in a single act of understanding or thought.22 The treasury therefore provided a number of 
various commonplaces—or to use Aristotle's term, τόποι—from which to draw one's 
knowledge. As Carruthers concludes, "every topic is in this sense a mnemonic, a structure of 
memory for recollection."23
The most significant instance of this metaphor in antiquity for our purposes here may 
be found in Plato's Phaedrus. In a well-known passage towards the end of the dialogue, Socrates 
speaks to Phaedrus concerning the propriety and impropriety of writing.24 As Socrates suggests,
written words serve merely as a reminder (ὑπομνῆσαι) for those readers who understand what
the writing is about.25 This is the context in which one must interpret the myth of Theuth and 
Thammuz in the Phaedrus.26 Theuth was the Egyptian god who invented (εὑρεῖν) inter alia 
geometry, astronomy, and above all, script.27 Theuth proclaims to the king, Thammuz, that 
20Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 12. She also refers synonymously to this activity of memorizing and 
composing anew as "creative thinking." This process of "creative thinking" (or cogitatio) will form the foundation 
to my arguments on "constellations" in chapter nine.
21Carruthers, Book of Memory, 38.
22Carruthers, Book of Memory, 39–40. 
23Carruthers, Book of Memory, 40.
24Plato, Phdr. 275B–276D (LCL 36:562–569). Carruthers, Book of Memory, 35–36, treats this passage under 
her consideration of the metaphor of wax tablets, but given Plato's use of "treasure" terminology directly, it seems 
to me relevant as it concerns the metaphor of the treasury.
25Plato, Phdr. 275D (LCL 36:564–65)
26Plato, Phdr. 274C–275B (LCL 36:560–65)
27The use of καὶ δὴ clearly places the emphasis on Theuth's invention of writing in Phdr. 274D (LCL 
36:562–63): τοῦτον δὲ πρῶτον ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὑρεῖν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἔτι δὲ 
πεττείας τε καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα
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writing is indeed a "drug for memory and wisdom" (μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον).28
In reply, however, Thammuz argues that writing has nothing to do with memory, only 
reminding. For Thammuz, one should never depend upon writing instead of learning first by 
imprinting images upon the memory.29 Writing, it appears, only produces negligence with 
respect to memory.
Yet, throughout the dialogue, Plato's concern is not with writing per se, but rather with 
the writing of manuals intended to serve as a substitute for live teaching.30 Though Socrates 
prefers living discourse (λόγον ζῶντα),31 as is evident from the myth of Theuth and Thammuz, 
he does not condemn writing wholesale.32 And the value he does assign to writing may be seen
in the following passage:
The gardens of letters he will, it seems, plant for amusement, and when he writes, he 
will write to treasure up reminders for himself (ἑαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα 
θησαυριζόμενος), when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for all who 
follow his tracks. He will take pleasure when he sees them putting forth tender leaves.33
28Plato, Phdr. 274E (LCL 36:562–63). I have translated φάρμακον as "drug" to retain the positive and 
negative potential of the term, either as "remedy" or as "poison." For a similar decision, see Jacques Derrida, 
“Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 70, who 
prefers to transliterate the term throughout his essay (pharmokon), though occasionally he employs the term "drug."
R. Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedrus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 157, translates φάρμακον as 
"recipe," which is followed by Carruthers, Book of Memory, 35. In the Loeb edition, Fowler chooses the term "elixir" 
(LCL 36:563).
29Plato, Phdr. 275A (LCL 36:562–63)
30Loveday Alexander, “The Living Voice: Scepticism towards the Written Word in Early Christian and in 
Graeco-Roman Texts,” in The Bible in Three Dimensions: Essays in Celebration of Forty Years of Biblical Studies in the University of 
Sheffield, eds. David J. A. Clines, Stephen E. Fowl, and Stanley E. Porter (Sheffield: JSOT, 1990), 237–38, clearly 
summarizes this point. Cf. Carruthers, Book of Memory, 35–36.
31Plato, Phdr. 276A (LCL 36:566–67)
32Cf. G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato’s Phaedrus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 204–22, who views Socrates' condemnation as an epilogue to the treatise, rather than a theme of the work 
as a whole. On the plot of the Phaedrus, see also Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of 
Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 4–6.
33Plato, Phdr. 276D (LCL 36:568–69): ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους, ὡς ἔοικε, παιδιᾶς χάριν 
σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράψει, ὅταν γράφῃ, ἑαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἐὰν ἵκηται, καὶ 
παντὶ τῷ ταὐτὸν ἴχνος μετιόντι, ἡσθήσεταί τε αὐτοὺς θεωρῶν φυομένους ἁπαλούς. Here, we might also 
compare the definition of memory (μνήμε) that Sextus Empiricus attributes to Zeno the Stoic: "memory is the 
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In using the verb θησαυρίζω, I suggest that Plato is claiming that, although it should 
not replace live teaching, writing is useful as a storehouse—a treasury—for one's memories. 
Writing never usurps teaching, but it does supplement teaching. Moreover, Plato's botanical 
imagery alludes to further related metaphors for memory and composition, one of which is the
apian imagery that Clement uses in the first chapter of the Stromateis.34
The Imagery of Bees
Mary Carruthers shows how the imagery of bees and honey used in antiquity is directly
related to the metaphor of the treasury.35  As bees collect honey in their hives, so individuals 
collect images within the "inventory" of memory. Quintilian, in praising the skills of the most 
eloquent orator to cull from various disciplines, compares him to the bees who "turn various 
kinds of flowers and juices into that flavor of honey which no human skill can imitate."36 For 
our purposes, the clearest illustration of this metaphor in relation to the memorial work of 
composition is found in Seneca's Epistle 84. 
We should follow, men say, the example of the bees, who flit about and cull the flowers 
that are suitable for producing honey, and then arrange and assort in their cells all that 
they have brought in.37
Much like the metaphor's use by Quintilian, Seneca maintains that we should imitate 
the gathering process of the bees, who cull from flowers the substances suitable for honey and 
treasury of images" (μνήμη θησαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν); see S. E., M 7.373 (SVF 1.19, fr. 64).
34Carruthers, Book of Memory, 35, suggests that Plato's terminology in this passage implies something along 
the lines of a florilegium already.
35See Carruthers, Book of Memory, 42–45. It is possible that Plato's metaphor for knowledge in Theaetetus, the 
aviary (περιστερεῶνα) in which one possesses a multitude of birds as one maintains a multitude of images in his 
memory, is making a similar point to the bee metaphor in other writers. See Tht. 197C–D (LCL 123:206–07). Cf. 
Carruthers, Book of Memory, 42–43.
36Quintilian, Inst. 1.10.7 (LCL 124:216–17). To be sure, Quintilian attributes this activity to "mute 
creatures" (muta animalia), but his references to flowers and honey show that he clearly has bees in mind.
37Seneca, Ep. 84.3 (LCL 76:276–77): Apes, ut aiunt, debemus imitari, quae vagantur et flores ad mel faciendum idoneos 
carpunt, deinde quicquid attulere, disponunt ac per favos digerunt et
122
store them in cells for subsequent use. But Seneca moves beyond Quintilian to apply this 
process of memory to the invention and composition that comes with reading and writing.
And reading, I think, is necessary, in the first place, to keep me from being satisfied 
with myself alone, and then, after I have learned what others have sought (quaesita) by 
their studies, to enable me to examine their discoveries (de inventis iudicem) and to 
meditate upon discoveries still to be made (cogitem de inveniendis).38
For Seneca, it is the process of creative exegesis that forms the context in which one 
ought to imitate the bees. He continues,
We also ought to copy these bees, and sift whatever we have gathered from a varied 
course of reading (ex diversa lectione), for such things are better preserved if they are kept 
separate; then, using our innate care and skill, we blend these various tastes into one 
savor (in unum saporem) that, even if it is apparent from whence it was taken, will yet be 
something different.39
Seneca proposes that the images, the memories, one retains from his diverse reading 
should be blended into one distinct and savory mixture. For Seneca, then, the imagery of bees 
and honey clearly illustrates the process of creative exegesis for which I have been arguing. The 
presence of a text provides opportunity for discoveries to be stored in the inventory of 
memory. Then, one may recollect and gather these images into a new composition, which 
supplements the source text, but nevertheless, as an exegesis and commentary on the source, is 
itself a new creation. In Ep. 84, Seneca adds one additional image for this process of memory 
and recollection—the figure of digestion.
The Imagery of Digestion
For Seneca, reading is not merely a process of consumption, but it is entirely a process 
of digestion. We have already seen Seneca's description of the bee, who collects a variety of 
38Seneca, Ep. 84.1 (LCL 76:276–77): Sunt autem, ut existimo, necessariae, primum ne sim me uno contentus; deinde ut, cum 
ab aliis quaesita cognovero, tum et de inventis iudicem et cogitem de inveniendis.
39Seneca, Ep. 84.5 (LCL 76:278–79): nos quoque has apes debemus imitari et quaecumque ex diversa lectione congessimus, 
separare, melius enim distincta servantur, deinde adhibita ingenii nostri cura et facultate in unum saporem varia illa libamenta confundere, ut 
etiam si apparuerit, unde sumptum sit, aliud tamen esse quam unde sumptum est, appareat.
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materials from the flowers to blend into honey, and this image recalls a second motif by which 
Seneca illustrates the process of reading and composition.
This [process of blending disparate materials into one substance] is what we see nature 
doing in our own bodies without any labor on our part . . . we should see to it that 
whatever we have absorbed should not be allowed to remain unchanged, or it will be 
no part of us. We must digest it (concoquamus illa); otherwise it will only enter our 
memory and not pass on to become a part of our abilities (alioqui in memoriam ibunt, non in 
ingenium). . . . This is what our mind (animus noster) should do: it should hide away 
(abscondat) all the materials by which it has been aided, and bring to light (ostendat) only 
what it has made of them.40
Though the metaphor has changed, the point clearly remains the same. As images enter 
the memory, one must digest these materials—or "hide them away," presumably in an 
inventory—in order to recollect them for the process of composition, commentary, and as I 
would label this entire process, creative exegesis. As Carruthers concludes, "Merely to store 
memory by reading is an incomplete process without composition, for composing is the 
ruminative, digesting process, the means by which reading is domesticated to ourselves."41 The 
metaphor of digestion for meditation, memory, and even invention or creative exegesis, has a 
long history in Jewish and Christian tradition. We may simply note a few examples, each of 
which reflect on the Levitical law concerning animals that "chew the cud" (Lev. 11:3).42
The Letter of Aristeas proposes that the description of the animals in Leviticus 11:3 as those
40Seneca, Ep. 84.6–8 (LCL 76:278–81): Quod in corpore nostro videmus sine ulla opera nostra facere 
naturam: alimenta, quae accepimus, quamdiu in sua qualitate perdurant et solida innatant stomacho, onera sunt; at
cum ex eo, quod erant, mutata sunt, tum demum in vires et in sanguinem transeunt. Idem in his, quibus aluntur 
ingenia, praestemus, ut quaecumque hausimus, non patiamur integra esse, ne aliena sint. Concoquamus illa; 
alioqui in memoriam ibunt, non in ingenium. Adsentiamur illis fideliter et nostra faciamus, ut unum quiddam fiat 
ex multis, sicut unus numerus fit ex singulis, cum minores summas et dissidentes conputatio una comprendit. Hoc
faciat animus noster: omnia, quibus est adiutus, abscondat, ipsum tantum ostendat, quod effecit
This translation is my own, though in my translation of non in ingenium, I have followed Carruthers, Book of 
Memory, 238.
41Carruthers, Book of Memory, 238.
42On the shared exegetical traditions between Jews and Christians on the food laws, see Gregory E. 
Sterling, “‘The School of Sacred Laws’: The Social Setting of Philo’s Treatises,” Vigilae Christianae 53 (1999), 152–54.
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"which part the hoof and chew the cud" is a clear expression for memory (τὸ τῆς μνήμης).43 
The Levitical description calls to mind the Torah's instruction to remember the deeds the Lord 
had accomplished for his people (cf. Deut. 7:18). Significantly, the Letter of Aristeas calls attention 
to the fact that God had ordered the people to "put the divine oracles (τιθέναι τὰ λόγια) upon 
our gates and doors as a remembrance of God (πρὸς τὸ μνείαν εἶναι θεοῦ)."44 The oracles form
the foundation upon which one should meditate upon (μελετᾶν) the works of God.45 The 
metaphor of "chewing the cud" is thus an "excellent analogy" (τὸ περισσὸν τῆς εὐλογίας) to 
describe the process of memory.46
Philo of Alexandria continues this exegetical tradition of understanding the Levitical 
description of animals which "chew the cud" as a description of memory and meditation. 
Philo, even more clearly than the Letter of Aristeas, places this act of meditation in a scholarly 
context, focusing on the process of teaching and learning. In book four of On the Special Laws, 
Philo offers the following description of "chewing the cud":
For just as a cud-chewing animal (τὸ μηρυκώμενον ζῷον) after biting through the food
keeps it at rest in the gullet, again after a bit draws it up and masticates it and then 
passes it on to the belly, so the pupil (ὁ παιδευόμενος), after receiving through his ears 
the principles and theories of wisdom from his teacher (παρὰ τοῦ διδάσκοντος), 
prolongs the process of learning, as he cannot at once apprehend and grasp them 
securely, until he calls up each thing that he has heard by memory in constant 
meditations (ἕκαστον ὧν ἤκουσεν ἀναπολῶν μνήμῃ συνεχέσι μελέταις)—which are 
the cement of conceptions—he stamps a firm impression of them on his soul.47
For Philo, "chewing the cud" recalled the process of memory, meditation, and 
recollection, as he employs the language that we will find in the Christian tradition of the 
second century C.E. Moreover, the link of the metaphor with the process of reading and 
43Ep. Arist. 153–54 (SC 89:176–77)
44Ep. Arist. 158 (SC 89:176–79)
45Ep. Arist. 160 (SC 89:178–79)
46Ep. Arist. 161 (SC 89:178–79)
47Philo, Spec. 4.107 (LCL 341:72–73)
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commentary is further clarified in Philo's treatise On Husbandry. 
For as the animal that chews the cud (τὸ μηρυκώμενον) renders digestible the food 
taken in before as it rises again to the surface, so the soul of the keen learner 
(φιλομαθοῦς), when it has by listening taken in this and that proposition, does not 
hand them over to forgetfulness (λήθῃ μὲν αὐτὰ οὐ παραδίδωσιν), but in stillness all 
alone, he turns (ἀναπολεῖ) them one by one quite quietly, and so comes to the 
recollection of them all (εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν πάντων ἔρχεται).48
Notice how Philo has here employed the language that we noticed earlier from the 
Phaedrus. The keen learner does not hand the materials he has heard to forgetfulness (λήθῃ), but 
instead he meditates upon them—he "turns them"—and is successful in the recollection of all 
of them as needed. We will deal with the process of recollection in the next chapter, but it is 
significant to note here that Philo's use of ἀνάμνησιν in this instance has no trace of Platonic 
epistemology built upon the preexistence of the soul. It is possible that Philo here has some 
consideration of a process of dialectic in mind, which would certainly accord with Plato's and 
Aristotle's conception of recollection.49 But the key point from these texts is that Philo's 
arguments, built on the Levitical description of "chewing the cud," are centered on memory, 
meditation, and recollection, a perspective that will continue in the Christian tradition. We may 
point quickly to the Epistle of Barnabas as one who draws upon this Jewish exegetical tradition. In 
Ep. Barn. 10:11, the author clearly describes "chewing the cud" in the language of meditation 
and memory.
What then does he mean? Cleave to those who fear the Lord, with those who meditate 
in their heart on the distinction of the word which they have received (μετὰ τῶν 
μελετώντων ὃ ἔλαβον διάσταλμα ῥήματος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ), with those who tell of the 
ordinances of the Lord and keep them, with those who know that meditation is a work 
of gladness and who chew the cud of the word of the Lord (μετὰ τῶν εἰδότων ὅτι ἡ 
μελέτη ἐστὶν ἔργον εὐφροσύνης καὶ ἀναμαρυκωμένων τὸν λόγον κυρίου).50
48Philo, Agr. 132 (LCL 247:174–75)
49On this possibility, cf. Philo, Agr. 145 (LCL 247:180–81)
50Ep. Barn. 10:11
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Clement's Metaphors for Memory
Thus, we have seen that, in addition to the metaphor of the wax tablet, three other 
powerful analogies were offered in antiquity for memory and composition. We saw from 
Plato's Phaedrus that memory, especially in the context of written notes (ὑπομνήματα), can serve
as a treasury for recollection in the future. The imagery of bees was for Seneca an especially 
fruitful metaphor for the process of culling material from various places to arrange into 
another productive composition. Seneca also provided a third metaphor that taught the same 
lesson as the bees. Just as an individual absorbs various foods into the body and the process of 
digestion mixes these foods into a single substance, so we should gather material from things 
that we have read and "digest it," to create a new work in the process of composition. 
Moreover, the striking fact of each of these metaphors is their application to the process of 
reading and writing. Thus, it should come as no surprise to see Clement revive such metaphors 
in the context of scriptural exegesis.    
Treasury
We have already seen Clement's use of the treasury metaphor in his apology for 
Christian figural reading in Str. 5. From Isaiah 45:3, Clement emphasizes the Spirit's promise to 
provide hidden treasures (θησαυροὺς ἀποκρύφους) in the Scriptures. For Clement, Scripture is 
a storehouse that contains the "treasures of God" (θησαυροὶ τοῦ θεοῦ). But, in a manner that 
hearkens back to the Aristotelian description of recollection, these treasures are not easy to 
discover. In fact, although Clement identifies the treasure as wisdom, he does not leave this 
unqualified. It is a "wisdom that is hard to catch" (ἡ δυσθήρατός ἐστι σοφία).51 Clement 
employs the hunting imagery that Aristotle was fond of using to describe the process of 
memorial recollection.52 It is also the imagery of the treasury that permits Clement's association
51Str. 5.23.2 (GCS 15:340)
52I will discuss the hunting imagery further in the next chapter on the process of recollecting one's 
memories.
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of Isaiah 45:3 with Colossians 1:2 later in book five of the Stromateis.
Clement also employs the imagery of the treasury at the end of his Paedagogus.53 Clement 
is speaking about the transfer of the Christian from an education at the hands of the divine 
Pedagogue to the education given by the Teacher. Clement claims that, although the pedagogical
process of both instructors was centered on the interpretation of Scripture, the Teacher is 
explicitly concerned with revealing the treasures collected in the storehouse of Scripture. 
Clement gives voice to the Teacher, who calls to his children with the following exhortation:
Follow, then, the good way that I will expound (ἐξηγήσωμαι) for you, O little one! 
Lend an attentive ear to me and hear: "And I will give you hidden treasures, concealed, 
invisible" to the Gentiles, but visible to you (cf. Isa. 45:3). I will give you "never-failing 
treasures" (cf. Wisd. 7:14) which the Apostle marveled at when he said, "O the depth of
the riches and of the wisdom!" (Rom. 11:33) Many are the treasures furnished by the 
one God, some revealed in the Law, others through the Prophets, and others directly 
from the mouth of God.54
Given Clement's focus on the scriptural exegesis at the center of this divine pedagogy in
Paed. 3.87, it seems likely that the Teacher's vow—ἐξηγήσωμαι—should be read as a promise to 
open the Scriptures to his student.55 Scripture is for Clement a storehouse, which holds its 
treasures, not only in the Law and the Prophets, but also in the words given directly from the 
divine mouth of the incarnate Christ. The scriptural texts—both Old and New Testaments—
were not only words to be read. They were also treasures to be stored in one's memory, which 
could be recollected through a myriad of associations in one's creative exegesis.56
53Paed. 3.87 (GCS 12:283–84)
54Paed. 3.87.3–4 (GCS 12:284)
55See LSJ, s.v., "ἐξηγέομαι," II.3
56It seems likely, in my view, that this is the reason for Clement's claim in Str. 1.179.4 (GCS 15:110), that 
Scripture is οὐ «μία Μύκονος». This will be the subject of the next two chapters.
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Bees
Clement appropriates the imagery of bees in the first chapter of the Stromateis, as he 
describes the exegetical ability of Pantaenus, the final teacher that Clement had heard after 
tracking him down. The description is vivid and resembles the words of Seneca's Ep. 84:
I fell in with the final one—supreme in mastery. I tracked him down to his hiding place
in Egypt and stayed with him. He was the true Sicilian bee, plucking flowers from the 
meadow of the prophets and apostles and producing a pure substance of true 
knowledge in the souls of his hearers.57
As in Seneca's epistle, Clement highlights the process of Pantaenus's creative exegesis, 
drawing materials from his reading and generating a new substance—true knowledge—for his 
audience. But Clement has added a new feature to the metaphor. For the first time in the 
tradition, he identifies the object text of the bee's culling action. The flowers are plucked 
specifically "from the meadow of the prophets and apostles" (προφητικοῦ τε καὶ ἀποστολικοῦ 
λειμῶνος). Clement is perhaps also giving the first example of an Old Testament and New 
Testament distinction in the Stromateis, which he will expand in later books. The significance of 
Clement's employment of the bee imagery, a stock metaphor for memory and composition in 
antiquity, is to be found in the application he gives it to Christian creative exegesis. Moreover, 
Clement links his own exegesis with the trade of his masters. After suggesting that Pantaenus 
and his other unnamed teachers were faithful in preserving the teaching of the apostles, 
Clement claims with respect to his teachers, "I think that they will be pleased—I do not mean 
that they will be pleased with my particular exposition, but simply in my preservation of the 
tradition with respect to my interpretation."58 Clement situates his own exegetical strategies 
57Str. 1.11.2 (GCS 15:8–9): ὑστάτῳ δὲ περιτυχὼν (δυνάμει δὲ οὗτος πρῶτος ἦν) ἀνεπαυσάμην, ἐν 
Αἰγύπτῳ θηράσας λεληθότα. Σικελικὴ τῷ ὄντι ἦν μέλιττα προφητικοῦ τε καὶ ἀποστολικοῦ λειμῶνος τὰ ἄνθη 
δρεπόμενος ἀκήρατόν τι γνώσεως χρῆμα ταῖς τῶν ἀκροωμένων ἐνεγέννησε ψυχαῖς
58Str. 1.12.1 (GCS 15:9): καὶ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἡσθέντες λέγω τῇδε, μόνῃ δὲ 
τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὑποσημείωσιν τηρήσει. I have translated the noun ὑποσημείωσις as "interpretation" (cf. Str. 2.1.2). 
For this reading, see PGL, s.v. ὑποσημείωσις, II. Cf. PGL, s.v. ὑποσημείωσις, I, which argues for the meaning 
"summary," but which uses this passage from Str. 1.12.1 as its only instance in patristic literature prior to Cyril of 
Alexandria's use of the term in his Commentary on John in the fifth century C.E. I am not convinced, however, by this 
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within that tradition that he learned from his teachers, centered upon the work of memory and
recollection pictured by the metaphor of the bee. 
"Chewing the Cud"
In his Ep. 84, Seneca compared the metaphor of the bee culling from flowers to the 
more natural, bodily metaphor of digestion. And while Clement does not employ the digestion 
metaphor in this way, he does have two substantial passages where he interacts with the biblical
image of "chewing the cud," which we saw earlier as a common trope in discussion of 
memory and recollection in the Jewish and Christian tradition.59
In the Paedagogus, we find the following explanation:
Everything "that divides the hoof and chews the cud" is clean, because the divided hoof
indicates an evenly balanced justice, which chews the cud of its own food of justice; 
namely, the word that enters from the outside through instruction, in a similar way to 
food, and, once inside, it is regurgitated as if from the stomach of the mind 
(ἀναπεμπόμενον ὥσπερ ἐκ κοιλίας τῆς διανοίας) as a logical recollection (εἰς 
ἀνάμνησιν λογικήν). The just man ruminates (μηρυκάζει) on the spiritual 
nourishment, since he has the word upon his mouth; and justice undoubtedly divides 
the hoof, in that it both sanctifies in this life and prepares us as well for the life to 
come."60
Andrew Itter has argued that this passage reveals Clement's desire to "develop a theory 
of 'rational anamnesis' (ἀνάμνησιν λογικήν) that synthesized Platonic thought and New 
Testament revelation."61 Itter notes that Clement's use of ἀνάμνησις does not develop in any 
arrangement and believe that Clement intends "interpretation" in both cases. Cf. Irvine, Making of Textual Culture, 250.
59In Str. 5.51.2–6 (GCS 15:361), Clement interacts with the reading of Ep. Barn. 10:11, which we noted 
earlier. Because he essentially copies the reading from Barnabas, I will not consider it here, beyond simply noting 
that Clement had direct familiarity with the correlation of memory, meditation, and chewing the cud, at least 
through Barnabas and perhaps through Philo as well.
60Paed. 3.76.1–2 (GCS 12:278): ἄλλα δὲ ὁμοίως ἀλληγορεῖται. Τίσιν οὖν οἰκειωτέον; τοῖς δικαίοις, πάλιν
ἀλληγορῶν φησιν. Πᾶν γὰρ «διχηλοῦν καὶ μαρυκώμενον» καθαρόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὸ διχηλοῦν δικαιοσύνην ἐμφαίνει
τὴν ἰσοστάσιον μηρυκάζουσαν τὴν οἰκείαν δικαιοσύνης τροφήν, τὸν λόγον ἔκτοσθεν μὲν εἰσιόντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ 
τῇ τροφῇ διὰ κατηχήσεως, ἔνδοθεν δὲ ἀναπεμπόμενον ὥσπερ ἐκ κοιλίας τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἀνάμνησιν λογικήν. 
Μηρυκάζει δὲ ὁ δίκαιος τὴν πνευματικὴν τροφὴν ἀνὰ στόμα ἔχων τὸν λόγον, καὶ διχηλεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἰκότως, 
κἀνταῦθα ἁγιάζουσα καὶ εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα παραπέμπουσα αἰῶνα.
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way directly from the New Testament texts upon which later doctrines of recollection will 
center.62 Itter suggests that Clement wants his readers to intentionally connect his work to a 
Platonic epistemology, which can be seen in his use of ὑπομνήματα in the lengthy title of the 
Stromateis.63 Nevertheless, Itter does confess that the "synthesis" he sees in Clement's work with 
Platonic thought "relies on the mediation of the reader's intellectual capacity to harmonize 
seemingly incongruous material as it is set out in the Stromateis."64 Itter may well be correct that 
Clement deliberately intends his readers to relate his work to Platonic thought; this has long 
been established in scholarship on Clement.65 What is less apparent, however, is that Clement 
deliberately makes this connection with his understanding of ἀνάμνησις, a claim that Itter 
explicitly promotes, appealing to the passage from Paed. 3.76 that I quoted above.66 It seems 
more likely, though, given the digestion metaphor inherent to the passage from the Paedagogus, 
that Clement employs recollection here and elsewhere in the ways that recall the art of memory
with its foundations in Aristotelian thought; that is, a process of recollection with deliberate 
rhetorical and exegetical ends in mind. For Clement, this recollective memory is a fundamental 
activity of creative exegesis.
This position is bolstered when we consider a similar passage from the seventh book of 
the Stromateis. Clement once again identifies "chewing the cud" with the process of scriptural 
61Andrew C. Itter, Esoteric Teaching in the Stromateis of Clement of Alexandria, (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 113–39; this 
quote is found on p.113.
62On the development of a doctrine of anamnesis with respect to the liturgy, see Odo Casel, “Das 
Mysteriengedächtnis der Meßliturgie im Lichte der Tradition,” JLW 6 (1926): 113-204; Nils A. Dahl, “Anamnesis. 
Mémoire et commémoration dans le Christianisme primitive,” ST 1 (1948): 69-95; and B. Botte, “Problèmes de 
l’Anamnèse,” JEH 5 (1954): 16-24.
63Itter, Esoteric Teaching, 113–15.
64Itter, Esoteric Teaching, 113–14.
65Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, remains the standard here. See also Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913); Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria; J. Wytzes, “The Twofold Way (I): 
Platonic Influences in the Work of Clement of Alexandria,” VC 11 (1957): 226-45; J. Wytzes, “The Twofold Way 
(II): Platonic Influences in the Work of Clement of Alexandria,” VC 14 (1960): 129-53; and Wyrwa, Die christliche 
Platonaneignung.
66Itter, Esoteric Teaching, 113: "Clement, however, develops a theory of "rational anamnesis (ἀνάμνησιν 
λογικήν)" that synthesized Platonic thought and New Testament revelation."
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meditation. 
Scripture teaches that the animals lifted for sacrifice which divide the hoof and chew 
the cud are clean and acceptable to God, since the righteous make their approach to the 
Father and the Son through their faith (for this is meant by the stability of those that 
divide the hoof) and they meditate and ponder over the oracles of God by night and 
day (τῶν «τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ» «νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν μελετώντων» καὶ 
ἀναπεμπαζομένων) in the mental receptacle of knowledge (which is an exercise of 
knowledge that the law describes figurally as chewing the cud by a clean animal)."67
Clement's verb of choice here is μελετάω, which was a distinct technical term in the 
Hellenistic school tradition and was already used in a similar fashion by Irenaeus.68 As in the 
passage from the Paedagogus, Clement specifically links the scriptural figure of chewing the cud 
with the memorization and meditation of the scriptural text. Indeed, we see a natural 
association of Leviticus 11 with Psalm 1, since both texts speak—in Clement's mind—of 
textual memorization and study. Thus, in the midst of an implicit argument for recollection as a
process of literary invention, Clement models just how one association might take place. Two 
similar items are associated such that the passages may be read together for mutual benefit. 
Mary Carruthers rightly identified such digestive activities as "powerful and tenacious" 
metaphors for the "complementary activities of reading and composition, collection and 
67Str. 7.109.2 (GCS 17:77): τὰ μὲν γὰρ διχηλοῦντα καὶ μηρυκισμὸν ἀνάγοντα τῶν ἱερείων καθαρὰ καὶ 
δεκτὰ τῷ θεῷ παραδίδωσιν ἡ γραφή, ὡς ἂν εἰς πατέρα καὶ εἰς υἱὸν διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῶν δικαίων τὴν πορείαν 
ποιουμένων (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τῶν διχηλούντων ἑδραιότης) τῶν «τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ» «νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν 
μελετώντων» καὶ ἀναπεμπαζομένων ἐν τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν μαθημάτων δοχείῳ, ἣν * καὶ συνάσκησιν γνωστικὴν
ὑπάρχουσαν καθαροῦ ζῴου μηρυκισμὸν ὁ νόμος ἀλληγορεῖ.
68On the exercises of the Hellenistic schools, see Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from 
Socrates to Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1995), esp. 81–125; and 
Loveday Alexander, “Memory and Tradition in the Hellenistic Schools,” in Jesus in Memory: Traditions in Oral and Scribal 
Perspectives, eds. Werner H. Kelber and Samuel Byrskog (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2009), 113-54. Hadot 
rightly sees the correlation between the Christian use of μελετάν and the earlier philosophical exercises: "Like 
philosophical meditation, Christian meditation flourished by using all available means of rhetoric and oratorical 
amplification, and by mobilizing all possible resources of the imagination" (133). For Irenaeus' use of μελετάν as 
a recollection and rehearsal of texts, see haer. 1.9.4 (SC 263:146–47). Jane M. F. Heath, “Nomina Sacra and Sacra 
Memoria Before the Monastic Age,” JTS 61 (2010), 534–35, has noted rightly that μελετάν has proved a 
"stumbling block" for English translations of Irenaeus' argument on the Homeric cento, due precisely to a 
misunderstanding of its role in literary analysis and reading.
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recollection."69 When taken together, these metaphors reveal the role of memorization in the 
process of reading and study in the ancient world. Each of the metaphors that we have 
considered here—the treasury, the industrious bee, and digestion or rumination—suggest not 
only the importance of memory to the process of reading, but they equally imply that the 
process of recollection, of invention and creative exegesis, is intimately related to reading. I 
agree, then, with Carruthers who suggests that these two activities are so related that, in fact, 
"the 'art of memory' is actually the 'art of recollection.'"70 How then should we understand this 
process of recollection?
69Carruthers, Book of Memory, 207.
70Carruthers, Book of Memory, 23–37.
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8Reading as "Creative Exegesis", Part II:
Scripture and Recollection
When they are examined with respect to other spaces, the Scriptures I have already discussed 
will yield other mysteries.1
In the previous chapter, I examined the various metaphors in Clement's work that 
showed his emphasis on the work of memorization and composition in the process of 
interpreting the Scriptures. In this chapter, I will consider the significance of this process of 
memory, inasmuch as it is also—and perhaps more fundamentally—an "art of recollection."2 
Clement employs the common trope of recollection as an investigation or a search. Taken 
together, Clement presents the entire process of memory and recollection as an art of literary 
invention, a hermeneutical performance that displays the creativity of scriptural exegesis.3 This 
chapter will proceed in two phases. First, I will examine ancient reflections on recollection, in 
order to situate Clement and early Christian readers in a proper context. Second, I will analyze 
Clement's use of these ancient perspectives in promoting this "art of recollection" in the 
practice of biblical exegesis.
1Str. 1.32.3 (GCS 15:21): κατ’ ἄλλους μέντοι γε τόπους ἐξεταζόμεναι αἱ προειρημέναι γραφαὶ ἄλλα 
μυστήρια μηνύουσαι παρίστανται
2This is the argument that we saw at the end of the previous chapter from Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 23–
37.
3For the language of rhetorical invention as a "hermeneutical performance," see Copeland, Rhetoric, 
Hermeneutics, and Translation, 151–78. On the ways that inventio reflect creativity and imagination, see Carruthers, Book of 
Memory, 10–12.
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Recollection as Investigation and Invention
"Recollecting Is a Sort of Reasoning"
The earliest extant treatise exclusively on the subject of memory and recollection is 
Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia. In the De memoria, Aristotle defines memory as a mental image
(φάντασμα) that is inscribed on the part of the body that constitutes memory.4 Not only, 
however, does Aristotle describe memory more vividly as an "imprint or drawing in us," like a 
picture,5 but he also describes how this memory comes about. "The change that occurs marks 
in a sort of imprint, as it were, of the sense-image, as people who seal things with signet 
rings."6 Here, Aristotle employs the metaphor for memory of the wax seal, derived most likely 
from Plato, who had already used the term δακτυλίοις ("signet ring") in his version of the 
metaphor.7 It is the second chapter of the De memoria that will concern us here, as Aristotle 
devotes the entirety of the second part of the treatise to the process of recollection (τὸ 
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί). Aristotle offers the following definition of recollection: "recollecting is, as it
were, a sort of reasoning (συλλογισμός). For in recollecting, a mean reasons that he formerly 
4Aristotle, Mem. 451a14–16 (LCL 288:296–97). Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, (London: Duckworth, 
2004), 14, notes that Aristotle is not always consistent in his discussion of "what" memory is. At Mem. 450a30, 
Aristotle seems to suggest that memory is the imprint of a sense image (οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος), but, as
Sorabji rightly claims, in Mem. 451a14–16, it is clear that "it is the phantasma, the having of which is said to be 
memory." Thus, it seems likely that the "picture-like effect," to use Sorabji's term for the imprint in 450a30, is 
simply a more vivid description of the φάντασμα that is memory. For a broader discussion of φάντασμα as 
mental images, see Aristotle, DA 431a16; 431b2; 432a3–14. See also Malcolm Schofield, “Aristotle on the 
Imagination,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De anima, eds. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992), 249-77.
5Aristotle, Mem. 450b18–32 (LCL 288:294–97).
6Aristotle, Mem. 450a30–32 (LCL 288:294–95): ἡ γὰρ γινομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ 
τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς δακτυλίοις.
7Cf. Plato, Tht. 191D; 193B–C (LCL 123:184–85; 190–93). Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, 5n.1, also notes 
that, beyond the lexical similarities between Plato and Aristotle in this metaphor for memory, both philosophers 
share the idea "that memory and imagination involve the seeing of internal pictures." On this shared idea, see the 
passages from Aristotle in the previous note and compare with Plato, Phlb. 38E–39D (LCL 164:298–303); Phd. 73D 
(LCL 36:254–55); Ti. 26D (LCL 234:44–47).
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saw, or heard, or had some such experience, and recollecting is, as it were, a sort of search 
(ζήτησίς)."8
It is significant that Aristotle describes recollection as a search. It is an investigation for 
material that has been placed in the memory but which now must be recalled after the passage 
of time.9 But for what is the object of this search? The answer is provided in Mem. 451b3–5. 
"When he recovers previously held scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμην), or perception 
(αἴσθησιν), or that of which we were earlier saying that the state connected with it is memory, 
this is, and is the time of, recollecting (τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι) one of the things mentioned."10 
Here, Aristotle distinguishes recollection from re-learning. In his view, recollection occurs 
when one, of his own accord, remembers something he had previously encountered. Re-
learning, on the other hand, depends on another individual. Whether this is an accurate 
distinction between recollection and re-learning need not detain us here.11 The significant point
is that Aristotle locates this process of recollection as an investigation by one's own agency into 
previously encountered material, housed as images in the memory.
How then does the process of recollection occur? Aristotle continues with a specific 
description of the activity.
But one must get a starting-point (ἀρχῆς). And this is why people are thought 
sometimes to recollect starting from "places" (ἀπὸ τόπων). The reason is that people 
go quickly from one thing to another—from milk to white, from white to air, and 
from this to fluid, from which one remembers (ἐμνήσθη) autumn, the season one is 
seeking (ἐπιζητῶν). In general in every case the middle also looks like a starting-point. 
For if no sooner, a person will remember when he comes to this, or else he will no 
8Aristotle, Mem. 453a10–13 (LCL 288:310–11): τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν οἷον συλλογισμός τις· ὅτι 
γὰρ πρότερον εἶδεν ἢ ἤκουσεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἔπαθε, συλλογίζεται ὁ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος, καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ζήτησίς 
τις.
9We may note Aristotle's insistence on the elapse of time to the process of recollection in Mem. 451a31–
b6 (LCL 288:298–301).
10Aristotle, Mem. 451b2–5 (LCL 288:300–01): ἀλλ᾿ ὅταν ἀναλαμβάνῃ ἣν πρότερον εἶχεν ἐπιστήμην ἢ 
αἴσθησιν ἢ οὗ ποτὲ τὴν ἕξιν ἐλέγομεν μνήμην, τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶ καὶ τότε τὸ 5ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων τι.
11Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, 37–40, has a helpful discussion on this point, concluding that Aristotle was 
wrong on this point. In his view, Plato's allowance for re-learning to occur on one's own accord (as in the 
dialogue of the Meno) is more accurate.
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longer remember from any position, as for example if someone were to think of the 
things denoted by Α Β Γ Δ Ε Ζ Η Θ. For if he has not remembered at Α, he will 
remember at Ε for from here he can move in either direction to Δ or to Ζ. But if he 
was not seeking one of these, after going to Ζ he will remember, if he is searching for 
Η or Θ, or if he is not, he will remember after going to Δ. And so in all cases.12
I want to note two points from this detailed description of recollection. First, notice 
that Aristotle once again describes the process as a search. From a starting-point, one seeks 
(ἐπιζητῶν) for the memory through a sequence of nodes. In fact, Aristotle elsewhere describes 
this progression through the sequence as a hunting excursion:
 We hunt (θηρεύομεν) for the successor, starting in our thoughts from the present or 
from something else, and from something similar, or opposite, or neighboring. By this 
means recollection occurs (ἡ ἀνάμνησις). For the changes connected with these things 
in some cases are the same, in others are together, and in others include a part, so that 
the remainder which one underwent after that part is small. Sometimes, then, people 
search (ζητοῦσι) in this way.13 
Indeed, throughout the De memoria, Aristotle's preferred terms for recollection (ἡ ἀνάμνησις) 
invoke an investigation or a hunt, as one progresses from one point to another along the series. 
Second, Aristotle offers in Mem. 452a12 an example of the association of ideas that 
ground his process of recollection. In the example he offers, it seems most likely that Aristotle 
proceeds from milk to white to air and so on because of a similarity that he sees in the images. 
In Mem. 451b18–22, however, he notes that, although one could recollect images from 
similarity (ἀφ᾿ ὁμοίου), one could just as easily associate nodes by the fact that they are 
12Aristotle, Mem. 452a12–24 (LCL 288:304–05): δεῖ δὲ λαβέσθαι ἀρχῆς. διὸ ἀπὸ τόπων δοκοῦσιν 
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ἐνίοτε. τὸ δ᾿ αἴτιον ὅτι ταχὺ ἀπ᾿ ἄλλου ἐπ᾿ ἄλλο ἔρχονται, οἷον ἀπὸ γάλακτος ἐπὶ λευκόν, ἀπὸ
λευκοῦ δ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἀέρα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐφ᾿ ὑγρόν, ἀφ᾿ οὗ ἐμνήσθη μετοπώρου, ταύτην ἐπιζητῶν τὴν ὥραν. ἔοικε δὴ 
καθόλου ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέσον πάντων· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πρότερον, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔλθῃ, μνησθήσεται, ἢ οὐκέτ᾿ οὐδὲ 
ἄλλοθεν, οἷον εἴ τις νοήσειεν ἐφ᾿ ὧν ΑΒΓΔΕΖΗΘ· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ Α μέμνηται, ἐπὶ τοῦ Ε ἐμνήσθη· ἐντεῦθεν 
γὰρ ἐπ᾿ ἄμφω κινηθῆναι ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ Δ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ Ζ. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων τι ἐπιζητεῖ, ἐπὶ τὸ Ζ ἐλθὼν 
μνησθήσεται, εἰ τὸ Η ἢ τὸ Θ ἐπιζητεῖ. εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπὶ τὸ Δ· καὶ οὕτως ἀεί.
13Aristotle, Mem. 451b18–23 (LCL 288:300–03):  
διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θηρεύομεν νοήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἢ ἄλλου 20τινός, καὶ ἀφ᾿ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου ἢ τοῦ 
σύνεγγυς. διὰ τοῦτο γίνεται ἡ ἀνάμνησις· αἱ γὰρ κινήσεις τούτων τῶν μὲν αἱ αὐταί, τῶν δ᾿ ἅμα, τῶν δὲ μέρος 
ἔχουσιν, ὥστε τὸ λοιπὸν μικρὸν ὃ ἐκινήθη μετ᾿ ἐκεῖνο. ζητοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὕτω
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opposite (ἐναντίου) or even simply neighboring (σύνεγγυς) within the series.14
To be sure, Aristotle confesses that these nodes can appear as "places" (τόπων), but 
Aristotle's arguments in the De memoria should be distinguished from the "place-system" as a 
strictly mnemonic device, especially as later described by the Rhetorica ad Herennium and thus 
transmitted to the Middle Ages.15 As can be seen from his example, although milk serves as the 
starting-point, from which Aristotle investigates until he discovers autumn, any of these nodes 
could serve as a starting-point, a location from which to search for any one of the others. And 
though it is different from the architectural mnemonic developed in the later Roman tradition, 
Aristotle's treatise does provide a philosophical explanation for the recollective activity of using 
associations to proceed between a variety of spaces in one's memory.16 It was this explanation 
that was to serve as the foundation for later conceptions of memory and, especially, 
recollection.
"The Arrangement of Spaces Will Preserve the Arrangement of Things"
For instance, after providing the well-known story of Simonides' recollection of 
banquet guests based on the seats around the table, Cicero continues in the De oratore with the 
following description of recollection: 
For those who would train this faculty must select spaces (locos) and form mental 
images of the things they wish to remember and store those images in these spaces (in 
eis locis collocanda). The result will be that the arrangement of the spaces (locorum ordo) will 
preserve the arrangement of the things (ordinem rerum), and the images of the things 
(rerum effigies) will designate the things themselves (res ipsas). Thus, we shall employ the 
14Cf. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, 42–46. These three possibilities are similar to at least two of Plato's laws of 
association in Phd. 73D–74A. That is, one can be reminded of Cebes by seeing Simmias who is often nearby 
(neighboring); or, one can be reminded of Simmias when he sees a picture of him (similar).
15Cf. David Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection: Text, Translation, Interpretation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism, 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), 43n.29, who registers his surprise at Aristotle's claim: "the passage does not accord well 
with the usual conception of loci."
16Cf. Carruthers, Book of Memory, 155; Jocelyn Penny Small, Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of Memory and 
Literacy in Classical Antiquity, (London: Routledge, 1997), 89–94; Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection: Text, Translation, 
Interpretation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism, 137–228, provides a lengthy essay on the reception of Aristotle's 
theory of memory in the West, though he is concerned primarily with memory in the philosophy of mind. 
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spaces as a wax tablet (locis pro cera) and images as letters written on it (simulacris pro 
litteris).17
In De oratore, Cicero moves beyond Aristotle's philosophy of the mind to describe a 
formal architectural mnemonic, just as the Rhetorica ad Herennium would do. Nevertheless, he 
employs the same spatial technique that we saw in Aristotle's De memoria. Much like Aristotle's 
"starting-points," the spaces are arranged to provide a vital link to an arrangement of the things
that are in one's memory. Moreover, Cicero, unlike Aristotle, describes this process of 
recollection as a process of reading letters. Indeed, it is this connotation of recollection that 
reveals the creativity of memory in the process of exegesis and literary invention, transposing it
from a general philosophy of the mind to the realm of commentary. This distinction is 
important to note, since two distinct traditions of memory and recollection are transmitted 
through late antiquity and the Middle Ages. On the one hand, Aristotle's De memoria serves to 
ground reflection on the temporal work of memory. In other words, the emphasis is on 
memory as a past moment, to be recollected in order to remember the past per se.18 On the other
17Cicero, de Orat. 2.354 (LCL 348:466–67). Cf. Quintilian, Inst. 11.2.30 (LCL 494:72–73). I have 
translated locus in the passage as "space" to draw out the general locational strategy of both Cicero's and Aristotle's 
process of recollection. Small, Wax Tablets of the Mind, 88–89, uses the term "bins" to make a similar point.
18See Janet Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). This aspect of "memory" and "the past" has been explored in biblical scholarship on 
"social," "cultural," or "collective" memories, most frequently to consider the movement from oral tradition to 
written text in the composition of the gospels. See the helpful summaries of the past decade in Chris Keith, “Social
Memory Theory and Gospels Research: The First Decade (Part One),” Early Christianity 6 (2015): 354-76; and Chris 
Keith, “Social Memory Theory and Gospels Research: The First Decade (Part Two),” Early Christianity 6 (2015): 
517-42. From the growing scholarly literature on this topic, see such works as Samuel. Byrskog, Story as History - 
History as Story: The Gospel Tradition in the Context of Ancient Oral History, WUNT 123 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000); James 
D. G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003); Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The 
Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006); Loren T. Stuckenbruck, Stephen C. Barton, and 
Benjamin G. Wold, Memory in the Bible and Antiquity, WUNT 212 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007); Anthony Le Donne, 
The Historiographical Jesus: Memory, Typology, and the Son of David, (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2009); and, most recently 
in Pauline studies, Benjamin L. White, Remembering Paul: Ancient and Modern Contests over the Image of the Apostle, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). To be sure, one should not make "collective memory" (or these other categories) 
to be synonymous with "historical accuracy"; according to Keith, “Social Memory Theory (Part One),” 362, this is 
not the focus: "Collective memory refers to the representation of the past in light of the needs of the present with 
no automatic assumption at the outset concerning the degree to which that representation may reflect past reality."
Nevertheless, as Keith also admits, "social memory theory is not so much a historiographical method as it is a 
theory of the social construction of the past that enables responsible historiography" (376, emphasis mine). Thus, even the 
scholarly focus on memory in biblical scholarship is focused on the past per se. However, the second aspect of 
"memory" that I have mentioned, which touches on creative composition, has been the focus of much less study, 
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hand, the spatial aspect of memory and recollection grounded another distinct tradition: the art
of recollection in service of literary invention. It is this function of memory and recollection 
that concerns us here, a focus on the task of recollection rather than the content of the past 
images. Thus, while all memorial images are temporally past, their significance for Christian 
exegesis is found in the process of recollection and association that creatively invents new 
relationships between texts in the hunt for meaning.
In her book The Craft of Thought, Mary Carruthers began with the point that the crucial 
task performed by memorial recollection is one of investigation, clearly seen in the language of
hunting and searching employed by Aristotle. Carruthers noted, as I have suggested, that 
beyond the use of Aristotle in philosophical discussions of psychology, the use of this 
recollective process has a particularly creative application in the realm of ancient rhetorical 
inventio, the discovery or "finding" of things to say. In ancient rhetoric, the chief task of memory
was to provide the orator with the material necessary to invent his speech ex tempore.19 This was 
the mark of the expert orator. But this was not the most influential aspect of the art of memory 
for the Christian tradition. Rather, Carruthers provides the ingenious observation that,
These structures [the "spaces" of memory and recollection] need not bear a direct 
relationship to the "art of memory" described in the Republican Roman Rhetorica ad 
Herennium. To limit the study of "locational memory" to this one variety has obscured 
both the generic concept and the medieval and even Renaissance developments of 
memoria. More important than (at least through the mid-thirteenth century), and in 
addition to, the precepts of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, there developed very early on in 
Christianity a disciplina or via of inventive meditation based on memorized locational 
inventory-structures, which was called by the monks "memoria spiritalis" or "sancta 
memoria." This traditional practice of meditation also was deeply implicated in the 
pedagogy of ancient rhetoric as well as the textual pedagogy of Judaism, making many 
of the same assumptions about "invention" and how it is to be done that we find more 
generally in non-Christian sources. As a consequence, it did not develop in total 
isolation from the ancient rhetorical practices of invention and composition.20
and it is my concern in this project.
19Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 8–10. Cf. Heath, “Nomina Sacra and Sacra Memoria,” 527–28.
20Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 12.
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As Carruthers argues, the "spaces" constructed in medieval monastic exegesis were 
drawn particularly from the Scriptures. In ways recalling Aristotle's associations of ideas in the 
De memoria, monastic exegetes, as Carruthers shows, drew together disparate scriptural texts into
a "memorative web" of creative invention. For these monastic interpreters, every scriptural 
verse "became a gathering place for other texts, into which even the most remote (in our 
judgments) and unlikely matters were collected, as the associational memory of a particular 
author drew them in."21 And, as Aristotle had noted, these associations can be made not only by
principles of consonance and similarity, but just as easily and profitably by divergences and 
opposition. Thus, the process of creative exegesis was simultaneously an art of recollection and 
an art of literary invention.
"Constellations" as Inventory
In this respect, Carruthers provides a helpful illustration.22 She points in particular to 
the practice of astronomers who divide up stars into "constellations," each of which are named
for a variety of things, from animals to mythic beings. But one would be mistaken to think that
these stellar groupings were intended to recall groups of stars that "looked like" certain 
creatures. Indeed, the intention of constellations was never to provide etiological fables to 
explain how the stars got there, and Carruthers shows how the explanations about the 
constellations in ancient textbooks like Isidore of Seville's De natura rerum never "counsel a 
student 'now look up in the sky and find the dog.'"23 The ancients assumed as we do that the 
pattern of the stars were the significant pieces of information to be understood from the 
constellations, and not the figures of a "dog" or "bull" themselves.
What people needed from star charts was a way of quickly and unerringly picking out 
certain stars, for their position was essential in the conduct of daily life—to calculate 
the calendar, to navigate, to plant, to know when to do a host of things. And a great 
21Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 19.
22For this illustration, see Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 24–27.
23Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 25; for an image of the relevant manuscript from Isidore, see Plate 6 between 
p.142 and 143.
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many random items, such as the individual stars, are not retrievable, and so cannot be 
learned, unless they are organized into patterns that allow people readily to find them. 
The constellations form a stellar inventory, one that is easily reconstructable, both in 
part and as a whole, and also one whose plan is completely distinctive. . . . The purpose 
of organizing stars into constellation patterns is not "representation," but to aid human 
beings, needing to find various stars, to locate them by means of a recognizable pattern 
retrieved immediately and securely from their own memories. Constellations are 
mnemotechnical tools.24
Constellations were devices that could be used by individuals to locate particular stars, 
for whatever purpose one needs. One could imagine the need even today. As a young boy in 
East Tennessee, I was taught how to discern a northern orientation without a compass via these 
same constellations. On a clear night, one need only find the "Big Dipper" (I learned that it was
called Ursa Major later), locate the edge of the ladle, and imagine a line directly through the 
two stars that form the outermost edges of Ursa Major. This line will then connect to the star at 
the tip of the handle of the "Little Dipper" (or, Ursa Minor), which is Polaris, or the "North 
Star." Like the ancients, my knowledge of the "Big Dipper" and "Little Dipper" constellations 
were expressly designed to be useful should I need to find the north-south line, even if one can
image strange drawings or fables that could develop around these patterns.25
It is the strangeness, the beauty, or even the obscurity of these fables that make them 
memorable, and as Carruthers shows, this is the very thing that makes constellations valuable to
a culture dependent upon memory. It was not only cultural fables that provided fodder for the 
24Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 26.
25In fact, I still read a story to my daughters frequently about a young girl who lived in a land that had 
experienced a drought for a very long time. When her mother was ill, she went to look for water, equipped with 
only a small tin ladle from their home. She finally came across a tiny spring on a mountainside, and although this 
spring was almost dry, she nevertheless patiently filled the ladle with drip after drip. On her way home, she 
encountered a parched dog, had mercy on it, and gave it the water. Her tin ladle then magically transformed into a
silver ladle, full of water again. When she arrived home, her mother insisted that the girl first give their old 
maidservant a drink of water. The girl's ladle then transformed into a gold ladle, as full of water as it had been. 
Finally, before she could give her mother a drink, there was a knock at the door. A stranger, pale and dusty from 
travel, entered their home, and he asked for some water. The girl gave him a drink from the ladle without a fuss. 
The stranger smiled, and he turned the dipper into a diamond ladle. When he tipped it over, the water poured out,
soaked into the ground, and bubbled up into a fountain for all to drink. The stranger disappeared into the sky, and 
to this day, there in the sky shines the diamond dipper. See J. Berg Esenwein and Marietta Stockard, “The Legend of
the Dipper,” in The Children’s Book of Virtues, ed. William J. Bennett (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 77-82.
142
memory and recollection of Christian readers. The Scriptures themselves provided key examples
that urged them to inventive exegesis.
A Pauline Trope for Invention (1 Cor. 3:10–17)
We may see one such scriptural motif in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. In 1 
Corinthians 3:10–17, Paul claims that he has laid a foundation—Christ—on which others will 
build. Although the building metaphor is introduced by Paul in this passage, it remains a 
significant motif throughout 1 Corinthians.26 From the first century C.E. onwards, this building
trope would be an image to represent the church as the building of God, and Paul was probably
employing standard educational terms to describe the function of the members, and especially 
teachers, within God's building.27 At the same time, however, Mary Carruthers has shown how 
the Corinthian passage itself contains a figure for literary and rhetorical invention.
Paul uses his architectural metaphor as a trope for invention, not for storage. Likening 
himself to a builder, he says he has laid a foundation—a foundation which can only be 
Christ—upon which others are invited to build in their own way. From the beginning 
of Christianity, the architecture trope is associated with invention in the sense of 
"discovery," as well as in the sense of "inventory." The foundation which Paul has laid 
acts as a device that enables the inventions of others. This may seem a minor point in 
this text, but it acquired major significance later on as exegetical scholars elaborated this
"foundation" for meditational compositions of their own, invited to do so by St. Paul 
himself.28
Carruthers points to Gregory the Great's articulation of the four senses and Hugh of St. 
Victor's mnemonic in the Didascalicon as two instances where medieval "exegetical scholars" 
26For a helpful discussion on the building metaphor, see Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of 
Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians, (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1991), 99–111,
who connects it with the political topos of concord amidst factionalism, as seen, for example, in one of Aristides' 
speeches on concord (cf. Or. 23.31). She notes the recurrence of the imagery in 1:6–8; 6:19; 8:1, 10; 10:23; 
14:3–5, 12, 17, 26; 15:58; and 16:13.
27Note the recent study of educational metaphors in Paul's Corinthian correspondence by Devin L. White, 
“Teacher of the Nations: Ancient Educational Traditions and Paul’s Argument in 1 Corinthians 1–4,” (Ph.D. diss., 
Emory University, 2016). 
28Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 17–18.
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develop Paul's figure towards literary invention.29 And this Pauline passage, read as "a trope for 
invention," provided even the earliest Christian exegetes with a model for culling disparate 
texts from the meadows of the Scriptures to employ to new, creative ends. Carruthers has 
shown convincingly that this Pauline text initiated inventive thought in medieval monastic 
rhetoric and scholastic exegesis. In the quote above, she claims that this trope was associated 
with invention and discovery "from the beginning of Christianity," but she never examines any 
Christian exegete prior to the fifth century C.E. This certainly begs the question. Did this 
process of creative exegesis exist "from the beginning of Christianity," or did it originate with 
the monastic rhetoric she analyzes? Were these medieval exegetes the first to think of 
meditation and scriptural interpretation in these ways? The evidence would seem to suggest 
otherwise. 
We already saw above that the Letter of Aristeas, Philo, and the Epistle of Barnabas all viewed 
the metaphor of "chewing the cud" as a directive toward meditation, memorization, and study 
in this way. Birger Gerhardsson has shown the mnemonic processes at work in Jewish exegesis 
and composition.30 Moreover, Jane Heath has suggested that the nomina sacra could have served 
likewise as an inventive tool in the reading culture of antiquity that prioritized memory and 
visuality.31 But we can bring the evidence closer to home, by looking at the Pauline trope from 
1 Corinthians 3:10–17 in earlier scriptural interpreters.
In her book Paul, the Corinthians, and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics, Margaret Mitchell has 
argued compellingly for the significance of the Corinthian correspondence in early Christian 
exegesis, not because it argued for a particular interpretive method, but rather because it 
"amounted to a set of carefully crafted and strategically delivered arguments by which they 
29See Gregory the Great, Mor. ad Leandrum 3 (CCSL 143:4.110–14); Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon 6.4 
(Buttimer, 118.10–13; 119.27–120.1). As Carruthers notes, Henri de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale, les quatre sens de l’écriture., 
(Paris: Aubier, 1964), 4:44, claims that this Pauline metaphor occupied a privileged place in medieval religious 
literature. He also adds: "Ce sont là, d'ailleurs, déjà des images bibliques, évangéliques et pauliniennes, dont les 
Pères avaient fait grand usage."
30Birger Gerhardsson, Memory and Manuscript: Oral Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early 
Christianity, trans. Eric J. Sharpe (Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells, 1961), 122–70, esp. 148–56
31Heath, “Nomina Sacra and Sacra Memoria”.
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volleyed back and forth the meaning of words, episodes, and relationships."32 Gregory of Nyssa
serves as Mitchell's exegete par excellence, who models the agonistic paradigm of interpretation 
modeled in the Corinthian correspondence. This is why it is all the more surprising to me that 
Mitchell never treats this building metaphor. Indeed, the quote from Gregory's prologue to the 
Homilies on the Song of Songs that Mitchell gives on the last pages of her book provide clear evidence
of the passage read as a "trope of invention." I will not quote the entire passage, but simply the 
section that is relevant for our purposes here.
If we desire, even after Origen exerted himself diligently in the study of this book, to 
hand on our own work in written form, let no one make that a reason for accusation, 
in view of the divine utterance of the Apostle who said, "Each will receive his own 
reward according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:14–15). Now my work has not been 
composed for show, but, when some of our companions, out of a love for learning, had
taken down notes in writing of many things we said in church, I took from their hand 
the things their note-taking had recorded in proper order, and added for my own part 
things that were necessary as a supplement. I have fashioned this composition in the 
form of homilies, bring forward verbatim in a continuous fashion the theoria of the 
words.33
For Gregory, it is the Pauline architectural trope of 1 Corinthians 3:10–17 that provides 
his justification for writing these homilies. Moreover, the appeal to the architectural imagery in 
Paul's letter situates Gregory's homilies as an exercise of invention, of "discovering" what may 
be said about the canticles, even if others like Origen had already offered comment upon them.
Indeed, Gregory postures his creative exegesis as a means of discovering the theoria hidden in 
the words (τὴν τῶν ῥητῶν θεωρίαν).
In light of this evidence, we may suggest that the workings of memory and recollection
were important to the creative exegesis of texts not only, or even primarily, for medieval readers
(though the study of Carruthers suggests it may have indeed been expanded in this period).34 
32Mitchell, Paul, the Corinthians, and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics, 10.
33Greg. Nyss., Cant. prol. (GNO 6.12–13). In something of a chiasmus, Gregory describes this task in the 
first paragraph of the prologue as a clarification—or, revelation (φανερωθῆναι)—of the "philosophy hidden in the
words" (τὴν ἐγκεκρυμμένην τοῖς ῥητοῖς φιλοσοφίαν).
34Cf. Alexander, “Memory and Tradition,” 141–42.
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Rather, the workings of memory and recollection may be seen as a framework through which 
to view all early Christian exegesis. In what follows, then, we may confirm that this conjecture 
holds true for Clement of Alexandria. We have already verified the existence of multiple 
metaphors for memory throughout Clement's work. What about his familiarity with the 
operations of recollection as we have seen them analyzed in this chapter? As we will see, 
Clement maintains the investigative connotation to the process of recollection seen in Aristotle's
De memoria, characterized primarily by the motifs of hunting and searching through the texts 
housed in one's memory. Moreover, Clement likewise employs the Pauline building metaphor 
as a trope for invention, seen as the discovery of what may be said about the Scriptures.
Clement's Use of Recollection
Having seen the understanding of memory and recollection in antiquity, we may now 
turn to observe the roles that these play in Clement's understanding of scriptural exegesis. I will
first argue that each of the metaphors for memory that were outlined above find a place in 
Clement's discussions of the Scriptures. Then, we may turn to see how Clement returns to the 
language of investigation that was prominent in the Aristotelian discussion of recollection. Not 
only does Clement describe exegesis as a search, but he places it in the context of memorial 
recollection and the creative exegesis that employs recollection to discover meaning in the 
scriptural text.
"Hunting for the Sequence of Divine Teaching"
For Aristotle, as we have seen, the process of recollecting items from one's memory can 
best be described as hunting for materials (θηρεύω) or, likewise, as a process of investigation 
(ζήτησίς). One must progress through the sequences of his memory to track down, "to 
recollect," the items that have been stored away in one's inventory. As I noted above, Aristotle 
does not employ recollection to the ends of literary invention, as it would be used 
subsequently. Clement, however, returns to Aristotle's imagery to describe the effective means 
of reading the Scriptures.
In Str. 1.179.4, Clement takes up the language of the hunt (θηράω), and he 
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appropriates it distinctively for the reading of Scripture and the search for its meaning. He 
claims, "those who hunt for the sequence of divine teaching (τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῆς θείας 
διδασκαλίας θηρωμένοις) must approach Scripture more dialectically."35 The connections with 
Aristotle's arguments are striking. Not only had Aristotle described the process of recollection as
a hunt, which Clement here assumes, but he had also described the path of the investigation as 
a movement through the sequence of the series within one's memory. In this passage, Clement 
retains the same idea, arguing that one must search through the sequence (τὴν ἀκολουθίαν) of 
divine teaching in various scriptural texts. Subsequent Christian appropriations of ἀκολουθία 
will emphasize such textual features as the chronological sequence of the narrative, but this is a
concern that rarely bothers Clement. So, in what way then does Clement suggest to track down 
the scriptural ἀκολουθία? If we approach Clement from the perspective of memory and the 
process of recollection, already entrenched in the culture of the second century C.E., then we 
may understand this exhortation more clearly. 
We have already seen from the fifth book of the Stromateis that Clement's scriptural 
correlations of two texts (or more) are often predicated on a shared or contrasting idea or 
word. For instance, Clement quickly links Isaiah 45:3 with Wisd. 7:14 and 8:18 on the basis of 
shared terminology. In Isaiah 45, Clement notes that God has promised hidden treasures 
(θησαυροὺς ἀποκρύφους). It is not a difficult move, then, for Clement to recall that the text of 
Wisdom presents wisdom as an unfailing treasure (ἀνεκλιπὴς θησαυρός), offering an answer 
for the question raised by Isaiah 45:3—"What are the treasures God has promised?" I will 
argue in a subsequent chapter that "wisdom" (σοφία) is one of the inventive topics around 
which Clement builds a constellation of texts, but the point here is that Clement's display of 
one of the metaphors of memory—the treasury—combines with one of his "spaces" of 
memory—"wisdom"—to make the recollection of Wisdom 7:14 a natural exegetical 
association. Clement has thus followed the sequence both of his memory but also, more 
fundamentally, of the divine teaching in the Scriptures. Recollection, seen as a hunt for the 
sequence of scriptural teaching, is a crucial facet of Clement's creative exegesis.
35Str. 1.179.4 (GCS 15:110). For other uses of this hunting motif, see Str. 1.35.4; 2.3.5 (GCS 15:23; 114).
147
 Clement also presents this hunt as a pursuit of the things taught by the divine Spirit. 
Once again, it seems quite significant that Clement employs the hunting imagery in the context
of scriptural investigation and creative exegesis.
It is necessary then, since everyone agrees that the Scriptures are spoken in parables, that
those who would interpret (διερευνωμένους) the Scriptures accurately (ἀκριβῶς) hunt 
(θηρᾶσθαι) from the words the notions about things, which the Holy Spirit, who 
possesses them, teaches by expressing, as it were, his mind in the words. The result is 
that when the words spoken with numerous meanings are examined stringently 
(ἀκριβῶς ἐξεταζόμενα), they are disclosed to us, and when that which was hidden by 
many coverings is examined and considered closely, it would be revealed and enlighten 
us.36 
The links with the aims of literary investigation are clear, as Clement presents the hermeneutics 
of Scripture as an investigation of signa and res, or ὄνομα and πρᾶγμα, to use Clement's Greek 
terms. And a close examination of the words, spoken with the potential for numerous 
meanings, will uncover the things, the meaning hidden in obscurity. This argument grounds 
the associations we may see in Clement, like the previous example, where material may be 
culled from a variety of scriptural texts when these texts may only share a single feature. This is 
the case as well when we consider Clement's employment of the language of searching.
In addition to the language of hunting, then, Clement recalls Aristotle's presentation of 
the process of recollection itself as an investigation (ζήτησις), a deliberate act of "recollective 
cogitation."37 We saw in an earlier chapter how Clement frequently described the task of 
scriptural exegesis in the fifth book of the Stromateis as an investigation. Clement reveals the vital 
link he holds between investigation and the understanding of Scripture in an interpretation of 
Psalm 22:26: 
Therefore, inquiry with respect to God (τὸ ζητεῖν περὶ θεοῦ)is saving, provided it does 
36Ecl. 32.2 (GCS 17:116–17): δεῖ τοίνυν τὰς γραφὰς ἀκριβῶς διερευνωμένους, ἐπειδὴ ἐν παραβολαῖς 
εἰρῆσθαι ἀνωμολόγηνται, ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων θηρᾶσθαι τὰς δόξας, ἃς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἔχον, εἰς τὰς λέξεις ὡς εἰπεῖν τὴν αὑτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐκτυπωσάμενον, διδάσκει, ἵνα ἡμῖν ἀκριβῶς ἐξεταζόμενα 
διαπτύσσηται μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα πολυσήμως εἰρημένα, τὸ δ’ ἐγκεκρυμμένον ἐν πολλοῖς τοῖς σκέπουσι 
ψηλαφώμενον καὶ καταμανθανόμενον ἐκφαίνηται καὶ ἀναλάμψῃ.
37The term "recollective cogitation" is from Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 117.
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not tend to strife, but instead to discovery (εἰς εὕρεσιν). For it is written in David, “The 
poor eat, and shall be filled; and those who seek him (ἐκζητοῦντες) shall praise the 
Lord. Their heart shall live for ever.” For those who investigate (οἱ γὰρ ζητοῦντες) in 
accordance with the true search (κατὰ τὴν ζήτησιν τὴν ἀληθῆ), praising the Lord, shall
be filled with the gift that comes from God, which is knowledge (τῆς γνώσεως)."38 
Matthew 7:7 provides Clement with the promise of discovery for the search, "Seek, and
you will find." And, for Clement, it is a textual investigation of the Scriptures by which one 
comes to understand the knowledge that God has placed in them. As he confirms elsewhere, 
"we must search and apprehend the hidden sense in the Scriptures with a worthy investigation 
and understanding."39 And, much the same as the hunting metaphor in Str. 1.179.4, this search 
is performed by collating material throughout the Scriptures. This much is clear in Clement's 
arguments from Str. 7.96.1: "Therefore, we also demonstrate perfectly matters about the 
Scriptures from the Scriptures themselves."40 This is much more than a Christian rendition of 
the common philological principle Homerum ex Homero, though I think it is that. Clement is here 
suggesting that the Scriptures are an entirely fertile ground for literary invention, a meadow of 
texts from which material can be drawn and used in Christian exegesis.
"When the Scriptures Are Examined From Other Spaces..."
The use of the hunting metaphor along with the language of investigation suggests the 
process of literary invention by which Clement will understand the Scriptures. And in the 
opening chapters of the Stromateis, Clement confirms this for us in explicit terms. "When they 
are examined (ἐξεταζόμεναι) with respect to other spaces (κατ’ ἄλλους τόπους), the Scriptures
I have already discussed will yield other mysteries."41 Here, Clement, as a good grammarian, 
38Str. 5.12.2 (GCS 15:334): Τὸ δὲ ἄρα ζητεῖν περὶ θεοῦ, ἂν μὴ εἰς ἔριν, ἀλλὰ εἰς εὕρεσιν τείνῃ, σωτήριόν 
ἐστι. γέγραπται γὰρ ἐν τῷ Δαβίδ «φάγονται πένητες καὶ ἐμπλησθήσονται καὶ αἰνέσουσι κύριον οἱ ἐκζητοῦντες 
αὐτόν· ζήσεται ἡ καρδία αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος.» οἱ γὰρ ζητοῦντες κατὰ τὴν ζήτησιν τὴν ἀληθῆ 
αἰνοῦντες κύριον ἐμπλησθήσονται τῆς δόσεως τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, τουτέστι τῆς γνώσεως
39Q.D.S. 5.2 (GCS 17:163): ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς κεκρυμμένον νοῦν μετὰ τῆς ἀξίας ζητήσεως καὶ 
συνέσεως ἐρευνᾶν καὶ καταμανθάνειν Cf. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 137.
40Str. 7.96.1 (GCS 17:68): οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραφῶν τελείως ἀποδεικνύντες
41Str. 1.32.3 (GCS 15:21): κατ’ ἄλλους μέντοι γε τόπους ἐξεταζόμεναι αἱ προειρημέναι γραφαὶ ἄλλα 
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refers to the concept we saw earlier in Aristotle's De memoria of the association of ideas. 
Significantly, however, Clement gives it a textual application, suggesting that a single scriptural 
word or passage may be approached in different ways to yield further meaning. He is reflecting
on recollection as a tool of literary invention, and in what follows, we may see an example of 
how this worked, using a text from the Paedagogus we encountered earlier.
We have already seen the keen observation by Mary Carruthers that, if we disconnect 
the structures of memory from the architectural mnemonics of the Roman rhetorical tradition, 
then we can see how Scripture itself served as tools for ancient exegetical invention. She argues 
that it is best to conceive of memory within this tradition not merely as "rote," which seeks to 
replicate verbatim, but also as a "matrix of a reminiscing cogitation, shifting and collating 
'things' stored in a random-access memory scheme, or set of schemes."42 Thus, we can extend 
Plato's and Aristotle's imagery, such that memory is not only a wax tablet or even a book, but it 
becomes a library, stocked with manifold "books" expressly to be recalled for the inventive 
purposes of creative exegesis. From this perspective, then, the tools of ancient Christian 
memory work are the lexemes, tropes, figures, and events of the Scriptures. The very words of 
Scripture become "the devices and machines" of reading and composition, the craft of 
thinking.43 And, as we have already seen, the Pauline building metaphor from 1 Corinthians 
3:10–17 was a significant trope for this process of literary invention. 
Clement indeed proves an early witness in the Christian exegetical tradition to this 
trope. In chapter two, I argued that Clement's creative exegesis in the fifth book of the Stromateis 
was intended to characterize the teaching of Scripture as a "structure of knowledge," the 
building of wisdom and knowledge upon the ground of faith. What was beyond our purview 
in that chapter—the source of his phrase "structure of knowledge"—is directly applicable here. 
It is worth including the relevant passage in full, before offering a few comments.
For he knows the spiritual man and the gnostikôs to be the disciple of the Holy Spirit 
μυστήρια μηνύουσαι παρίστανται.
42Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 4.
43Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 3–4
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furnished by God, which is the mind of Christ. “But the natural man receiveth not the 
things of the Spirit, for they are foolishness to him.” Now the apostle, in 
contradistinction to the perfection of knowledge, sometimes calls common faith the 
"foundation," and sometimes "milk," writing in this way: “Brothers, I could not speak 
to you as to spiritual, but as to carnal, to babes in Christ. I have fed you with milk, not 
with meat, for you were not able. Neither are you now able, for you are still carnal. For 
whereas there is among you envy and strife, are you not carnal, and walk as men?” 
These things are the choice of those men who are sinners. But those who abstain from 
these things give their thoughts to divine things, and partake of gnostic food. 
“According to the grace,” it is said, “given to me as a wise master builder, I have laid 
the foundation. And another buildeth on it gold and silver, precious stones”—such is 
the superstructure of knowledge on the foundation of faith in Christ Jesus. But “the 
stubble, and the wood, and the hay,” are the additions of heresies. “But the fire shall try 
every man’s work, of what sort it is” (1 Cor. 3:10–13). In allusion to this structure of 
knowledge also in the Letter to the Romans, he says, “For I desire to see you, that I may 
impart unto you a spiritual gift, that ye may be established” (Rom. 1:11). It was 
impossible that gifts of this sort could be written without disguise.44
Notice that Clement's use of the Pauline building metaphor is entirely hermeneutical. It 
is found in an argument on the levels of textual understanding between believers and Christian 
gnostikoî. Not only does the Pauline educational metaphor of milk and meat reflect the levels of 
the pupils, but Clement understands the architectural metaphor also to be a reflection of 
scriptural interpretation. The foundation is "faith in Christ Jesus," and the superstructure 
(ἐποικοδομήματα) is completed when others build upon this foundation. Significantly, poor 
construction is seen in the poor interpretations of the sects (τῶν αἱρέσεων). And, for Clement, 
Paul himself confirms that the "spiritual gift" in Romans 1:11 is identical to the "structure of 
44Str. 5.25.5–26.5 (GCS 15:341–42): πνευματικὸν γὰρ καὶ γνωστικὸν οἶδεν τὸν τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος 
μαθητὴν τοῦ ἐκ θεοῦ χορηγουμένου, ὅ ἐστι νοῦς Χριστοῦ. «ψυχικὸς δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος· 
μωρία γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστιν.» αὐτίκα ὁ ἀπόστολος πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν γνωστικῆς τελειότητος τὴν κοινὴν πίστιν πῇ
μὲν θεμέλιον λέγει, πῇ δὲ γάλα, γράφων τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· «ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν ὡς 
πνευματικοῖς, ἀλλ’ ὡς σαρκικοῖς, ὡς νηπίοις ἐν Χριστῷ. γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα, οὐ βρῶμα· οὔπω γὰρ ἐδύνασθε. 
ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἔτι νῦν δύνασθε, ἔτι γὰρ σαρκικοί ἐστε. ὅπου γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις, οὐχὶ σαρκικοί ἐστε καὶ κατὰ 
ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε;» τὰ αἱρετὰ τοῖς ἁμαρτωλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ τούτων ἀπεσχημένοι τὰ θεῖα 
φρονοῦσι καὶ βρώματος γνωστικοῦ μεταλαμβάνουσιν. «κατὰ τὴν χάριν», φησί, «τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι ὡς σοφὸς 
ἀρχιτέκτων θεμέλιον τέθεικα, ἄλλος δὲ ἐποικοδομεῖ χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον, λίθους τιμίους.» ταῦτα γνωστικὰ 
ἐποικοδομήματα τῇ κρηπῖδι τῆς πίστεως τῆς εἰς Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, «καλάμη» δὲ τὰ τῶν αἱρέσεων ἐπαναθήματα
καὶ «ξύλα» καὶ «χόρτος». «ὁποῖον δὲ ἑκάστου τὸ ἔργον, τὸ πῦρ δοκιμάσει.» τὴν γνωστικὴν οἰκοδομὴν κἀν τῇ 
πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐπιστολῇ αἰνισσόμενός φησιν· «ἐπιποθῶ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἵνα τι μεταδῶ χάρισμα ὑμῖν 
πνευματικὸν εἰς τὸ στηριχθῆναι ὑμᾶς.» ἀποκεκαλυμμένως δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν χαρισμάτων 
ἐπιστέλλειν.
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knowledge" (τὴν γνωστικὴν οἰκοδομὴν), which is figured in 1 Corinthians 3:10–17 and is the
goal of Christian creative exegesis.
But it is not merely Clement's use of the Pauline metaphor that recalls the inventive 
process of recollection in this passage. Notice how he describes Paul's teaching on faith. At 
times, Clement says, Paul will describe faith as the "foundation," and at other times, he speaks 
about faith by calling it "milk." In subtle fashion, Clement reflects here the ability to discern 
"faith" in multiple passages of Scripture by treating it, to use Carruthers' analogy, as a 
"constellation." That is, an examine of the Pauline corpus under the heading of "faith" might 
legitimately recollect the passage on "milk," but it could at other times recollect the Pauline 
language of "foundation." In its implications for literary invention, this imaginative recollection
is quite fruitful for early Christian exegesis.
When we see that Clement, centuries before Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory the Great, 
had already employed this Pauline metaphor as a trope for literary invention, it provides us 
with a means for understanding some of Clement's exegetical creativity. As an example of this 
ingenuity, we may take a second look at two passages we examined earlier. I have already called 
attention to the significance of Clement's use of the metaphor of digestion in the scriptural 
figure of the animal that chews the cud. If the argument advanced in this chapter is right, and 
Clement's use of metaphor and recollection is turned to inventive ends, then it is striking to 
note the distinctions in the association that Clement draws between Leviticus 11 and Psalm 1 in
both Str. 7.109 and Paed. 3.76. 
Scripture teaches that the animals lifted for sacrifice which divide the hoof and chew 
the cud are clean and acceptable to God, since the righteous make their approach to the 
Father and the Son through their faith (for this is meant by the stability of those that 
divide the hoof) and they meditate and ponder over the oracles of God by night and 
day (τῶν «τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ» «νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν μελετώντων» καὶ 
ἀναπεμπαζομένων) in the mental receptacle of knowledge (which is an exercise of 
knowledge that the law describes figurally as chewing the cud by a clean animal)."45
45Str. 7.109.2 (GCS 17:77): τὰ μὲν γὰρ διχηλοῦντα καὶ μηρυκισμὸν ἀνάγοντα τῶν ἱερείων καθαρὰ καὶ 
δεκτὰ τῷ θεῷ παραδίδωσιν ἡ γραφή, ὡς ἂν εἰς πατέρα καὶ εἰς υἱὸν διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῶν δικαίων τὴν πορείαν 
ποιουμένων (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τῶν διχηλούντων ἑδραιότης) τῶν «τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ» «νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν 
μελετώντων» καὶ ἀναπεμπαζομένων ἐν τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν μαθημάτων δοχείῳ, ἣν * καὶ συνάσκησιν γνωστικὴν
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In this passage from the Stromateis, I suggested that the creative association Clement 
makes between "chewing the cud" in Leviticus 11 and "meditating on the oracles of God" in 
Psalm 1 was due to the similarity that each text had in promoting textual memorization and 
study. But the association in the Paedagogus is entirely different. Clement writes,
Everything "that divides the hoof and chews the cud" is clean, because the divided hoof
indicates an evenly balanced justice, which chews the cud of its own food of justice; 
namely, the word that enters from the outside through instruction, in a similar way to 
food, and, once inside, it is regurgitated as if from the stomach of the mind 
(ἀναπεμπόμενον ὥσπερ ἐκ κοιλίας τῆς διανοίας) as a logical recollection (εἰς 
ἀνάμνησιν λογικήν). The just man ruminates (μηρυκάζει) on the spiritual 
nourishment, since he has the word upon his mouth; and justice undoubtedly divides 
the hoof, in that it both sanctifies in this life and prepares us as well for the life to 
come.46
Clement's application of the biblical figure of chewing the cud to the process of 
recollection is, in some sense, expected, and it is identical to the reading that he offered in Str. 
7.109 above. It is what follows, however, that is striking. After his reading of Leviticus 11 as a 
standard metaphor for memory, Clement returns to his broader arguments in the Paedagogus:
As for the theater, the Educator certainly does not lead us there. One could—not 
unreasonably—call the stadium and the theater "seats of pestilence" (καθέδραν 
λοιμῶν). The "gathering" (βουλὴ) in such a place is indeed wicked, and, as it were, set 
up against the just; therefore, attendance at it is cursed.47
Here, Clement offers us another example of the recollective process at work in his 
creative exegesis. Clement's imaginative association of Leviticus 11 with Psalm 1 is expected, 
since the figure of chewing the cud recalls for him the psalmist's encouragement to meditate 
ὑπάρχουσαν καθαροῦ ζῴου μηρυκισμὸν ὁ νόμος ἀλληγορεῖ.
46Paed. 3.76.1–2 (GCS 12:278): ἄλλα δὲ ὁμοίως ἀλληγορεῖται. Τίσιν οὖν οἰκειωτέον; τοῖς δικαίοις, πάλιν
ἀλληγορῶν φησιν. Πᾶν γὰρ «διχηλοῦν καὶ μαρυκώμενον» καθαρόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὸ διχηλοῦν δικαιοσύνην ἐμφαίνει
τὴν ἰσοστάσιον μηρυκάζουσαν τὴν οἰκείαν δικαιοσύνης τροφήν, τὸν λόγον ἔκτοσθεν μὲν εἰσιόντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ 
τῇ τροφῇ διὰ κατηχήσεως, ἔνδοθεν δὲ ἀναπεμπόμενον ὥσπερ ἐκ κοιλίας τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἀνάμνησιν λογικήν. 
Μηρυκάζει δὲ ὁ δίκαιος τὴν πνευματικὴν τροφὴν ἀνὰ στόμα ἔχων τὸν λόγον, καὶ διχηλεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἰκότως, 
κἀνταῦθα ἁγιάζουσα καὶ εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα παραπέμπουσα αἰῶνα.
47Paed. 3.76.3 (GCS 12:278); Cf. Ps. 1:1
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upon the oracles of God. This is evident from the passage in the Stromateis. In that case, the 
association is made, to use Aristotle's terminology, between two similar points. In this instance, 
however, Clement's recollection of Psalm 1 permits him to proceed further in the series and 
associate the psalmist's "seats of pestilence" (καθέδραν λοιμῶν) with the seats that his audience
occupy, when they attend the theater. Moreover, the theater is an establishment where only the 
wicked gather as a quasi-"council" (βουλὴ).48 In this instance, then, the recollection of Psalm 1 
is clear, but given the subject matter of the Paedagogus and its moral exhortation, Clement recalls 
the text not to recover something similar, but to recollect something neighboring it in his 
memory.
Creative Exegesis is "Inventive" Exegesis
The purpose of the last two chapters has been to provide a justification for my decision 
to use the adjective "creative" as a proper description of Clement's exegesis. We have seen 
Clement's employment of standard metaphors for memory within the process of reading and 
commentary, and I have suggested that these metaphors, when combined with Clement's use of
hunting language and his reading of the Pauline building metaphor from 1 Corinthians 3:10–
17, situate Clement in the early stages of a tradition of creative exegesis that would continue 
into the medieval monastic practices of memoria sacra. Thus, Clement is rightly seen as an exegete 
whose enterprise of literary analysis is not only grounded in the grammatical tradition, but is 
also an activity of invention—the imaginative act of discovering what may be said about a text 
in any given instance.
In the next chapter, we must turn to consider the result of this creativity within 
Clement's reading practices. If Clement's creative exegesis is at its core an activity of literary 
invention, then how might we describe the "inventive" associations of scriptural texts and 
images that he collects? To use Carruthers' terms, what are the structures of Clement's 
"locational memory"? 
48Clement is here playing on the homonymy of the term, which may mean either "counsel" (TLG, s.v. 
βουλή, I.2) or "council" (TLG, s.v. βουλή, II).
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9"Fear of the Lord is the Beginning of Wisdom":
Constellations for Reading Scripture
"The Mosaic philosophy is accordingly divided into four parts: first, the historic part; second, 
that which is strictly called the legislative part (both of which properly belong to ethics); a 
third part, which relates to liturgy (a part of physical science); and fourth, above all, the 
theological part, the vision, which Plato says belongs to the truly great mysteries, while 
Aristotle calls it metaphysics" . . . There are four ways in which we can receive the meaning of 
the Law: it may present a type; it may show a sign; it may lay down a command for right 
conduct; and it may pronounce a prophecy. I am well aware that to make these distinctions and 
expound them is the work of fully mature men. The whole of Scripture is not, in the proverbial 
saying, "a single Myconos."1
In chapter seven, I argued that Clement's reflection on writing in the first book of the 
Stromateis does not, as is often assumed, understand writing predominantly in negative terms. 
Especially as it comes to the action of commenting upon and understanding the Scriptures, 
Clement employs common metaphors from the traditions of memory and composition to 
suggest the significance of such an activity. As he claims there, his teacher Pantaenus would 
gather material from the meadow of the Scriptures, and, like the quintessential bee, create a 
composition of exposition as pure as honey. In chapter eight, I argued that Clement is not 
interested in memory per se. Rather, he employs these metaphors alongside standard imagery for
the art of recollection to suggest that the act of exegesis is itself a process of literary invention. 
Thus, creative exegesis is not simply an act of grammatical interpretation. It is also always an act
of the imagination, of the recollection of scriptural texts and themes that may be considered 
"constellations"—the textual gathering places to and from which one might draw a myriad of 
associations or contrasts.2 Indeed, Clement suggests that his own exegetical activity in the 
1Str. 1.176.1–2; 179.3–4 (GCS 15:108; 110)
2On this concept, I am following the insightful work on monastic reading by Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 
esp. 19, who gives a similar definition. Note also how she describes the function of astral constellations: "a great 
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Stromateis should be viewed in this light. That is, his own deep interpretation (ὑποσημείωσιν), 
like his teacher's exposition, should be seen as the continued practice of memory and 
composition, drawing pure exegetical honey from the flowers of the Scriptures.3
These "creative" associations form the framework by which early Christian readers 
work with the text of Christian Scripture to understand the dramatic narrative of God's activity 
in the world and in their own time. To be sure, as with all instances of one's memorial archive, 
the potential for constellations is limitless. Nevertheless, it is true that certain constellations 
become priorities in one's logic, continually finding a place in a recitation of Scripture's 
teachings. Thus, as I suggested earlier, a focus on the textual constellations drawn from the 
scriptural memory of various exegetes provides a fruitful way forward in our attempts to 
understand the reading practices of early Christianity. 
In this chapter, then, we will consider Clement's own "memorial archive"—the themes,
texts, or figures of Scripture from which he develops his constellations for scriptural 
interpretation.  By using the term "memorial archive," I do not intend to suggest that we may 
develop a systematic catalog of Clement's imagination, since we surely have no way of accessing
the totality of Clement's memorial archive. On the contrary, I use the term "memorial archive" 
as a way of connecting Clement's art of recollection with the grammatical archive that we 
examined in the earlier chapters of this study. By analyzing Clement's textual "constellations"—
the gathering places to and from which he draws a myriad of other texts and figures—we 
might understand those topics that become a priority in his unique rendition of the scriptural 
narrative.4 
many random items, such as the individual stars, are not retrievable, and so cannot be learned unless they are 
organized into patterns that allow people readily to find them" (26). Similarly, I would suggest that the individual 
creativity of early Christian readers produce equally unique "patterns" and "constellations" through which we may
understand their reading practices.
3Cf. Ecl. 28 (GCS 17:145)
4Though it goes beyond the scope of this chapter, my use of the term "rendition" is motivated by a desire
to emphasize that the term "creative" presupposes a dramatic or performative way of reading Christian Scripture. 
This analogy for scriptural reading has been explored, with varying degrees of fruitfulness, in such works as 
Nicholas Lash, “Performing the Scriptures,” in Theology on the Way to Emmaus, (London: SCM Press, 1986), 37-46; 
Rowan Williams, “The Discipline of Scripture,” in On Christian Theology, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 
44-59; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology, (Louisville: Westminster
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In particular, I will argue that an attention to the scriptural constellations that Clement 
develops will enable us to reconsider a perennial difficulty in understanding his corpus. The 
question of whether Clement's interpretation of Scripture "fits" within the pedagogical 
paradigm he seems to describe has loomed over scholarship for decades. Does Clement 
interpret Scripture according to a definitive plan of Christian growth and maturity? Or is his 
interpretation as random and variable as the title of his Miscellanies suggests, a veritable loose 
association of unrelated texts?5 The rest of this chapter, then, will consist of two stages. First, I 
will examine two substantive "constellations" by which Clement organizes his scriptural texts. 
Then, I will show how these two constellations can help us to reconsider the supposed "literary
problem" within Clement's work, if this is even a helpful terminology by which to describe it.6
In fact, I think that Clement points us toward these two significant and overarching 
constellations in the very first extended discussion of Scripture we find within his corpus. In 
the first seven chapters of his Protrepticus, Clement rarely appeals to Scripture to make his point. 
The outset of the eighth chapter, however, marks a distinct turning point, and the Christian 
Scriptures are from here on out placed front and center in Clement's theological reasoning. 
Clement begins Prot. 8 in this way:
It is now time, as we have despatched in order the other points, to go to the prophetic 
Scriptures; for the oracles present us most clearly the resources necessary for the 
attainment of piety, and in this way, they establish the truth. The divine Scriptures and 
practices of wisdom form the short road to salvation. Devoid of embellishment, of 
John Knox Press, 2005); Matthew Levering, Participatory Biblical Exegesis: A Theology of Biblical Interpretation, (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008); and Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry, 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011). In a broader account of the performative aspect to Christian "creative 
exegesis," I would want to emphasize that the persuasiveness of readings more likely hinges not on the specific 
reading itself but in its role within the exegetical performance taken as a whole.
5The best description of the state of affairs comes from Matyáš Havrda, who says, "Apart from those 
approaching Clement of Alexandria merely as a doxographic source, the readers of his Stromata are inevitably 
confronted with the question of whether the sequence of topics discussed in that work follows any plan, or 
whether it is merely a chance association of more or less elaborated texts, accruing in the manner of a 
Wittgensteinian city. It seems that both answers are correct, to some extent." See Matyáš Havrda, review of Esoteric 
Teaching in the Stromateis of Clement of Alexandria, by Andrew Itter, Adamantius 18 (2012): 573.
6Due to its clear and concise nature, I borrow the term "literary problem" from Walter Wagner, “Another 
Look at the Literary Problem in Clement of Alexandria’s Major Writings,” CH 37 (1968): 251-60. Cf. also Marco 
Rizzi, “The Literary Problem in Clement of Alexandria: A Reconsideration,” Adamantius 17 (2011): 154-63.
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outward beauty of diction, of wordiness and seductiveness, they raise up humanity 
strangled by wickedness, teaching men to despise the casualties of life; and with one 
and the same voice remedying many evils, they at once dissuade us from pernicious 
deceit, and clearly exhort us to the attainment of the salvation set before us.7
In what follows, Clement argues that the Scriptures are used by God both to exhort 
men to conversion and, subsequently, to progress to the maturity that comes with divine 
knowledge. In this chapter, then, I simply want to suggest that Clement derives this narrative 
from the Scriptures by creating two constellations of texts centered on distinct themes: fear and
wisdom. It is perhaps surprising to hear that these two constellations are repeatedly emphasized
in the course of Clement's writings. After all, these terms are not frequently mentioned when 
discussing Clement's theology. I will argue that a close reading of some significant passages 
from the Paedagogus and the Stromateis allows us to understand the importance of fear and wisdom
to Clement's rendition of the scriptural narratives. 
Before proceeding, however, it is important to note that I am not making the claim that 
these constellations form the definitive way to understand Clement's use of Scripture. Rather, I am
suggesting that these form two distinct ways of analyzing Clement's approach to Scripture.8 In 
making this claim, I am implicitly drawing a contrast between my approach and all others that 
might suggest there is a conclusive description of an individual's scriptural exegesis. If the 
constellations are innumerable, then the means by which we may describe a reader's exegesis is
also innumerable. I do believe, however, that these particular constellations not only form the 
foundation of Clement's chronological connection between Old and New Testaments, but they 
also correspond to two distinct ways of reading the Old Testament in particular. I will argue that 
for Clement the concept of fear suggests the initial workings of faith, and it comes as the result 
of reading the Old Testament text as either a series of commandments or examples. At the same 
time, wisdom stands as the key constellation for Clement's understanding of New Testament 
realities, what he calls in the Protrepticus the "mysteries of wisdom." In other words, the key 
7Prot. 8.77.1 (GCS 12:59)
8Indeed, reflections on each of these constellations could fill an entire chapter, in addition to a number of
other Clementine scriptural topologies, such as "little ones," gnosis, and above all, unity.
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pedagogical process that Clement emphasizes throughout his corpus is the progression from 
fear to wisdom, two terms which correspond to distinct readings of Christian Scripture. One 
begins the life of faith in obedience to God's commands through fear, but if one is to become a
Christian gnostikôs, then he must move to obedience through love via the life of wisdom, 
prophesied in the Old Testament and seen explicitly in the life of the incarnate Christ.
"I Will Teach You the Fear of the Lord":
Fear and Its Textual Constellations in the Protrepticus
But how does Clement understand the Scriptures to function in this way? How do they 
guide us to salvation? Here, Clement introduces us to the two constellations that form the 
foundation of this chapter. We will note what he says about wisdom later in this chapter, but 
notice how he introduces his reader to the function of fear as it is seen in the Scriptures. 
Clement begins chapter nine in this way:
I could bring before you ten thousand passages of Scripture, of which not “one tittle 
shall pass away,”without being fulfilled (Matt. 5:18); for the mouth of the Lord, the 
Holy Spirit, has spoken these things. He says, “Do not any longer, my son, despise the 
chastening (παιδείας) of the Lord, nor faint when reproved by Him” (Prov. 3:11). O 
surpassing love for man! Not as a teacher speaking to his students, not as a master to his
servants, nor as God to men, but as a gentle father9 the Lord admonishes his children. 
Thus Moses confesses that “he was afraid and trembling” (ἔμφοβος εἶναι καὶ ἔντρομος;
cf. Heb. 12:21; Deut. 9:19) when he heard about the Word, but do you not fear when 
you also hear the voice of the Divine Word? Are you not anxious? Are you not cautious 
and eager to learn— that is, eager for salvation, — fearing wrath, loving grace, striving 
after hope, so that you may avoid the judgment?10
Clement claims that innumerable texts from Scripture—indeed, his use of μυρίας 
γραφὰς with Matthew 5 here seems to suggest a hyperbolic reference to all of the Scriptures—
when understood to be spoken by the Lord's own voice, should provoke its readers to anxiety, 
as it did, Clement argues, for Moses. Indeed, it is the fear that results from one's reading of the 
9On this phrase (πατὴρ ὣς ἤπιος), cf. Homer, Od. 2.47.
10Prot. 9.82.1–3 (GCS 12:62)
159
Scriptures that marks the first step towards salvation, as it causes one to hasten to learn more 
from the Logos.11 Such a position is not surprising at this juncture in the Protrepticus, as Clement 
has already alluded to such fear twice earlier in the treatise. First, as we saw in chapter five, 
Clement outlines the pedagogical work of the Logos in the Scriptures, from his voice speaking 
to the Hebrews in Egypt and the wilderness to the clear voice of the incarnate Lord. And 
Clement describes the Word's pedagogy in those early scriptural events with the same 
terminology of fear: "By this fear which these inspired, [the Logos] addressed the hard-
hearted."12 Even in this first instance of this concept in the Protrepticus, we see that it is fear that 
the Word uses to initiate the process of salvation.
Then, in Prot. 4.59.3, Clement draws upon both Petrine and Johannine language to 
distinguish the life of believers from the lives of the multitude of pagans. "We are a chosen race
and royal priesthood" (1 Pet. 2:9), he says, "who are not from beneath but understand the 
dispensation of God" (cf. Jn. 3:31; 8:23). But the same cannot be said of the pagans, whom 
Clement calls "the many." They have neglected the fear that Scripture instills, and instead, wed 
themselves to impurity.13 It is the proper response of fear that characterizes the Christian 
response to the divine voice of the Scriptures.
Yet, for Clement, it is a text from the Psalms that provides the clearest expression of the 
role that fear plays in the divine process of salvation. Having introduced the Scriptures as the 
"letters that sanctify and deify," he queries with a bit of brashness: 
Are ye so devoid of fear, or rather of faith, as not to believe the Lord Himself, or Paul, 
who in Christ’s stead thus entreats: “Taste and see that God is good” (Ps. 33:8)? Faith 
will lead you in; experience will teach you; and Scripture will train you, for it says, 
“Come here, children; listen to me, and I will teach you the fear of the Lord (φόβον 
11For a helpful scholarly discussion on the role of fear in Clement's thought, mostly concentrated on the 
Stromateis, see Méhat, Étude sur les ‘Stromates,’ 312–26, who was rightly convinced that "cet aspect de la pensée et de 
l'œuvre de Clément ayant été assez négligé par les auteurs qui en ont traité, il convient de s'y arrêter" (313). Méhat
emphasizes the role of divine punishment in Clement's pedagogy (l'éducation de l'homme par les châtiments 
divins), but it seems to me that he leaves room to consider the role of Scripture, and its "examples" or 
"commands," in the advancement of the pedagogical progression from fear to wisdom.
12Prot. 1.8.2 (GCS 12:8): Τούτῳ μὲν δὴ τῷ φόβῳ τοὺς σκληροκαρδίους προὔτρεπεν·
13Prot. 4.60.1 (GCS 12:46)
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κυρίου διδάξω)" (Ps. 33:11).14
Though the attribution of the psalmist's language to the Apostle may strike one as odd, 
the use of Psalm 33 to describe the initial stages of salvation is less strange when one notes the 
presence of fear in Psalm 33:11. For Clement, the fear that the Word instills through the 
Scriptures is the first stage of the process of salvation. The argument of the Paedagogus continues 
this trajectory, as it is an exhortation to move from fear to wisdom and love. And it is in the 
Paedagogus where we see that Clement's logic of fear is for him a Pauline theme. Clement 
employs texts from 1 Corinthians and Galatians to express once again this chronology of fear, 
perhaps moving towards some explanation for his strange attribution of the psalmist's language
to Paul in Prot. 9.87.4. 
"He Weaves the Thread of Fear Into Everything":
Fear and Its Textual Constellations in the Paedagogus
Whereas Clement addressed pagans in the Protrepticus, in the Paedagogus he turns to exhort 
young Christians to follow the commands of the Scriptures and grow from those Scripture calls
"little ones" to the Christian gnostikôs who serves the Lord out of love. Nevertheless, Clement's 
main point in the first book of the Paedagogus is further developed around the constellation of 
fear, even though his text of choice is altered. In order to draw out his point that Christians 
must turn from fear to wisdom, Clement suggests that the Apostle Paul himself made this very 
claim. He points to 1 Corinthians 13:11: "When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought 
like a child, I reasoned like a child; when I became a man, I gave up childish ways." What better
way to picture the movement from fear than a clear analogy in growth from childhood to 
maturity? To emphasize the chronology of fear that he had set out initially in the Protrepticus, 
Clement links 1 Corinthians 13 with Galatians 3:23–25:
But before faith came, we were kept imprisoned under the Law, shut up for the faith 
that was to be revealed. Therefore, the Law has been our educator in Christ, that we 
might be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, we are no longer under an 
14Prot. 9.87.4–88.1 (GCS 12:65)
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educator.
Clement emphasizes that the Law was "accompanied by fear" (Paed. 1.31.1), and this 
passage from Galatians becomes key to understanding Clement's metaphor of childhood. Just 
like a child is afraid of ghosts, those who are subject to the fear that accompanies the Law 
reveal themselves to be children. Thus, Clement claims that Paul's phrase "when I was a child, I 
spoke as a child" is, in fact, a description of life under the Old Testament Law. To move beyond 
childish things, then, is to no longer think the things of the Law but rather the things that 
accord with Christ—to be subject to faith and not to fear.15
This leads him to the most explicit description of the chronology of fear in Paed. 1.59.1:
In former times, our ancestors had an Old Testament. As law, it guided them through 
fear (νόμος ἐπαιδαγώγει τὸν λαὸν μετὰ φόβου); as word, it was a messenger (λόγος 
ἄγγελος ἦν). But to the new and young people a new and young testament has been 
given. The Word has become flesh; fear has been turned into love. Jesus, that mystical 
messenger, has been born. Formerly, this same Pedagogue proclaimed, "You will fear 
the Lord your God" (Deut. 6:2). But to us He exhorts, "You shall love the Lord your 
God" (Matt. 22:37). For this reason then, he commands us, "Cease from your deeds"—
your old sins—"and learn to do good; turn away from evil and do good. You have loved
justice and hated lawlessness" (cf. Isa. 1:16–17). This is my new testament, already 
engraved in the letters of the old.16
When viewed as "law" the Old Testament guides the people of God through fear, and 
this becomes the basis for Clement's understanding of God's corrective hand as seen in the Old 
Testament. In the midst of identifying a number of corrective measures that one may see the 
Educator using on his "children" throughout the Old Testament—reproof, rebuke, admonition, 
censure, and so on17—Clement suggests that the importance of fear may be seen in the fact that
it is the divine device intended to save his people. It is the initial step of the Scripture's 
15Paed. 1.34 (GCS 12:110)
16Paed. 1.59.1 (GCS 12:124–25). As this passage continues, Clement offers a striking claim that the 
teaching of the New Testament can be seen "already engraved in the letters of the Old" (παλαιῷ κεχαραγμένη 
γράμματι). I will suggest below that this points to Clement's understanding of distinct ways to approach the 
Christian Old Testament. 
17See Paed. 1.62–88 (GCS 12:126–42)
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presentation of salvation. Indeed, Clement's claim is grand: "[The Educator] weaves the thread 
of fear into everything because 'the fear of the Lord is the beginning of understanding.'"18 But 
this passage from Paed. 1.59 goes further than suggesting "fear" as a theme of Scripture. 
Clement claims that the Old Testament itself may be read in multiple ways, both as "law" and as
"word." As a constellation for his exegesis, fear does not simply allow Clement to gather 
multiple texts from Scripture—Psalm 33; Galatians 3; 1 Corinthians 13—to make a specific 
point. It also provides him with an avenue to make the claim that the Old Testament may be 
read in distinct ways. As "law," the Old Testament gives commands and examples that one must 
obey through fear. In fact, we can see this logic in a passage from the first chapter.
Christian Scripture in Pedagogical Mode
After an introduction at the outset of the Paedagogus to the role of the Logos as the 
pedagogue for mankind, Clement turns to describe the mode of discourse one will find in his 
treatise. His description is significant:
I believe it is already evident (δῆλον) what the Educator (ὁ παιδαγωγὸς) desires and 
what He professes to accomplish, what he has in mind in his words and in his deeds 
when he commands what to do and what we are to avoid. It is also clear (σαφὲς) that 
the other kind of discourse, the didactic (τὸ διδασκαλικόν)—holding the deepest 
mysteries (τὸ ἐποπτικόν)—is at the same time direct and spiritual, in unmistakeable 
language. But, for the present, let that be. As for him who lovingly guides (τὸν 
καθηγούμενον) us along the way to a better life, we ought to return him love and live 
according to the dictate of his principles. This we should do not only by fulfilling his 
commandments and obeying his prohibitions, but also by turning away from the evil 
examples we just mentioned and imitating the good.19
Presently, I'm not concerned about Scripture's didactic mode (τὸ διδασκαλικόν), as we 
will discuss that in the following section. Notice, though, the language that Clement uses to 
describe the pedagogical discourse of the Logos. Clement claims that both the words and deeds
of the Logos are seen as "commands" to which those who follow him ought to return love and
18Paed. 1.77.1 (GCS 12:135), citing Prov. 9:10.
19Paed. 1.8.3–9.1 (GCS 12:95)
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obedience. The pedagogical mode that Clement describes here views Scripture as an extended 
series of commands and examples. As the passage continues, Clement confirms that this is a 
posture before Christian Scripture, a pedagogic manner of reading the text: "considering the 
Word as law (νόμον), let us see his commandments and counsels (τὰς ἐντολὰς καὶ τὰς 
ὑποθημοσύνας αὐτοῦ) as direct and sure paths to eternity."20
It is common knowledge that Clement's interpretation of Scripture in the Paedagogus is 
bent towards moral exhortation. What is less emphasized, but more significant, in my view, is 
that this moral exhortation is entirely derived from reading the Scriptures as a book of 
commands and examples. This is what Clement means by suggesting that one receive the words
of the Old Testament as "law." In the Protrepticus, as we saw, Clement suggested that the Old 
Testament stories were examples that produced fear leading to conversion. In the Paedagogus, the 
stories are once again held up as examples: "Let us little ones, then, attending to the story of 
the sins of others, refrain from like offenses, from fear of the threat of suffering like 
punishment."21
From these accounts, Clement argues, one can see the "rod" (ῥάβδος) with which the 
Lord educates his people. But Clement chastises those who believe that this makes the Lord 
unloving, and unsurprisingly, he describes the Lord's action in terms of "fear."
Thereupon certain persons have arisen denying that the Lord is good, because of the 
rod and threats and fear that he uses. First of all, these persons misunderstand the 
Scriptures, which say somewhere, "And the one who fears God will turn to his own 
heart."22
The failure of those who mistakenly claim that the Lord is not good is a poor reading of
the Scriptures. Thus, at this point, Clement turns to consider the various types of discourse 
20Paed. 1.9.4 (GCS 12:95). Although it goes beyond the scope of the present work, Clement's insistence on
both the practical and theoretical, the deeds and the words of the Logos, may suggest a Stoic influence on his 
perspectives. Here, I anticipate the forthcoming work of Gretchen Reydams-Schilds, who will be analyzing the 
Stoic influence on Clement's thought.
21Paed. 1.58.3 (GCS 12:124)
22Paed. 1.62.1 (GCS 12:126)
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found in the Scriptures. But, as we saw, regardless of their generic identification, all of these 
distinct kinds of discourse share a common thread within the Lord's own pedagogical mode of 
speaking: "He weaves the thread of fear into everything because 'the fear of the Lord is the 
beginning of understanding.'"23 For Clement, far from showing the Lord to be uncharitable, the
fear that he uses is, in fact, a measurement of his love for his people: "Fear, indeed, is beneficial 
for men, and leads men towards good. For 'the spirit who fears the Lord will live, because his 
hope is upon the one who saves them' (Wisd. 34:14)."24 And unsurprisingly, when considering
the texts that we have already seen him use in his constellation of fear, Clement returns to both 
1 Corinthians, where he had seen the chronology of Christian maturity in the movement from 
fear to wisdom, and the Psalms, wherein he had discovered that the Word instructs his people 
in the fear of the Lord. It is an ingenious—a "creative"—correlation of these texts that allows 
Clement to discover the overarching purpose of the Lord's rod that brings fear.
And through the lips of David, he says, "The Lord chastising has chastised me, but he 
has not delivered me over to death" (Ps. 117:18) Indeed, the very act of being 
chastised, and being educated by the Lord as a child (1 Cor. 13:11), means deliverance 
from death. Again, he says through the same psalmist, "You shall rule them with a rod 
of iron" (Ps. 2:9). Similarly, the Apostle exclaimed when aroused by the Corinthians: 
"What is your wish? Shall I come to you with a rod, or in love and in the spirit of 
meekness?" (1 Cor. 4:21) By another psalmist, the Lord says again, "The Lord will send 
forth the rod of power out of Zion" (Ps. 109:2 LXX). And "your rod and staff"—this 
pedagogical mode of discourse (ἡ παιδαγωγικὴ αὕτη)—"have comforted me," another says 
(Ps. 22:4).25
Scripture's pedagogical mode—composed of commands, counsels, and examples—is a 
comforting discourse, not because it avoids fear, but because the fear that it instills is the first 
stage of the Word's saving activity.  That this is the ultimate goal that the Word seeks to 
accomplish is clear to Clement (Paed. 1.8.3), and it becomes the framework for his 
interpretation of the Scriptures throughout the Paedagogus. Having outlined this perspective at the
23Paed. 1.77.1 (GCS 12:135)
24Paed. 1.67.2 (GCS 12:129)
25Paed. 1.61.2–3 (GCS 12:126), emphasis mine.
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outset of the treatise, and having attended to Scripture's commands and examples in the course 
of his argument, Clement summarizes the same perspective in his closing chapter: 
The things we should be on our guard against at home, and how we are to preserve our
lives upright, the Pedagogue has shown us in abundant detail. The things that are dear 
to him to discourse about along the way until he lead us to the Teacher, these he has 
suggested and proposed by way of a general summary right in the Scriptures. He gives 
his commands plainly (γυμνὰς παρατιθέμενος τὰς παραγγελίας), adapting them to 
the time of guidance, but he turns them over to the Teacher for their interpretation (τὰς
ἐξηγήσεις). The purpose of his rule is to weaken fear and free the will for its act of 
faith.26
Notice the change in subject at the end of this passage. The Pedagogue had given 
commands plainly for the education of his little ones. Then, Clement describes the passage from
the Pedagogue to the Teacher. If my arguments are correct about Clement's constellation of fear, 
with his simultaneous emphasis on the chronological movement from fear to wisdom, then the
stress of the pronoun in the final sentence is surely a reference to the Teacher. In other words, 
the one whose activity is meant to move beyond fear is the Teacher and not the Pedagogue. The 
discourse of the Teacher moves beyond the pedagogical by stressing wisdom and not fear.
"When a Man Loves Wisdom, His Father Will Be Pleased":
Wisdom and Its Textual Constellation in the Stromateis
As we saw earlier, the passage from Stromata 1.11 in which Clement discusses writing, 
the tradition of his teachers, and his own exegetical practice is best construed as an argument 
for the importance of the memorial archive in Christian biblical interpretation. Clement 
suggests that his teacher Pantaenus was the eminent exegetical bee, who could produce a pure 
honey from the meadows and flowers of the Scriptures. Here, however, I want to note a feature 
of this passage that is often overlooked. Clement actually identifies the content of the pure 
26Paed. 3.87.1 (GCS 12:283–84):   Ὅσα μὲν οὖν οἴκοι παραφυλακτέον καὶ ὡς τὸν βίον ἐπανορθωτέον, ὁ
παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῖν ἅδην διείλεκται· ἃ δ’ οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ὁμιλεῖν αὐτῷ φίλον τοῖς παιδίοις ἄχρις ἂν 
ἀγάγῃ αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον, ταῦτα δὲ ἡμῖν ἐν κεφαλαίου μέρει δι’ αὐτῶν ὑποτίθεται καὶ παρατίθεται τῶν
γραφῶν, γυμνὰς παρατιθέμενος τὰς παραγγελίας, ἁρμοζόμενος μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῆς καθοδηγήσεως, τὰς δὲ 
ἐξηγήσεις αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπων τῷ διδασκάλῳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος αὐτοῦ τὸν φόβον ὑπεκλύειν βούλεται τὸ ἑκούσιον 
ἐλευθερώσας εἰς πίστιν
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substance that the exegetical bee derives from the scriptural field. 
Immediately after recounting that his own exegesis in the Stromateis should be viewed in 
relation to that of his teachers, Clement makes the following statement. "In my view, the one 
whose soul desires to keep the blessed tradition securely has an outline (ἡ ὑποτύπωσις) along 
the lines of this: 'When a man loves wisdom, his father will be pleased' (Prov. 29:3)."27 It is the 
preservation of scriptural wisdom that Clement presumes will please those from whom he 
initially learned it. Indeed, appealing to the story of the light under a bushel in Matthew 5:15, 
Clement argues that wisdom is the pure substance of the Scriptures that must be cultivated in 
teacher and pupil alike: "What is the profit of wisdom which does not also bring wisdom to 
anyone capable of understanding?"28
Indeed, this reflection leads Clement to consider a scriptural phrase to which he will 
return  multiple times in his contemplations on wisdom throughout the Stromateis. "Speak to a 
wise man, and he will be wiser" (cf. Prov. 1:5; 9:9).29 For Clement, this phrase applies in 
particular to scriptural interpretation, and the recollection of Scripture's teachings of wisdom, 
presumably first taught by his teachers, when he cannot remember.30 Clement goes so far as to 
claim that "wisdom" is indeed the primary truth to be garnered from the Scriptures, though its
scope is all-encompassing.
The Apostle reasonably called God's wisdom "manifold," "working in many forms and 
many ways" (πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως) through technical skill, scientific 
knowledge, faith, prophecy; it shows us its power for our benefit because, as the 
Wisdom of Jesus says, "all wisdom comes from the Lord and is with him to all eternity"
(Sir. 1:1). "For if you call for wisdom and perception at the top of your voice, if you 
27Str. 1.12.1 (GCS 15:9)
28Str. 1.12.3 (GCS 15:9). For the most recent discussion on the function of wisdom in the first two books 
of the Stromateis, see Schneider, Theologie als christliche Philosophie, 232–45. Schneider rightly notices Clement's 
description of the pedagogy of wisdom, drawn predominantly from sapiental texts, and then subsequently used 
for interpreting other scriptural passages. However, as I hope will be clear in this chapter, I am less inclined than 
Schneider to see this as an instance of willkürlicher Eisegese (245), with the negative connotations that such a 
description could bring. Rather, I suggest that this is an example of the creativity of Clement's exegesis, regardless 
of whether Schneider or I would find Clement's reading compelling.
29Str. 1.14.1 (GCS 15:10)
30Str. 1.14.2 (GCS 15:10)
167
seek it (ζητήσῃς) as you would a treasure of silver (ἀργυρίου θησαυροὺς), and if you 
track it down (ἐξιχνιάσῃς) ardently, then you will realize the meaning of reverence for 
God and you will grasp the perception of God" (Prov. 2:3–5). The prophet spoke to 
distinguish this from the philosophic approach to perception. He is teaching us with 
great dignity and solemnity to search it out (ἐξερευνᾶν), in order to progress towards 
reverence for God. So he opposed to it perception made in reverence for God, hinting at
knowledge in these words: "For God grants wisdom (σοφίαν) from his mouth together
with perception and practical wisdom (αἴσθησίν καὶ φρόνησιν), and stores up help for 
the righteous" (Prov. 2:6–7).31
In this passage, Clement makes two claims that, in my view, will be sustained 
throughout the rest of the Stromateis. First, Clement distinguishes the wisdom of God in the 
Scriptures from that of Greek philosophy. In fact, Clement appeals to the characteristic imagery 
of the "search" (ζητήσῃς), which we considered in the previous chapter, to charge his audience
to seek for divine wisdom in the Scriptures.32 The distinction Clement makes here is surely seen
in his desire to articulate the theft of the Greeks from the Christian Scriptures. He does not 
engage in such polemics merely to justify the Christian way of philosophy. He is even more 
concerned to raise the term "wisdom" to the heights of Christian interpretation.33
Second, from this passage it becomes clear that Clement will understand wisdom as the 
overarching category of Scripture's deepest mysteries. This accords nicely with his suggestion 
earlier in Stromata 1.11–12 that wisdom is indeed the pure substance of scriptural 
interpretation, passed from teacher to pupil. But it also provides Clement with a broad term, 
grounded in the Scriptures themselves, by which to refer to the deepest mysteries of the 
31Str. 1.27.1–3 (GCS 15:17)
32It is significant, in my view, that Clement also employs the metaphor of the treasure (θησαυροὺς) here. 
See my discussion of the treasury metaphor above in chapter seven.
33Cf. the description of Clement's lengthy exposition on the anteriority of the Jews in Méhat, Étude sur les 
‘Stromates,’ 316: "Qu'est-ce à dire, sinon que cette chronologie n'a pas seulement pour but d'établir l'antériorité des 
Juifs sur les Grecs, mais aussi de présenter un résumé d' 'histoire sainte', bref qu'elle recouvre une catéchèse 
élémentaire, où la pédagogie de la crainte, comme le voit, tient une large place." I agree with Méhat's analysis that 
this "pedagogy" is an underlying motive for Clement in this defense, though I am suggesting here that fear plays a 
smaller role than wisdom. It is significant, I think, that in a later section of his book, entitled "De la sagesse et de la
philosophie" (354–56), Méhat does in fact note that Clement's extended defense of the "larceny of the Greeks" 
comes immediately after his reflections on true and false wisdom. Indeed, the immediate context of the discussion 
on Greek theft is wisdom and not the fear that precedes it in the divine pedagogy. Thus, the pedagogy of fear has 
become the pedagogy of wisdom in the Stromateis.
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Christian faith. This is a point we don't want to bypass too quickly. It has been a common 
theme of Clementine scholarship to seek an overarching theme or doctrine to Clement's 
theology: from γνῶσις or unity to his Logos-theology or apophatic theology.34 The concept of 
γνῶσις in Clement's thought has perhaps the strongest arguments for occupying a central role, 
and yet, every discussion of this concept in the first book of the Stromateis is subsumed under a 
broader dialogue concerning wisdom. In fact, Clement himself seems to think that the term 
wisdom is large enough to encompass the entirety of Scripture's mysteries, including divine 
knowledge (γνῶσις).35
In Stromata 2.7, Clement once again appeals to the phrase from Proverbs that "the wise 
man will be wiser." At the outset of the second book, however, Clement provides an exposition 
of the entire passage from Proverbs 1:2–6. In this extended exposition, we see how Clement 
not only how Clement relates wisdom and knowledge, but we also see quite clearly that 
wisdom pays distinct dividends in the interpretation of Scripture's mysteries.
"On hearing this, the wise man"—the person who has been persuaded to obey the 
commandments—"will be wiser" with respect to knowledge. "The person of 
understanding will acquire the power of government and will understand parables, 
dark language, the sayings of the wise, and enigmas." For neither those inspired by God
nor those equipped by them express sentiments that lead into error, still less into the 
traps in which the majority of sophists entangle the young without directing their 
studies to the truth at all. But those who possess the Holy Spirit search out "the depths 
of God" (τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ; cf. 1 Cor. 2:10)—in other words, they attain the hidden 
secrets that surround prophecy.36
34To these, one could easily add other examples. Cf. Arkadi Choufrine, Gnosis, Theophany, Theosis: Studies in 
Clement of Alexandria’s Appropriation of his Background, (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), on the role of deification in Clement's
thought. 
35Mondésert, Clément d’Alexandrie, 85, rightly notes that, for Clement, one must take a word like "wisdom" 
(sagesse) in its strongest sense, pointing as an example to Clement's discussion of wisdom in Prot. 11.113.1.
36Str. 2.7.2–3 (GCS 15:116): τῶνδε γὰρ ἀκούσας σοφός», ὁ ὑπακούειν ταῖς ἐντολαῖς πεπεισμένος, 
«σοφώτερος ἔσται» κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν, «ὁ δὲ νοήμων κυβέρνησιν κτήσεται νοήσει τε παραβολὴν καὶ σκοτεινὸν 
λόγον ῥήσεις τε σοφῶν καὶ αἰνίγματα.» οὐ γὰρ κιβδήλους οἱ ἔπιπνοι ἐκ θεοῦ λόγους προφέρουσιν οὐδ’ οἱ παρὰ 
τούτων ἐμπορευόμενοι οὐδὲ μὴν πάγας, αἷς οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν τοὺς νέους ἐμπλέκουσι πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς 
σχολάζοντες, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα κεκτημένοι ἐρευνῶσι «τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ,» τουτέστι τῆς περὶ τὰς 
προφητείας ἐπικρύψεως ἐπήβολοι γίνονται·
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In this exposition of Proverbs, Clement affirms the chronology of fear and wisdom to 
which I have been calling attention in this chapter. He identifies the "wise man" of Prov. 1:5 
with the one who has turned to obey the commandments. It seems likely that this man 
represents the audience Clement addressed in the Protrepticus and Paedagogus, whom he hoped to 
see turn in fear to obey the commands of Scripture. But this isn't the end of the process in 
Clement's mind. The one who by fear obeys the commandments, will grow in wisdom "with 
respect to knowledge" (κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν). How is this accomplished? According to Clement's 
exposition here, this growth in wisdom occurs in large part through the interpretation of 
Scripture, in the acquisition of the ability to understand parables and the enigmas found in the 
Scriptures.37 Clement develops this constellation of wisdom by linking the text from Proverbs 
with 1 Corinthians 2:10, suggesting that the result of Christian interpretation is a growth in 
wisdom tantamount to seeking the "depths of God."38 And much like his constellation of fear 
turned on the view that Scripture, and especially the Old Testament, was composed of examples
and commandments (which is unsurprisingly confirmed in the present passage), Clement 
suggests that the wisdom contained in Scripture can be seen most explicitly when one views 
the text in its didactic mode as "prophecy" (προφητεία).
Christian Scripture in Didactic Mode
Let us take a minute to remember the text from the early chapters of the Paedagogus. I 
argued above that Clement understood Scripture's pedagogical mode to be seen clearly in the 
commands and examples that populate the text. Clement differentiates this mode of discourse 
from a second scriptural mode.
It is also clear (σαφὲς) that the other kind of discourse, the didactic (τὸ 
διδασκαλικόν)—holding the deepest mysteries (τὸ ἐποπτικόν)—is at the same time 
direct and spiritual (ἰσχνόν καὶ πνευματικόν), in unmistakeable language 
37See Clement's claim in Prot. 1.10.1 (GCS 12:10), that the presence of the incarnate Word has ushered in 
a period of understanding Scripture's mysteries and breaking the silence of the "prophetic enigmas" (τῶν 
προφητικῶν αἰνιγμάτων). Cf. Str. 5.10.3 (GCS 15:332).
38We encountered a similar logic in chapter two, when we examined Clement's interpretation in Str. 5.
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(ἀκριβολογίας). But, for the present, let that be.39
As I argued above, Clement does not concern himself with this didactic mode in the 
body of the Paedagogus. He does, however, explicitly turn to give way to this didactic mode at the 
end of the treatise. He once again summarizes his understanding of the pedagogical discourse 
of the Educator that has been his concern until this point, and now, he foreshadows the didactic
discourse that will occupy the Stromateis.40
 [The Pedagogue] gives his commands plainly, adapting them to the time of guidance, 
but entrusting the interpretation of them to the Teacher (πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον). The 
purpose of his rule is to weaken fear and free the will for its act of faith. . . . [The 
Teacher says,] Lend an attentive ear to me and hear: "And I will give you hidden 
treasures, concealed, unseen" (Isa. 45:3 LXX) by the Gentiles, but visible to you, 
"unfailing treasures of wisdom" (cf. Wisd. 7:14; Lk. 12:33), which the Apostle 
marveled at when he said, "O the depths of the riches and the wisdom!" (Rom. 
11:33)41
As Clement describes the discourse of the teacher, he turns to distinct scriptural texts 
that will arise time and again in the Stromateis—especially in his articulation of figurative reading
in book five. Appealing to Isaiah 45:3, Clement claims that the discourse of the teacher can be 
pictured as the discovery of "hidden treasure."42 But, as Clement will do again in book five of 
39Paed. 1.8.3 (GCS 12:95): Σαφὲς δὲ ὡς ἄρα θάτερον εἶδος τῶν λόγων, τὸ διδασκαλικόν, ἰσχνόν τέ ἐστι 
καὶ πνευματικόν, ἀκριβολογίας ἐχόμενον, τὸ ἐποπτικόν, ὃ δὴ ὑπερκείσθω τὰ νῦν.
40For a similar reflection on the "didactic mode" of Scripture, see Robert G. T. Edwards, “Clement of 
Alexandria’s Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue,” JECS 23 (2015), 520–26. Note especially Edwards' claim that 
"because Clement’s interpretation is gnostic in character, in many cases he does not read the commandments as 
commands at all" (520, emphasis original). I am sympathetic to much of Edwards' article, especially as it concerns
the various ways of reading dependent upon the implied audience. There are, however, items with which to 
disagree, like Edwards' claim that the commands of the Protrepticus and Paedagogus are given "completely without 
allegory" (521). This is a similar claim to Rizzi, “Literary Problem,” 159; see my interaction with Rizzi's points 
below, n.57.
41Paed. 3.87.1–3 (GCS 12:283–84):   Ὅσα μὲν οὖν οἴκοι παραφυλακτέον καὶ ὡς τὸν βίον 
ἐπανορθωτέον, ὁ παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῖν ἅδην διείλεκται· ἃ δ’ οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ὁμιλεῖν αὐτῷ φίλον τοῖς 
παιδίοις ἄχρις ἂν ἀγάγῃ αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον, ταῦτα δὲ ἡμῖν ἐν κεφαλαίου μέρει δι’ αὐτῶν ὑποτίθεται καὶ
παρατίθεται τῶν γραφῶν, γυμνὰς παρατιθέμενος τὰς παραγγελίας, ἁρμοζόμενος μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῆς 
καθοδηγήσεως, τὰς δὲ ἐξηγήσεις αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπων τῷ διδασκάλῳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος αὐτοῦ τὸν φόβον ὑπεκλύειν
βούλεται τὸ ἑκούσιον ἐλευθερώσας εἰς πίστιν
42The parallels between the treasury motif in the previous chapter are clear.
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the Stromateis, he specifically identifies the treasure in a reading of the Wisdom of Solomon. The 
didactic discourse of Scripture contains the "unfailing treasures of wisdom" (σοφίας δὲ 
θησαυροὶ ἀνέκλειπτοι). Moreover, Clement further describes this treasure as the "depth of 
wisdom" (βάθος σοφίας), which may in fact provide him with the foundation to connect 1 
Corinthians 2:10 with Proverbs 1:5 in the passage from the Stromateis above. In any case, 
Clement understands this second mode of scriptural discourse as the movement beyond fear 
and into the revelation of wisdom. It is important, though, to remember that Clement does not
necessarily differentiate between distinct genres of Christian Scripture. On the contrary, the 
same text—indeed, the Old Testament as a whole—can be seen in both modes. Here, the 
passage from Paed. 1.59 is once again instructive:
In former times, our ancestors had an Old Testament. As law, it guided them through 
fear (νόμος ἐπαιδαγώγει τὸν λαὸν μετὰ φόβου); as word, it was a messenger (λόγος 
ἄγγελος ἦν). But to the new and young people a new and young testament has been 
given. The Word has become flesh; fear has been turned into love. Jesus, that mystical 
messenger, has been born. . . . This is my new testament, already engraved in the letters 
of the old.43
For Clement, the key exegetical factor is not to identify whether a text belongs to one 
discourse or the other. Rather, every text may belong to both discourses. At one time it may 
speak pedagogically through fear, and at another time, it will point to the "unfailing treasures 
of wisdom" of the didactic discourse.44 This seems to be the most likely reason for Clement's 
43Paed. 1.59.1 (GCS 12:124–25): Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρότερον τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ λαῷ πρεσβυτέρα διαθήκη ἦν καὶ
νόμος ἐπαιδαγώγει τὸν λαὸν μετὰ φόβου καὶ λόγος ἄγγελος ἦν, καινῷ δὲ καὶ νέῳ λαῷ καινὴ καὶ νέα διαθήκη 
δεδώρηται καὶ ὁ λόγος γεγέ<ν>νηται καὶ ὁ φόβος εἰς ἀγάπην μετατέτραπται καὶ ὁ μυστικὸς ἐκεῖνος ἄγγελος 
Ἰησοῦς τίκτεται. Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς οὗτος παιδαγωγὸς τότε μὲν «φοβηθήσῃ κύριον τὸν θεὸν» ἔλεγεν, ἡμῖν δὲ 
«ἀγαπήσεις κύριον τὸν θεόν σου» παρῄνεσεν. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐντέλλεται ἡμῖν «παύσασθε ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων ὑμῶν»,
τῶν παλαιῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, «μάθετε καλὸν ποιεῖν· ἔκκλινον ἀπὸ κακοῦ καὶ ποίησον ἀγαθόν· ἠγάπησας 
δικαιοσύνην, ἐμίσησας ἀνομίαν». Αὕτη μου ἡ νέα διαθήκη παλαιῷ κεχαραγμένη γράμματι. As this passage 
continues, Clement offers a striking claim that the perspective and teaching of the New Testament can be seen 
"already engraved in the letters of the Old" (παλαιῷ κεχαραγμένη γράμματι). I will suggest that this points to 
Clement's understanding of distinct ways to approach the Christian Old Testament, a concept to which we will 
return below. 
44Schneider, Theologie als christliche Philosophie, 166, comes close to this perspective, when he says that 
Clement approaches scriptural texts with the question, "Bei welchen Dingen, in welchen Fragen kann uns dieses 
Gleichnis unsere Erkenntnis erweitern?"
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frequent return to the Kerygma of Peter. At times, Clement provides an extended quote from this 
text. But most frequently, Clement simply returns to the characteristic phrase drawn from the 
Preaching of Peter: the Lord is called both "Law and Word."45 In fact, standing at the end of the first
book of the Stromateis, just after his description of the four ways that the Old Testament may be 
understood, and just prior to the exposition of Proverbs 1 that opens book two, Clement 
appeals to the Lord's identity as both Law and Word as a succinct summary of the single power 
and trajectory of the Old Testament. To be sure, Clement's use of the Preaching of Peter could have 
other applications beyond his conception of the Old Testament, but after his exposition of 
Proverbs, Clement reiterates this position in Str. 2.29.1–4. Here, he provides a trenchant 
expression of the relationship between Old and New Testaments: they form "a single process of 
salvation proceeding from prophecy to fulfillment in the gospel, through one and the same 
Lord."46 As the one who furnished the Old Testament, the Lord is both "Law and Word," 
guiding his people through fear and into wisdom, respectively.
Fear, Wisdom, and Clement's "Literary Problem"
As we have seen in this chapter, Clement divides scriptural discourse into two distinct 
modes, a pedagogical mode and a didactic mode. Moreover, these two modes are identified 
through Clement's construction of two distinct textual constellations: the constellation of fear 
and the constellation of wisdom. When viewed as "law," the Old Testament presents commands 
and examples for the education of God's people. In following the Word's pedagogical discourse,
Clement encourages believers to obey the commands or heed the examples out of fear that 
what has happened to earlier generations will indeed happen to them. Yet, when viewed as 
"word," the same texts of the Old Testament present a prophecy that finds its fulfillment in the 
New Testament and especially in the incarnation of the Lord. Indeed, the "mysteries of 
45The significance of the Preaching of Peter to Clement's understanding of scriptural interpretation is tangible.
In Str. 6.127–28 (GCS 15:496–97), Clement confirms his view that Scripture's prophetic nature is intended to 
reveal "holy mysteries" that accompanied the Incarnation of the Word.
46Str.2.29.1–4 (GCS 15:128–29). Clement incorporates the Pauline statement of Rom. 1:17 in this second
passage, a text that will prove vital to his logic on figural reading in the fifth book of the Stromateis. See H. Clifton 
Ward, “‘The Symbolic Mode is Most Useful’: Clement of Alexandria’s Scriptural Imagination,” JECS (forthcoming).
173
wisdom" are seen clearly in the life of Christ which has broken the silence of the prophetic 
enigmas.47
In what follows, I will suggest that this attention to Clement's textual constellations can 
contribute an answer to the question of Clement's literary output that has "vexed" Clementine 
scholarship for years.48  Does Clement interpret Scripture according to a definitive plan of 
Christian growth and maturity? Or is his interpretation as random and variable as the title of 
his Miscellanies suggests, a veritable loose association of unrelated texts? Most answers to these 
questions have been dependent on a passage that concludes the first chapter of Clement's 
Paedagogus. In this passage, Clement outlines the pedagogical process employed by God to lead 
his people to salvation:
The entirely benevolent Logos, being eager to perfect us by the progressive stages of 
salvation, uses a beautiful plan (τῇ καλῇ οἰκονομίᾳ), appropriate for effective education
(εἰς παίδευσιν ἐνεργῆ): first he exhorts us (προτρέπων), then he trains us 
(παιδαγωγῶν), and, finally, he teaches (ἐκδιδάσκων).49
This short text has led to a tremendous amount of discussion pertaining to Clement's 
own literary activity, and one can easily understand the temptation for this dialogue. After all, 
the activity which Clement ascribes to the Logos aligns closely with the titles of his own works,
though Clement has no work paralleled to the "teaching" activity of the Logos, which would 
ostensibly be titled the Didaskalos. Of course, this has led to much ink on whether Clement's 
Stromateis might correspond to the teaching activity of the Logos.50 I do not claim to have a clear
47Cf. Prot. 1.10.1 (GCS 12:10)
48This is the way that the situation is described by Wagner, “Another Look,” 251.
49Paed. 1.3.3 (GCS 12:91)
50The ease with which scholars move from the verbs in this passage to the titles of Clement's works is 
clearly seen in the words of Bogdan G. Bucur, Angelomorphic Pneumatology: Clement of Alexandria and Other Early Christian 
Witnesses, (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 13: " The work of the Logos as προτρέπων and παιδαγωγῶν finds its counterpart 
in Clement’s Logos Protreptikos and Logos Paidagogos. The question is to determine what corresponds to the divine Logos 
as ἐκδιδάσκων." Others have warned against reading too much into them; cf. Völker, Der wahre Gnostiker, 29–30. For 
the clearest exposition of the debate concerning whether the Stromateis should be identified with the Didaskalos, see 
Wagner, “Another Look”. The traditional position was to identify the two; see Carl Heussi, “Die Stromateis des 
Clemens Alexandrinus und ihr Verhältnis zum Protreptikos und Pädagogus,” ZWT 45 (1902): 465-512. Indeed, in 
recent years, some scholars have returned to traditional arguments (and offered occasional new theses) in order to
identify the Stromateis with the expected Didaskolos. See Eric Osborn, “Teaching and Writing in the First Chapter of 
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solution to the question of whether the Stromateis should be identified as the anticipated 
Didaskolos. However, I do think that the arguments I have provided in this chapter suggest that 
this anticipation for a threefold pedagogical paradigm, based on such passages as this one from 
the Paedagogus, and into which we must fit Clement's own literary plan is misguided. On the 
contrary, Clement more clearly identifies a twofold discourse within the Scriptures—which he 
calls the voice of the Lord—and this twofold discourse generally aligns with a division of his 
works that focus on moral exhortation to the faith and the teaching of Scripture's deeper 
mysteries. If Clement models his own literary corpus on the work of the Logos, then I would 
argue that such treatises as the Protrepticus, the Paedagogus, and Who is the Rich Man Who Will Be Saved?, 
composed as they are with obvious paraenetic goals, are modeled on the pedagogical discourse 
of the Logos in the Scriptures. Likewise, the Stromateis and the Hypotyposeis (including what 
remains extant in the Eclogae propheticae, the Adumbrationes, and the Excerpta Theodotus) are modeled on
the didactic discourse, composed of subtle hints and figurative readings to instill an 
understanding of the deepest "mysteries of wisdom" contained in the Scriptures.51
In a recent essay on Clement's "literary problem," Marco Rizzi has offered an argument 
the Stromateis of Clement of Alexandria,” JTS 10 (1959): 335-43; and, most recently, Itter, Esoteric Teaching, who 
concludes matter-of-factly, "The Stromateis is the Didaskalos" (221). Nevertheless, compelling arguments can be made 
that the Stromateis is not the intended Didaskalos. See Eugène de Faye, Clément d’Alexandrie: Étude sur les rapports du 
Christianisme et de la philosophie grecque au IIe siècle, (Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1967); Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 189n.4; 
and, above all, Pierre Nautin, “La fin des Stromates et les Hypotyposes de Clément d’Alexandrie,” VC 30 (1976): 
268-302, whose manuscript analysis of the 11th century Codex Laurentianus—the only manuscript to include the
Stromateis, Excerpta, and Eclogae—suggested that the Stromateis were in fact a preparatory text for the intended Didaskalos.
51On the setting and purposes of Quis dives salvetur, see L. Michael White, “Moral Pathology: Passions, 
Progress, and Protreptic in Clement of Alexandria,” in Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. 
Fitzgerald (London: Routledge, 2008), 284-321. Méhat, Étude sur les ‘Stromates,’ 42–54, suggested that Q.D.S. was 
written after Clement left Alexandria, sometime around 203 C.E. David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A 
Survey, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 144–45, argued in support of Méhat's chronology, suggesting that the 
lack of Philonic material in both Q.D.S. and the works that postdate the Stromateis would appear to confirm this view. 
White, “Moral Pathology,” 310n.24, contests this view by noting that there are, in fact, some common notions 
between Clement and Philo on the passions, though there are no direct quotations or clear allusions (291–96). 
Moreover, if one considers the possibility that Clement's reference to his work ἐν τῇ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ θεολογίας 
ἐξηγήσει (Q.D.S. 26.8) is a referral to the Stromateis rather than a separate work (cf. Str. 4.2.1–2), it remains entirely 
possible that the "differential use of Philonic material" is related more to audience and purpose than to 
geographical provenance. White thus argues that Q.D.S. is addressed "to the cultured elite" as an exhortation "to 
pursue his Christian educational program." I agree with White on this score, but I want to stress the fact not that 
this audience is composed of the "cultural elite," but rather of novices on the educational program—that is, those 
in need of the "pedagogical discourse" I discuss here.
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that supports my thesis of a twofold discourse in Clement's work.52 In his essay, Rizzi seeks to 
refute the "very idea of a threefold project in [Clement's] work,"53 and he develops his notion 
that Clement operates in two distinct styles: a "proptreptic and pedagogic style" and a "didactic 
style."54 Rizzi points to a passage within the Paedagogus that confirms this general schema: Paed. 
2.76.1. In this text, Clement says, "I have departed from the pedagogical mode (παιδαγωγικὸς 
τύπος) and encroached upon the didactic mode (διδασκαλικὸν εἶδος). Let me thus return to 
my subject."55 Here, Clement employs two terms that are, as Rizzi rightly notes, "taken from 
the specific rhetorical vocabulary and refer to problems of style and literary genres."56 Once 
again, like in the preface to the Paedagogus, Clement distinguishes in his own scriptural 
interpretation between a pedagogical and didactic mode, reminiscent of the twofold discourse 
of the Word. 
Rizzi wants to distinguish the style of interpretation for each of these modes, arguing 
that the "pedagogic style" is characterized by literal exegesis and the "didactic style" by 
allegorical exegesis.57 I think this distinction is difficult to maintain, given the fact that 
Clement's works do not so easily divide according to this strict dichotomy. Figural reading can 
be seen from the outset of the Protrepticus, and the Stromateis contains multiple passages that 
provide literal readings of scriptural texts. Moreover, Rizzi's use of the term "style" to 
differentiate between the "pedagogic" and "didactic" is unfortunate because the primary 
differences between the two are not primarily stylistic—understood as a grammatical and 
52Rizzi, “Literary Problem”
53Rizzi, “Literary Problem,” 155.  I only encountered Rizzi's essay after coming to similar conclusions 
independently, and I judge our similar descriptions of Clement's activity to be mutually confirming. This reading 
of a twofold pattern to Clement's work was earlier supposed by Giuseppe Lazzati, Introduzione allo studio di Clemente 
Alessandrino, (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1939), 1–36.
54Rizzi, “Literary Problem,” 159. The similarity of the terms by which we both describe Clement's "style" 
or "mode"—which we construed independently—can be adequately explained by our individual attempts to pay 
deference to the Greek terminology that underlie them.
55Paed. 2.76.1 (GCS 12:203)
56Rizzi, “Literary Problem,” 159.
57Rizzi, “Literary Problem,” 159. 
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literary-critical distinction. Thus, I think we can better describe the differences in Clement's 
readings by distinguishing between two modes of interpretation that parallel the "pedagogical"
and "didactic" modes of discourse used by the Logos: namely, "exemplary interpretation" and 
"prophetic interpretation." In Clement's exemplary interpretation, the reader approaches the 
Scriptures seeking to discover its commands, precepts, and examples, which through fear 
exhorts the reader to faith. On the other hand, Clement's prophetic interpretation reads the 
same scriptural texts in search of Scripture's deepest mysteries, seen most clearly, but not 
simply, in Old Testament promises fulfilled in the incarnation of Jesus.58 
I am less concerned with advancing the effect of these arguments on solving Clement's 
"literary problem" than Rizzi appears to be. Indeed, I remain open to the possibility that 
Clement's literary works are perhaps aligned with the threefold philosophical subdivision 
prevalent in the second century C.E., and yet, I think the conclusions of Nautin—that the 
Stromateis appear to be preparatory to the extant fragments of Hypotyposeis—are entirely right. 
Nevertheless, it seems true that the implications of the arguments advanced in my last two 
chapters on the scriptural constellations in Clement's creative exegesis do suggest that a twofold
pattern—a pedagogical and didactic mode of reading—is highlighted, and thus, if the Stromateis 
appear as a preparatory text to the Hypotyposeis, it seems entirely possible that Clement himself 
did not intend for these to be two distinct documents.59
58A related question, but which goes beyond the scope of the current project, is how the didactic 
discourse—nearly always described as mystical, mysterious, or enigmatic—can be explained as having an 
"exactness" or "preciseness" (ἀκριβολογίας) in Paed. 1.8.3–9.1. Clement never answers this question explicitly. Is 
he simply inconsistent on this point? I think it more likely that the view of a twofold paradigm—a pedagogical 
and didactic discourse—turns the emphasis from the speech itself to the speaker's understanding of his audience. 
That is, the didactic mode can be described as "exact" or "clear," but only to an audience who is prepared to 
understand it as such. This implied audience has moved from fear to wisdom and is capable of understanding the 
"mysteries of wisdom" contained in Scripture, which Clement calls elsewhere the "depths of God" (cf. 1 Cor. 
2:10).
59Cf. Marco Rizzi, “The End of Stromateis VII and Clement’s Literary Project,” in The Seventh Book of the 
Stromateis: Proceedings of the Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria (Olomouc, October 21-23, 2010), eds. Matyáš Havrda, Vít Hušek, 
and Jana Plátová (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 299-311.
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The Complexity of Textual Constellations
The benefit to approaching Clement's biblical exegesis from the perspective of the 
textual constellations that he organizes goes far beyond any potential solution to the literary 
problem. I want to emphasize in conclusion to this chapter, then, the profit that this perspective
brings to evaluate whether Clement's exegetical praxis aligns with his theory. Does his actual 
execution of scriptural interpretation fit with his description of exegesis? Permit me to remind 
us of Clement's most explicit description of exegesis in the two passages from Str. 1.176 and 
1.179, with which I began this chapter:
"The Mosaic philosophy is accordingly divided into four parts: first, the historic part; 
second, that which is strictly called the legislative part (both of which properly belong 
to ethics); a third part, which relates to liturgy (a part of physical science); and fourth, 
above all, the theological part, the vision, which Plato says belongs to the truly great 
mysteries, while Aristotle calls it metaphysics." . . . There are four ways in which we can
receive the meaning of the Law: it may present a type; it may show a sign; it may lay 
down a precept (ὡς ἐντολὴν) for right conduct; and it may pronounce a prophecy (ὡς 
προφητείαν). I am well aware that to make these distinctions and expound them is the 
work of fully mature men. The whole of Scripture is not, in the proverbial saying, "a 
single Myconos."60
This theoretical explanation from Clement has been considered frequently in attempts 
to systematize Clement's exegesis, especially in its relation to his list in Str. 1.176 that is clearly 
Philonic.61 For example, André Méhat, in his astute work on the Stromateis, refers to this passage 
60Str. 1.176.1–2; 179.3–4 (GCS 15:108; 110): τετραχῶς δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκληπτέον καὶ τοῦ νόμου τὴν 
βούλησιν, ** ἢ ὡς σημεῖον ἐμφαίνουσαν ἢ ὡς ἐντολὴν κυροῦσαν εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθὴν ἢ θεσπίζουσαν ὡς 
προφητείαν. ἀνδρῶν δὲ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα διακρίνειν τε καὶ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ «μία Μύκονος» ἡ πᾶσα πρὸς 
νόησιν γραφή, ᾗ φασιν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι
61Str. 1.176.1 (GCS 15:108). This passage reads: "The Mosaic philosophy is accordingly divided into four 
parts: first, the historic part; second, that which is strictly called the legislative part (both of which properly 
belong to ethics); a third part, which relates to liturgy (a part of physical science); and fourth, above all, the 
theological part, the vision, which Plato says belongs to the truly great mysteries, while Aristotle calls it 
metaphysics." Cf. Philo, Mos. 2.46 (LCL 289:470–71). For a discussion of the relevant passages, see Boer, De 
allegorese, 47–64; Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1970), 56; André Méhat, “Clément d’Alexandrie et les sens de l’Écriture,” in Épektasis; mélanges patristiques offerts au 
cardinal Jean Daniélou, eds. Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 358–62; and Hoek,
Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo, 60–62.
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as either a "fourfold list of the meanings of Scripture" or a "formula on biblical exegesis."62 
Méhat followed these statements with an essay devoted to the "deux listes quadripartites des 
sens de l'Ecriture" (i.e., Str. 1.176.1 and 1.179.3), in which he argues that, although the two 
lists do not align directly to one another, they both concern the hermeneutical discernment of 
Scripture's different senses. Moreover, Méhat claims that the formula of Str. 1.179.3 aligns with 
a catechetical progression that Clement has placed not merely within the problem of his literary
trilogy but indeed in the advancement presupposed by the Stromateis themselves.63
I want to emphasize, however, that passages like this one should not be used to 
formulate a description of the hermeneutical "senses" that Clement might discern in 
Scripture.64 After all, Clement rarely shows the drive to differentiate a "type" from a "sign," 
much less use this terminology.65 On the other hand, we have confirmed that he quite often 
emphasizes that the Law is received as either a "command" or as a "prophecy." But I want to 
suggest that these are not primarily a difference in genre for the hermeneutical enterprise. 
Instead, they represent differences in approaches to the Law, and they turn the tables on the 
important questions to ask before the exegetical enterprise can even begin. That is, the identity 
of the audience is of far more importance than the identification of textual genre or style.66 Is 
62See Méhat, Étude sur les ‘Stromates,’ 435n.76 and 316n.104, respectively. 
63Méhat, “Sens de l’Écriture,” 365. This is the conclusion of his earlier study in Méhat, Étude sur les ‘Stromates,’
507–22, where Méhat argues that even the Stromateis begin with a "deuxième Protreptique" and should be expected to
have concluded with the now lost Hypotyposeis in their internal movement from ethics to physics to epoptics. This 
second claim was forcefully argued in the magisterial article by Nautin, “La fin des Stromates”. And though he 
does not appeal to either of these texts for his classification, Mondésert, Clément d’Alexandrie, 153–62, also seeks to 
classify Clement's exegesis by hermeneutical vocabulary.
64For a similar claim, see Boer, De allegorese, 59: "Een hermeneutische indeeling, die als basis kan worden 
gebruikt bij een onderzoek van Clemens' interpretaties van bijbelsche en profane schrijvers, kunnen wij bij hem 
niet vinden." Oddly, Boer's earlier statement concerning Str. 1.179.3 does label it a hermeneutical distinction: "In 
179,3 is echter van het begin af aan niet sprake van een uiterlijke indeeling, maar van een hermeneutisch 
onderscheid" (56).
65Méhat, “Sens de l’Écriture,” 362–64, comes closest in my view to understanding how Clement might use
the terms τύπος and σημεῖον in Str. 1.179.3. He argues from Paed. 2.89.2–3 that τύπος is used by Clement to mean
"example," situating the term within Clement's moral discourse. Moreover, Méhat argues—though I would 
disagree here—that σημεῖον is used in Prot. 8.1.3 and Str. 6.28.3 in the sense of "miracles," which are also used by 
God for "la conversion des pécheurs endurcis." According to Méhat, then, "examples" and "miracles" (along with 
"commands") are part of the moral exhortation of the Law.
66I hope to investigate this claim more fully in a future work, as it seems to me a fundamental question 
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the audience in need of moral exhortation to live Christianly (and perhaps read Christianly?), 
and thus in need of seeing the examples or commands of Scripture that teach the fear of the 
Lord? Or is the implied audience composed of mature Christians who seek the "mysteries of 
wisdom" in the figurative and enigmatic language of Scripture as a prophetic text?
Of course, these questions are not always answered in our sources; Clement himself 
rarely provides an explicit answer. However, by looking to the textual constellations that 
Clement forms from his experience with the Scriptures, one can move towards understanding 
how Clement would articulate his posture before Christian Scripture. For Clement, the same 
text may speak as a command or example for right conduct in one instance and as a prophetic 
pronouncement in another. And, to be sure, to leave our investigation without satisfactorily 
discerning the actual settings in which a text is read for either an exemplary or prophetic 
interpretation (outside of my suggestion that, for Clement, the audience who participates in 
the investigation is the deciding factor) is certainly not without its difficulties. But difficulties is
merely another word for complexities. And this is an instance where systematization would 
simplify and distort a complex issue. Thus, I maintain what I said at the outset; namely, it is this
very complexity—the potential to notice the constellations that motivate the thoughts of our 
early Christian exegetes while simultaneously (and happily) confessing our inability to 
systematize this thought—that provides the most fruitful and accurate description of ancient 
reading practices for our understanding of early Christian exegesis today.
for articulating the distinctions between the constellations emphasized by various early Christian authors.
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Epilogue:
Clement as Commentarial Theologian
Far from being writers—founders of their own place, heirs of the peasants of earlier ages now 
working on the soil of language, diggers of wells and builders of houses—readers are travellers;
they move across lands belonging to someone else, like nomads poaching their way across 
fields they did not write, despoiling the wealth of Egypt to enjoy it themselves.1
I began this study by situating it as a contribution to the reappraisal of early Christian 
exegesis initiated in the late twentieth century. The best book to have emerged from this 
reassessment is, in my opinion, Elizabeth Clark's Reading Renunciation. I come to this judgment for 
two reasons. First, Clark's monograph heeded the clarion call of Frances Young's earlier Biblical 
Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture to be dissatisfied with investigations into the idea of early
Christian exegesis and, instead, to give attention to the detailed practices of biblical exegesis. 
Thus, Clark limited her study to an investigation of ascetic exegesis in early Christianity, 
specifically as it concerned sexual renunciation, and she situated these ascetic concerns within 
the context of Jewish and Greco-Roman exegetical culture. Yet, Clark went a step further, 
providing the second reason for my earlier judgment of her book. Clark developed ways of 
discussing how these exegetes employed the Scriptures in creative and (at times) surprising 
ways. The fifth chapter of Reading Renunciation, for example, focused on "exegetical and rhetorical 
strategies" that Clark observed in early Christian ascetic interpretation, and she provided her 
audience with the opportunity to consider what these exegetes did with the scriptural texts: 
from placing texts in different contexts to "imploding" texts into unrelated core ascetic issues, 
from "talking back" with a textual interlocutor to changing the implied audience of a biblical 
1Michel de Certeau, “Reading as Poaching,” in The Practice of Everyday Life, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984), 174. This quote was originally cited by Clark, Reading Renunciation, 371.
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text. As Clark compelling argued, early Christian interpreters were both readers and writers, 
who engaged the Scriptures creatively to form an "asceticized version of Christianity."2 Reading 
Renunciation rightly moved the focus of the discussion further away from the idea of exegesis and
much closer to exegetical practice.3
Nevertheless, the scope of Clark's book does not allow much room for conclusions 
about individual readers. Since she limits her investigation to sexual renunciation, she could 
never consider the immense amounts of material from certain early Christian figures. Indeed, 
this fact might require the contemplation that, although Chrysostom, Jerome, and Origen 
might provide three helpful "models of reading renunciation," these models might not hold up
to the scrutiny of examining the reading practices of any of these figures individually across 
their own works.4 Thus, although Origen might offer a "transhistorical reading of Scripture" 
and jettison a "chronological trajectory between Hebrew past and Christian present" for the 
purposes of discussing sexual renunciation, in order to transpose such a discussion from 
focusing on physical bodies to the inner composition of one's soul, is it the case that his 
reading practices holistically represent such a strategy? I would imagine this is not the case, and
David Dawson has offered an argumentation along these lines.5 Therefore, one way of filling 
this lacuna is an examination that takes as its delimiting factor the work of an individual reader. 
This study has been an attempt to accomplish this very task as it relates to the scriptural 
exegesis of Clement of Alexandria.
In order to accomplish this task, I have sought to develop a concept of "creative 
2Clark, Reading Renunciation, 371.
3Of course, this does not mean that Clark's work is above criticism. For instance, I am not compelled by 
her attempt at separating "close reading" from "intertextual exegesis" (see Clark, Reading Renunciation, 118–28). 
Indeed, I would argue that these categories are inherently too broad to provide meaningful discussion of the 
techniques employed in such readings. That is, prosopological exegesis, the definition of terms, identifying a 
textual genre, and scanning for thematic resonances across a given corpus are all techniques of "close reading," 
and they all also prove fruitful in much intertextual exegesis. Thus, while Clark's monograph moved the focus 
toward the practice of exegesis, I suggest that there remains further travel to be made in this direction.
4For these three "models of reading renunciation," see Clark, Reading Renunciation, 153–74.
5See Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, and particularly such comments as, "Origen is explicitly and intensely
concerned with history precisely as event. Indeed, it is only as event—especially as ongoing or renewable event—that 
Origen thinks history is important" (125, emphasis original).
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exegesis" that is consciously mindful of two foundations to exegetical practices in antiquity. 
First, the literary analysis of antiquity was consistently developed on the foundations of the 
tools and techniques of reading learned at the hands of the ancient γραμματικός. One can view
the various techniques and strategies of the grammarian as a repository—a grammatical 
archive—from which a reader draws the necessary textual practices for working with a text as a
carpenter draws the necessary tools from his toolbox to work with the lumber in front of him. 
Second, I have argued that Clement's scriptural exegesis displays the existence of a second 
archive, one less concrete than the grammatical archive and nevertheless just as significant. By 
examining Clement's use of standard metaphors of memory and recollection from antiquity, I 
suggested that we may catch a glimpse of his memorial archive, seen most clearly in the 
constellations around which he interprets a variety of scriptural texts and to which he collects 
others. This activity displays the creativity of Clement's exegesis. Exegesis becomes an act of 
discovery, a rhetorical invention, wherein Clement (and, I would argue, any ancient interpreter 
engaged in creative exegesis) "dwells among the texts," especially the Christian Scriptures, and 
"is always discovering in them more things to say."6
Even if I have been persuasive in developing this concept of creative exegesis as a means
by which to examine early Christian exegesis, there are a few areas of further study that can be 
identified to extend our understanding of creative exegesis in antiquity. In the course of my 
argument, I have seen fit to examine Clement's reading practices primarily from the lens of 
grammatical interpretation and the art of recollection as these activities are expressed in the 
Greco-Roman tradition. There remains work to be done on the parallels between creative 
exegesis as I have outlined it here and the practices inherent to Jewish exegesis. In fact, the term
"creative exegesis" has been used to describe midrashic interpretation, especially in its aggadic 
form. Joseph Heinemann described the phenomenon as follows:
The Jewish people sought, successfully, to continue living according to the dictates of 
the Torah. To achieve this, it was necessary that the Torah remain dynamic and open to 
varying interpretation in order to meet the challenges of drastically varying 
6This quote is drawn from the definition of a "grammarian embellisher" given by Bruns, Inventions, 56, 
and cited approvingly by Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 84, who likewise sees this exegesis as a 
rhetorical invention, an exploration of the "indeterminate areas of the text."
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circumstances. By developing a method of "creative exegesis" the aggadists were able to 
find in Scripture—which might otherwise have come to seem irrelevant to 
contemporary needs—the new answers and values which made it possible to grapple 
with the shifts and changes of reality.7
Perhaps the characteristics of "creative exegesis" as I have developed it in this study will 
align in a number of fruitful ways with Jewish exegetical practices. Some scholars have already 
suggested that there are some parallels to be drawn.8 Others, however, insist that we must be 
careful to suggest such connections too hastily.9 Regardless of the conclusions, there could be, 
in my view, much benefit to extending the concept of creative exegesis in accordance with a 
study of Jewish interpretation in late antiquity.10
7Joseph Heinemann, “The Nature of the Aggadah,” in Midrash and Literature, eds. Geoffrey H. Hartman and 
Sanford Budick (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 43. Heinemann draws attention to the first use of 
the term "creative exegesis" to describe such midrashic interpretation by Isaak Heinemann, Darkhei ha-Aggadah, 
(Givatayim: Magnes and Massada, 1970).
8On the exegetical practices of midrash, see Daniel Boyarin, Intertextuality and the Reading of Midrash, 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990); and David Halivni, Peshat and Derash: Plain and Applied Meaning in 
Rabbinic Exegesis, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). The standard article on the parallels between Jewish and
Greco-Roman techniques is David Daube, “Rabbinic Methods of Interpretation and Hellenistic Rhetoric,” HUCA 22
(1949): 239-64. See also David Daube, “Alexandrian Methods of Interpretation and the Rabbis,” in Festschrift Hans 
Lewald: Bei Vollendung des vierzigsten Amtsjahres als ordentlicher Professor im Oktober 1953, (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1953), 
27-43. On the role of memory and recollection in Jewish readings of Scripture, see Gerhardsson, Memory and 
Manuscript; and William W. Hallo, “Midrash as Mnemonic: A New Approach to Rabbinic Exegesis,” HUCA 74 (2003):
157-73.
9Michael A. Fishbane, “Inner-Biblical Exegesis: Types and Strategies of Interpretation in Ancient Israel,” in 
The Garments of Torah: Essays in Biblical Hermeneutics, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), 3-18, has sought
to temper the arguments of Daube, “Rabbinic Methods of Interpretation and Hellenistic Rhetoric”. For Fishbane, 
Daube has mistaken "the occurrence of similar exegetical terms for the inner-Jewish cultivation of preexistent 
native traditions of interpretation" (4). A similar argument on shared exegetical terminology is made by Saul 
Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1950), 56–68. Beyond 
the discussions of influence, it is possible that Fishbane's work could provide interesting extensions of our 
understanding of the imaginative—or "creative"—aspects to early Christian exegesis. Note how he describes the 
role of imagination in exegetical practice: "One of the great and most characteristic features of the history of 
religions is the ongoing reinterpretation of sacred utterances which are believed to be foundational for each 
culture. So deeply has this phenomenon become part of our modern literary inheritance that we may overlook the 
peculiar type of imagination which it has sponsored and continues to nurture: an imagination which responds to 
and is deeply dependent upon received traditions; an imagination whose creativity is never entirely a new creation,
but one founded upon older and authoritative words and images" (3). This comment touches on the nature of 
commentary itself, a question whose answer is crucial, but the investigation of which must be postponed for 
another study. 
10Though he does not employ the term "creative exegesis," Gerald L. Bruns, “Midrash and Allegory: The 
Beginnings of Scriptural Interpretation,” in The Literary Guide to the Bible, eds. Robert Alter and Frank Kermode 
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Additionally, another potential area for beneficial study is the creative exegesis of other 
early Christian readers. I have suggested that the reassessment of early Christian exegesis in the 
last few decades is a helpful corrective, but while my study suggests that this model of creative 
exegesis, complete with explorations of its grammatical and memorial foundations, is a helpful
lens through which to exegete the exegetes, so to speak, I have nonetheless only explored the 
practices of one reader—Clement of Alexandria. Before any possible conjectures about the 
fittingness of "creative exegesis" as a wholesale label for early Christian scriptural interpretation
can be made, there must be further explorations of individual exegetes from various 
geographical and chronological locations. Let me simply suggest two possibilities.
Gregory of Nyssa was the most productive author among the Cappadocians, and yet, to 
date there exists no good book on Gregory's biblical exegesis in English.11 In the existing 
scholarship on Gregory's exegesis, most contributions either consider exegetical techniques as 
they are seen in one particular treatise, or they prioritize the theological development of 
Gregory's claims with less concern on the practices of exegesis that lead to his theological 
positions.12 A broader reflection on the reading practices to be seen in Gregory's creative 
exegesis is surely needed. Cyril of Alexandria provides another author whose creative exegesis 
leaves room for further study. Cyril was a prodigious exegete, and there remains more extant 
exegetical literature from Cyril's hand than any other patristic figure of the East.13 Matthew 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 625-46, does see numerous parallels between midrash and 
early Christian figural reading. Cf. Gerald L. Bruns, “The Problem of Figuration in Antiquity,” in Hermeneutics: Questions
and Prospects, eds. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 147-64; and the 
chapter on "The Hermeneutics of Midrash" in Gerald L. Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992), 104–23.
11For the French contribution to this question, see Mariette Canévet, Grégoire de Nysse et l’herméneutique biblique: 
Étude des rapports entre le langage et la connaissance de Dieu, (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1983); and Matthieu Cassin, 
L’écriture de la controverse chez Grégoire de Nysse: polémique littéraire et exégèse dans le Contre Eunome, (Paris: Institut d’études 
augustiniennes, 2012). 
12For the former claim, see Cassin, L’écriture de la controverse chez Grégoire de Nysse, whose valuable study is 
circumscribed to the Contra Eunomius.  For the latter claim, one may consult the various essays in Matthieu Cassin 
and Hélène Grelier, eds. Grégoire de Nysse: la Bible dans la construction de son discours. Actes du colloque de Paris, 9-10 février 2007 
(Paris: Institut d’études augustiniennes, 2008). These essays vary in their actual contribution to Gregory's 
exegetical practice rather than the idea of his exegesis.
13The best work on Cyril's exegesis in recent years is Matthew R. Crawford, Cyril of Alexandria’s Trinitarian 
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Crawford has argued that "Cyril's numerous and lengthy exegetical works illustrate his 
remarkable commitment to the elucidation of the biblical text within a theological tradition, 
and this devotion makes him a prime candidate for furthering our understanding of pro-
Nicene exegesis."14 Crawford takes up this mantle to consider Cyril's contribution to the 
development of pro-Nicene Trinitarian theology and, more specifically, the importance of this 
theological context for his exegetical approach. Thus, Crawford confesses that "without doubt 
further investigation is needed to elucidate the manner in which Cyril appropriates those 
techniques that were common to late antique paideia."15 These are simply two potential fruitful 
lines of investigation in early Christian creative exegesis, to which one could add numerous 
other possibilities.
Elizabeth Clark was surely right in her estimation that early Christian exegetes were 
both readers and writers who, to use Certeau's imagery (which, as Clark notes, itself is a 
traditional Christian trope), both "despoil the wealth of the Egyptians" by enjoying other texts 
for themselves and "found their own place" in writing about these texts. For Clark, this is seen 
in the "asceticized Christianity" that the earliest Christian readers created in their commentary 
on Scripture. But Clark neglects to add the very next sentence of Certeau's analysis, which runs 
as follows: "Writing accumulates, stocks up, resists time by the establishment of a place and 
multiplies its production through the expansionism of reproduction."16
Perhaps Certeau's point is less that a place is created—like the asceticism in Clark's 
analysis—than it is a call to the awareness of writing itself.17 If so, then Clark's book is still a 
Theology of Scripture, OECS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
14Crawford, Trinitarian Theology of Scripture, 5.
15See Crawford, Trinitarian Theology of Scripture, 183. Crawford points to the studies of J. David Cassel, “Cyril 
of Alexandria and the Science of the Grammarians: A Study in the Setting, Purpose, and Emphasis of Cyril’s 
‘Commentary on Isaiah’,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1992); and Lois M. Farag, St. Cyril of Alexandria, a New 
Testament Exegete: His Commentary on the Gospel of John, (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2007). These studies, however, could
be situated in the same category as Cassin's work on Gregory of Nyssa above, as they focus on one of Cyril's texts, 
to the exclusion of his other works. With the immense corpus of Cyril's exegetical literature still extant, there 
remains the need for a more comprehensive investigation of his reading practices.
16Certeau, “Reading as Poaching,” 174.
17Certeau's citation of Barthes' third type of reading, which "cultivates the desire to write," would seem 
to support this conjecture. See Certeau, “Reading as Poaching,” 176, citing Roland Barthes, “Sur la Lecture,” Le 
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resolute success, for it calls us to give more attention to the "mechanics of textual construction 
and to the productive role of readers" in early Christian commentary.18 Indeed, this is what I 
have sought to do in giving attention to the product of Clement's creative exegesis, and we can 
see this, I think, in the definition of creative exegesis we developed throughout this study:
Creative exegesis is the task of employing the grammatical archive to clarify textual 
obscurity and discovering the textimmanent intention of an author.
Clement's creative exegesis was simultaneously an attempt at respecting the authority of
his source text, the Christian Scriptures, and yet an articulation of his own understanding of the
proper way to read this text. It is, as Certeau suggests, a "production through the expansionism 
of reproduction."19 Yet, Clement's production is much more than the stringent asceticized 
Christianity that Clark sees (though, at times, it is that).20 As we have seen, Clement shows deep
concerns with the narrative of God's pedagogy in the world as it expands from Old Testament 
to New Testament. He reflects on the love of God displayed in the fear by which he brings 
humanity to faith (chapter nine). He contemplates the wisdom of God as the ultimate 
progression of this pedagogy, and the sine qua non for the figural reading of Scripture (chapter 
nine). And speaking of the figural exegesis of Scripture, Clement takes pains to identify the 
content of Scripture's two mysteries—the incarnation of Christ as the fulfillment of history and
the wisdom and knowledge of God's essence, the very "depths of God" to which Scripture 
alludes in 1 Corinthians.
In all these ways, regardless of our estimation of his reading practices, Clement still 
shows himself to be a theologian. For Clement, the exegesis of Scripture is the foundational 
Français aujourd’hui 32 (1976), 15–16.
18Clark, Reading Renunciation, 371, citing Valentine Cunningham, “Renoving that Bible: The Absolute Text of 
(Post) Modernism,” in The Theory of Reading, ed. Frank Gloversmith (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1984), 1-51, and 
Boyarin, Intertextuality.
19For thoughts on this as an inherent dialectic of commentary, see Sluiter, “Dialectics of Genre.”.
20Clement appears only a few times in Reading Renunciation; see the index entry for Clement at Clark, Reading 
Renunciation, 412. The most dense occurrence of Clement's thoughts occur in Clark's evaluation of interpretations of 
marriage (316–28), which is unsurprising given the topic(s) of book three of the Stromateis. 
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practice of Christian theology. Indeed, the case can be made that scriptural exegesis is at the 
heart of the development of all early Christian theology.21 Thus, in order to better understand 
the nature of theological practice in early Christianity, we must better understand the practices 
of scriptural exegesis at its core. This latter point has been the goal of this study. In stepping 
back from explicit theological questions to focus on Clement's textual practices, I hope to have 
shown more clearly that sustained reflection on how Clement "did things with the text" is a 
necessary prolegomena to understanding his theological practice as a whole.22 I agree with 
Elizabeth Clark's thesis that much in modern literary theory can be incredibly useful for the 
study of patristic commentary, including the perspective she rightly promotes that this 
exegetical endeavor is itself the construction of a "new text" out of the old.23 However, I am not
convinced that this must necessarily bring "issues of power" or "the creation of 'difference'" to 
the fore.24 On the contrary, it is my contention that, while he was certainly engaged in 
polemical dispute that resulted in the creation of "difference,"25 Clement nevertheless saw his 
project of creative exegesis as the foundation of his theological practice. Indeed, the Stromateis 
can itself be read as a reflection on the nature of theological inquiry. Thus, Clement may rightly 
be considered "above all an exegete," as we saw at the outset of this study.26 But Clement's 
status as a biblical exegete cannot exclude the philosophical and theological concerns that 
motivated and shaded his creative exegesis. Indeed, these concerns are the items that set distinct
early Christian theologians apart. Clement's creative exegesis was an exercise in practicing 
theology on the basis of Christian Scripture, using it as the fundamental resource for his 
21On this, above all, see Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy.
22On this phrase as a moniker for the textual practices of reading in antiquity, see Anthony Grafton and 
Glenn W. Most, “How To Do Things With Texts: An Introduction,” in Canonical Texts and Scholarly Practices: A Global 
Comparative Approach, eds. Anthony Grafton and Glenn W. Most (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1-13.
23See Clark, Reading Renunciation, 371–73. This has many affinities with the quote on creativity and 
imagination that I provided earlier from Fishbane, “Inner-Biblical Exegesis,” 3.
24Clark, Reading Renunciation, 373.
25On this cultural revision, see Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 183–234.
26Campenhausen, Fathers of the Greek Church, 30.
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theological imagination. What I hope to have shown, then, can be summarized simply: Clement
is above all a commentarial theologian.27
 
27Here, I borrow the term from John Webster, “Rowan Williams on Scripture,” in Scripture’s Doctrine and 
Theology’s Bible: How the New Testament Shapes Christian Dogmatics, eds. Markus N. A. Bockmuehl and Alan J. Torrance (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 106. Cf. Paget, “Christian Exegesis,” 498, who says that "For Clement the Bible
is the central focus of his theological meditation." As far as I can tell, Webster does not develop this concept in any 
fashion elsewhere. In my view, however, the notion of commentarial theologian both prioritizes the role of 
scriptural exegesis in theological practice—granting the sophisticated cultural interactions in which the process of 
reading and writing inevitably participates—and retains a traditional emphasis on the aims that early Christian 
readers had for their interpretation of Scripture. Questions on the nature of commentary, its relationship to 
philosophy/theology, and whether the understanding of "commentary" changed for Christians over time must, 
for now, await a future investigation.
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